Showing posts with label trial system. Show all posts
Showing posts with label trial system. Show all posts

April 8, 2011

"Jurors Gone Wild": Blogging, texting, tweeting in court

On his blog, "Juror No. 7" portrayed the defense lawyer as "whacked out" and having a "Columbo detective-style of acting stupid." He complained about the court's long breaks and likened court staff to "Caltrans freeway workers" who always seem to be "picnicking alongside the freeway." … After complaining about the length of the 19-day trial, he told his readers that he had volunteered to be foreman to "expedite matters." During deliberations, he used his cell phone camera to photograph the murder weapon -- a 15-inch saw-toothed knife -- and posted the image on his blog.

Although an appellate court upheld the defendant's conviction, finding Juror No. 7’s conduct harmless, appellate attorney Linda C. Rush disagreed:
"The problem with his blog was, the responses he got were affirming his cynical attitude toward the judge and the process. He created an audience, and during deliberation he was playing to an audience that other jurors didn't even know was there."

Juror antics like this are no longer unusual, according to an article in the current issue of California Lawyer magazine. Judges and attorneys are finding themselves struggling with "how to protect a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial when jurors are awash in social media, potentially contaminating the integrity of the proceedings," writes Pamela MacLean:
Leslie Ellis, a jury consultant with TrialGraphix in Washington, D.C., says she advises her clients to monitor jurors' Facebook, MySpace, or Twitter accounts and blogs during a trial to make sure none are discussing the case outside court sessions. "That's how a lot of jurors have been caught," she says.

Another possible alternative, raised in a case that may soon be taken up by the California Supreme Court, involves making all private social media communications posted by a juror during trial available to defense counsel.
But how much monitoring is too much? At what point will jurors begin to feel like criminal suspects and balk at serving altogether? And is all this much ado about nothing?

The full California Lawyer article is online HERE.

Related post: Blogging jurors (Nov. 26, 2008)

February 19, 2011

Steffan's Alerts: New column features fresh scholarship

In a new column launching today, forensic psychologist Jarrod Steffan scours the academic journals as they roll off the presses and brings you his top choices for articles of interest to forensic practitioners. Just click on a title to go to the journal site and read the full abstract; click on an author's name to request the full article. Feel free to leave comments on this new feature in the comments section of the blog.

Expert testimony in false confession cases

Mock jurors perceive that coercive interrogation tactics elicit confessions from guilty but not innocent suspects. Authors Iris Blandon-Gitlin, Katheryn Sperry, and Richard Leo go on to report the effects of an actual disputed confession case on jurors’ perceptions of false confessions in the current issue of Psychology, Crime and Law.

Meta-analysis of mental health courts

Are mental health courts working? Preliminary analyses point in the direction of success, according to an article by Christine Sarteschi and colleagues published in the Journal of Criminal Justice.


In the new issue of Criminal Justice and Behavior, Claudia E. Van Der Put and colleagues provide data showing that dynamic risk of adolescents' decreases as they age, thereby affecting the effectiveness of risk assessment and related interventions.


Preliminary data, reported by lead author Randy Otto in Assessment, suggest that a new measure called the Inventory of Legal Knowledge may assist evaluators in appraising defendants’ response style in competency to stand trial evaluations.
  • A previous blog post on the new instrument is HERE.

Compared to killers of nonprostitutes, serial murderers of prostitutes have killed more and for longer periods of time, according to a study by Kenna Quinet published in Homicide Studies.


In Aggression and Violent Behavior, Kathleen Fox, Matt Nobles, and Bonnie Fisher take stock of the literature on stalking assessment and, based on their review of 56 studies, recommend guidelines for future research.

Steffan's alerts are brought to you by Jarrod Steffan, Ph.D., a forensic and clinical psychologist whose practice is based out of Wichita, Kansas. For more information about Dr. Steffan, please visit his website.

February 7, 2011

Special issue, Current Directions in Psychological Science

The February issue offers a cutting-edge roundup of psychology-law topics, with contributions from many luminaries. Click on an author link to request a reprint.
  • Expert Psychological Testimony by Brian L. Cutler and Margaret Bull Kovera (I haven't finished reading this one yet, but I see that it discusses the critical issue of adversarial allegiance, identified by Murrie, Boccaccini and their colleagues in regard to the Psychopathy Checklist)
  • Future Directions in the Restoration of Competency to Stand Trial by Patricia A. Zapf and Ronald Roesch
  • Current Directions in Violence Risk Assessment by Jennifer L. Skeem and John Monahan
  • Jury Decision Making: Implications For and From Psychology by Brian H. Borstein and Edie Greene
  • The Utility of Scientific Jury Selection: Still Murky After 30 Years by Joel D. Lieberman
  • Resolving the Offender "Profiling Equations" and the Emergence of an Investigative Psychology by David V. Canter
  • Forensic Interviewing Aids: Do Props Help Children Answer Questions About Touching? by Debra Ann Poole, Maggie Bruck, Margaret-Ellen Pipe
  • Interviewing Cooperative Witnesses by Ronald P. Fisher, Rebecca Milne, and Ray Bull
  • Current Issues and Advances in Misinformation Research by Steven J. Frenda, Rebecca M. Nichols, and Elizabeth F. Loftus
  • Eyewitness Identification by Neil Brewer and Gary L. Wells
  • Outsmarting the Liars: Toward A Cognitive Lie Detection Approach by Aldert Vrjj, Par Anders Granhag, Samantha Mann, and Sharon Leal

January 28, 2011

Untattoo You

What happens when you cross the Avon Lady with a Neo-Nazi murder defendant?

Guest essay by Sam Sommers*

Several colleagues and students forwarded to me this story from the NY Times describing a criminal defendant in Florida whose attorney successfully petitioned the court to pay for a cosmetologist to help him cover up his swastika tattoos with makeup before trial each morning. The basis for the request was the defense's (quite reasonable) concerns that jurors would have a hard time remaining impartial as they sat in judgment of someone adorned by Neo-Nazi symbols.


The case raises a wide range of interesting questions involving the psychology of law, physical appearance, first impressions, and daily interaction–the very issues often at the heart of this blog. Questions such as:

Should the court have agreed? 

While the unusual nature of the request is what has rendered it newsworthy, similar issues arise in a wide range of cases. Defendants often change clothes before entering court in order to prevent them from having to appear in front of the jury in a prison jumpsuit. Similarly, defendants in custody may be unshackled outside of the presence of the jurors so as to avoid undue bias.

The question becomes, though, should such accommodation apply to tattoos? After all, the defendant in the Florida case presumably chose to decorate himself in Neo-Nazi images. Should the taxpayers foot the bill to cover up decisions that the defendant made of his own free will? Moreover, the prosecution alleges that the attacks in question were motivated by hate: one assault victim was attacked allegedly for associating with a Black man; the homicide victim was gay. Reactions to the case might be different had the defendant gotten the tattoos earlier in life and long since forsworn the ideology associated with them. This wasn't the case here.

Can the issue be reframed? 

Many people I've spoken with have suggested, as alluded to above, that since the defendant chose these tattoos, he should be stuck with the repercussions of that decision. But the issue becomes more complex when you consider that the question for the court was not simply whether the defendant should be allowed to cover his tattoos, but rather whether the court would pay for it. Because a tattooed defendant with the money for his own removal/cover-up would be free to do as he wished.

Most people I've talked to have trouble with the idea that the court would pay for a Neo-Nazi charged with hate crimes to cover up swastika tattoos. But when the same question is reframed, most of the same people agree that a poor defendant charged with capital crimes should be entitled to just as vigorous a defense as a wealthier defendant in the same situation. Pitched this way, the issue becomes more complicated.

Couldn't the judge just remind the jurors to stick to the evidence and ignore the defendant's appearance? 

Sure. And as the division director for the Florida attorney's office argues in the Times article, "We believe the jurors listen to judges' instructions."

But while I have no doubt that jurors often try to follow the rules they're given, examples to the contrary abound. For instance, years ago I published a few research studies indicating that evidence still impacts a jury even after it has been ruled inadmissible. Moreover, judicial instructions to avoid prejudice or partiality have not been sufficient to eliminate other forms of disparity, such as the increased likelihood that a defendant in a capital trial will be sentenced to death when his victim is White as opposed to non-White.

It remains the case that sometimes jurors decide they'd rather not hew to the letter of the judge's instructions. And other times, jurors aren't even aware in the first place of the biases that they're supposed to be avoiding.

If this defendant gets money to change how he looks, what about other defendants similarly disadvantaged by appearance? No good legal debate is complete without the proverbial slippery slope argument, so where do we go from tattoo guy? Should relatively unattractive defendants be allowed to ask for makeovers? Given stereotypes about overweight individuals and self-control, what about an obese defendant in a negligence case? Clearly, the slope isn't so slippery as to allow a defendant from a traditionally disadvantaged minority group to appear in court in whiteface, but where should the line be drawn?

When symphony orchestras wanted to reduce bias in the hiring of musicians, they had candidates audition behind a screen so that gender was not apparent. Accordingly, one of my students in class last week asked, why not do the same to mask the demographics and background of a criminal defendant? Not a proposal that you're likely to see anytime soon in a courtroom near you, but interesting fodder for discussion nonetheless.

So I now turn the question to you, dear readers... Court-sponsored tattoo cover-ups: misguided use of public funds or necessary protection of defendant rights?

Sam Sommers is an award-winning social psychology professor at Tufts University who has served as an expert witness on bias.

*This essay originally appeared on Dr. Sommers' Psychology Today blog, The Science of Small Talk. Reposted with the written permission of Sam Sommers.

Previous guest essay by Sam Sommers: On police, profiling, and Henry Gates (July 28, 2009)

November 28, 2010

The Psychology of jury voir dire

How many times have you debriefed jurors after they rendered their verdict and been surprised by what they told you? Jurors don't deliberate based on facts and argument. They deliberate based on their perception of the facts and arguments. And it is the juror's belief system that accounts for the varying way that jurors perceive facts and arguments.


That is the start of an informative how-to piece in The Jury Expert by psychologist Matthew L. Ferrara, a trial consultant based in Austin, Texas.

The current issue of The Jury Expert has several other interesting articles, including:
Photo: "The Jury," John Morgan, 1861 (Public domain; source: Wikimedia commons)

November 16, 2010

Police psychologist settles confession suit for $1 million

A psychologist who helped police obtain a false confession from 14-year-old Michael Crowe has settled out of court for $1 million. A judge had called the aggressive interrogations of Crowe and two friends "psychologically abusive."

Dr. Lawrence "Deadlift" Blum, a police psychologist, helped police in Escondido, California formulate the "tactical plan" that they used to get Michael to confess to the murder of his 12-year-old sister, according to the Crowe family's lawsuit.

Blum admitted in a pretrial deposition that he told a police detective that 15-year-old Aaron Houser, Michael's friend, was a "Charlie Manson wannabe."

Only through serendipity were the boys' charges dismissed more than a year after their arrests, when DNA evidence proved that a mentally ill transient had committed the murder. That man, Richard Tuite, was ultimately convicted of manslaughter.

Images from the videotape of Michael Crowe's interrogation.

The family's lawsuit against the police is still pending in federal court.

Crowe's confession became the subject of an award-winning Court TV documentary that I show to my graduate students. (Unfortunately, The System: The Interrogation of Michael Crowe is no longer commercially available, as far as I can determine.)

The San Diego Union-Tribune coverage of the settlement is HERE. My prior coverage of the case is HERE. The Tru Crime Library (formerly Court TV) has more background on the case HERE.

October 10, 2010

Rare juror speaks out after sexual predator trial

Civil commitment unfair, says law-and-order Floridian

Juror Number 6 is a conservative, law-and-order Republican. But she was appalled when she realized that in the United States, someone can be indefinitely detained not for what he has done, but for what he might do in the future.

Kathy Martin spoke to a news reporter after she and her five colleagues refused to civilly commit a convicted sex offender. Robert Richard Sanzone, age 34, had finished the prison term imposed in 2004 for having sex with one 15-year-old girl and trying to coax a second girl into sexual intimacies.

Martin said that she was struck by the similarities between the 2002 film Minority Report and Florida's Jimmy Ryce Act, under which sex offenders who are determined to still be a danger to society may be held indefinitely for so-called treatment.

"I didn't realize in America you could be given an indefinite sentence," the registered nurse told reporter Richard Prior of Florida's St. Augustine Record. “I'm not a bleeding-heart liberal, but I would like to think someone can't incarcerate me because they think I might do something."

Martin said she and the other members of the 5-woman, 1-man jury were skeptical of the reliability of the Static-99 actuarial risk assessment tool.

She also expressed concern about civilly committing someone for having consensual sex with a teenager.
"This is supposed to be about violent sexual predators, and I kept waiting for the violence to come up. I kept waiting for one of the witnesses to say he threw (them) against the wall or pushed (them) to the ground or pulled a knife. When I realized that wasn't going to happen ... well, I listened politely to the closing argument, but by that time I'd made up my mind."
Florida's Jimmy Ryce Act was passed in 1998 after Juan Carlos Chavez raped, beat, dismembered, and murdered 9-year-old Jimmy Rye in 1995. Chavez is currently awaiting execution on Florida's death row. The Ryce Act parallels sexually violent predator civil commitment laws in 20 U.S. states.

The articulate juror said she understands why horrific crimes lead to new laws, but she doesn't like that knee-jerk practice.
"When a brutal case occurs, the public wants to do something. It makes us feel better that we passed a law. This law has unintended consequences that can come back and bite someone's behind. I think these laws are just feel-good measures."
Two psychologists, Amy Swan and Mary Anne Etheridge, testified in favor of civil ccommitment for Sanzone. Dr. Etheridge diagnosed Sanzone with "fetishism" -- in this case toward underwear -- as well as the ubiquitous antisocial personality disorder.

Psychologist Deborah Leporowski, the lone defense witness, disputed the prosecution psychologists' estimation of Sanzone's risk, and said many of his early problems could be attributed to teenage impulsivity and immaturity.

Sanzone will remain on special sex offender probation for many years, and will be banned from schools, playgrounds, or other places where children congregate.

Richard Prior's fascinating interview with juror Kathy Martin is HERE.

September 19, 2010

Science often disbelieved, study finds

How many times have you found yourself in court, being challenged on basic information that is virtually undisputed and noncontroversial among scientists? As it turns out, no matter how knowledgeable you are, or how great your credentials, judges or jurors may disbelieve the scientific evidence you are presenting if it does not match their social values.

That's no big surprise, given decades of social psychology research into cognitive dissonance. But a study funded by the National Science Foundation and scheduled for publication in the Journal of Risk Research sheds new light on why "scientific consensus" fails to persuade.

Study participants were much more likely to see a scientist with elite credentials as an "expert" on such culturally contested issues as global warming, gun control, and the risks of nuclear waste disposal if the expert's position matched the participant's own political leanings.

"These are all matters on which the National Academy of Sciences has issued 'expert consensus' reports," said lead author Dan Kahan, a law professor at Yale University. "Using the reports as a benchmark, no cultural group in our study was more likely than any other to be 'getting it right,' i.e., correctly identifying scientific consensus on these issues. They were all just as likely to report that 'most' scientists favor the position rejected by the National Academy of Sciences expert consensus report if the report reached a conclusion contrary to their own cultural predispositions."

The findings suggest that mere education alone will not increase people's willingness to accept scientific consensus as accurate, said co-author Donald Braman, a law professor at George Washington University. "To make sure people form unbiased perceptions of what scientists are discovering, it is necessary to use communication strategies that reduce the likelihood that citizens of diverse values will find scientific findings threatening to their cultural commitments."

Information sources more atomized

Unfortunately, trends in public consumption of news may make this task increasingly difficult. Although people are spending at least as much time as ever on the news, they are less likely to read the daily newspaper and more likely to get their information from television and online sources including, most recently, their telephones, according to an informative new survey by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. This decreases our common knowledge base and makes it easier for ideologically slanted information sources to influence public opinion.

Indeed, the Pew researchers found ideology inextricably linked with people's choices of news sources. For example, here in the United States, Republicans, conservatives, and so-called "Tea Party" enthusiasts were much more likely than the general public to watch Fox News and listen to Rush Limbaugh. In contrast, the researchers found, supporters of gay rights make up large shares of regular readers of the New York Times and listeners at National Public Radio.

In an interesting analysis of the mainstreaming of extremism, alternative journalist Arun Gupta points out the ease with which political pundits for whom facts are irrelevant can indoctrinate the uninformed. A respondent committed to rational scientific inquiry becomes like a dog chasing its tail: In the time it takes to deconstruct one fraudulent news story, the pundits have concocted five more.

Top myths of popular psychology

For a great myth-busting tool, I recommend Scott Lilienfeld's latest, 50 great Myths of Popular Psychology. Lilienfeld and co-authors Steven Jay Lynn, John Ruscio, and the late Barry Beyerstein provide dozens of examples of entrenched popular beliefs that have been debunked by high-quality research, many relevant to forensic practice. A few examples:
  • Human memory works like a tape recorder or video camera, and accurately records the events we have experienced
  • Abstinence is the only effective treatment for problem drinking
  • Criminal profiling helps solve crimes
(You'll remember that last one from my most recent post.)

Given the public's increasingly atomized sources of information, it behooves us to be knowledgeable about both ideological influences and common myths. What an expert witness might naively regard as established science may, after all, be subject to disbelief.

A blogger responds:

"Science, Believing Is Believing," Scott H. Greenfield, Esq. at Simple Justice

The featured research:

August 16, 2010

APA Dispatch II: Whither juvenile forensics?

The U.S. Supreme Court ruling this May in Graham v. Florida, restricting life without parole sentences for juveniles, relied in part upon scientific evidence from developmental psychology and neuroscience. In ruling that juveniles are categorically different from adults, the high court was assisted by amicus briefs from the American Psychological Association and other professional organizations including the American Psychiatric Association and the National Association of Social Workers.

The APA's position, which the Supreme Court also validated in its 2005 ruling in Roper v. Simmons outlawing the death penalty for juveniles, is that juveniles' diminished culpability is based on three basic differences from adults:
  1. Immaturity: Juveniles are more impulsive and less likely to reason judiciously about risk
  2. Vulnerability: They are more likely to be influenced by peer pressure
  3. Changeability: They are still developing, and are more amenable to rehabilitation than adults
At this week's APA convention, the American Psychology-Law Society (Division 41) hosted a cutting-edge track on juvenile justice. The dynamic sessions raised intriguing issues about how the growing acceptance of adolescent immaturity and difference will affect forensic practice in the juvenile justice system.

Bryan Stevenson: "Huge implications" of Graham case

In an eloquent presentation, NYU law professor Bryan A. Stevenson, founder of Alabama's Equal Justice Initiative, expressed optimism that Graham and the twin case of Sullivan v. Florida, in which he was counsel, signal that the tide is turning away from the punitive Superpredator hysteria of the 1980s. He encouraged the APA to continue its public policy advocacy by bringing legal attention to the impacts of trauma, violence, and neglect on youngsters.

Hopefully, the capacity crowd of psychologists will attend to the implications of Stevenson’s other take-home messages: Mass incarceration has radically changed American society, creating a class of "new untouchables." And the victims of this sea change are overwhelmingly poor and minority. Indeed, he asserted, wealth -- not criminal culpability -- largely drives criminal sentencing. In Louisiana, for example, of the juveniles serving life without parole for crimes other than homicide at the time of the Graham decision, 94 percent are African American. Most are incarcerated for rape, with 71 percent of the victims being white.

Tom Grisso: "Forensic examiners beware"

Forensic psychology guru Tom Grisso sounded a more cautionary note about Graham's implications. The high court's adoption of a categorical approach to juveniles is at odds with the discretionary, individualized method at the core of forensic assessment, he pointed out.

Grisso demonstrated his point through a mock cross-examination. On the stand, the mock expert conceded that the research of Laurence Steinberg, Elizabeth Cauffman, and others on adolescent immaturity is now widely accepted in the field, as shown by Supreme Court's rulings in Graham and Roper. Next, Grisso produced a New York Times op-ed co-authored by Steinberg, reiterating Roper's conclusion that psychologists "are unable to distinguish between the young person whose crime reflects transient immaturity and the rare juvenile offender who may deserve the harsh sentence of life without parole." In the script, the expert was left speechless and incapable of defending her individualized opinions about risk.

Grisso said forensic psychologists must be aware of this debate, and think about how to answer such questions in court. The outlook for prediction is not as bleak as the APA's advocacy efforts might suggest, he asserted, as experts do have a reliable basis on which to give probability estimates, especially about more short-term risk.

Good news for juveniles with a sex crime

A panel of juvenile sex offender experts was more upbeat about the implications of the scientific research on adolescent difference. As with general criminality, they said, research has not identified methods to accurately predict which juveniles will reoffend sexually. Indeed, none of the factors that predict sex offender recidivism in adults (multiple victims, male victims, young child victims, personality disorder, sexual deviance, etc.) predict recidivism for juveniles.

But this inability to differentiate is not bad news, because what we can say is that the overwhelming majority -- 93 percent -- of juveniles who have committed a sex crime will not reoffend sexually as adults.

An audience member who works in the civil commitment industry expressed incredulity at the cumulative research, saying many of the men in his civil detention facility began their offending careers in their teens.

That may be true, responded researcher Michael Caldwell. But the directionality cannot be reversed. All NBA stars may have played basketball in the ninth grade. But we cannot predict by watching a group of ninth-graders play basketball which, if any, of the players will become basketball superstars.

(A summary of the presentation, "Juvenile Offenders are Ineligible for Civil Commitment as Sexually Violent Predators," is online HERE; it contains a slough of good references. The PowerPoint presentation is HERE.)

Judges launch crusade to save children of color

The most optimistic presentation I attended was a symposium of family court judges who are at the forefront of a movement to reduce the vastly disproportionate representation of minority children in the child welfare system, from which many graduate to juvenile delinquency and adult criminal courts.

The remarkable Hon. Katherine Lucero of San Jose, California said she became active in this movement when she realized she was serving as part of the vast "cradle-to-prison pipeline," processing children who would end up poor, homeless, drug addicted, illiterate, pregnant at a young age, delinquent, and -- ultimately -- incarcerated. When she looked out at her courtroom filled with children of color, her training that justice is blind was cognitively dissonant, making her feel like she was living "in a delusion."

The equally inspiring Hon. Nan Waller of Portland, Oregon said the movement challenges the basic historical tenet of the child welfare system, which promotes removal from families -- so-called "child rescue" -- rather than family strengthening. Most of the mothers who lose their children are suffering from severe trauma that they medicate with drugs. Rather than "cookie-cutter" quick-fixes, including automatic referrals for psychological evaluations and parenting classes, these women need support and help obtaining even basic resources such as housing, transportation, and health care, the judges said.

Assisted by a research and advocacy project of the National Council on Juvenile and Family Court Judges, these and other judges are using a combination of model courts, wraparound services, community interventions, training in implicit race bias at all levels of the system, and other creative methods to reduce the number of children who are placed in foster care. Already, their data show they are having an impact in their respective communities.

Alarming call for preventive detention of children

In the discussion period following their presentation, the judges said they are turning away from ordering psychological reports except when a parent has a genuine, severe mental disorder. They gave two reasons for this. First, psychological evaluations are costly. Second, and more important, the judges do not find it helpful to "slap" pathologizing psychiatric labels on parents. They expressed curiosity as to whether and how we in the field of psychology are working to address the effects of poverty and racism in the populations we serve.

Sadly, the honest answer is that many forensic practitioners and scholars are not adequately addressing the impact of larger social forces -- poverty, race, trauma -- on the people we evaluate, treat, and/or study. Perhaps the sparse attendance at the judges' presentation as compared with other seminars in the forensic juvenile justice track is an indicator of this neglect.

Indeed, at a more well-attended session came a chilling proposal at the polar opposite extreme: To establish a system to preventively detain dangerous juveniles. Raising this "public safety" proposal was attorney Christopher Slobogin, a co-author of the forensic psychology stalwart Psychological Evaluations for the Courts. It will formally air in a book, Juveniles at Risk: A Plea for Preventive Justice, forthcoming from Oxford University Press. Slobogin has good intentions, I am sure; he believes such a model will treat juveniles more fairly and help stem the erosion of the separate juvenile justice system.

But the proposal has potentially far-reaching unintended consequences. It myopically ignores what the family court judges and attorney Stevenson are so painfully aware of: The differential treatment of poor and minority children. It is hard to accurately predict juvenile risk, and actuarial risk prediction tools are especially inaccurate when applied to juveniles. This is just the type of nebulous decision-making situation in which implicit (unconscious) biases are most salient, research shows. Forensic psychological evaluations would provide a scientific veneer, masking racial and class biases in deciding who is labeled as dangerous and who is not.

Rather than locking up kids for crimes they have not (yet) committed, we should be working to give young victims of trauma and abuse -- and their families -- the practical resources and tools they need to lead productive lives. Let's hope the field of psychology and public policymakers heed the pleas of the judges and attorneys in the trenches who are fighting to save kids before they get sucked into the "cradle-to-prison pipeline" in the first place.

August 9, 2010

Can implicit religious bias affect jury verdicts?

Homaidan Al-Turki, a Saudi Arabian citizen pursuing his doctoral degree in Colorado, was on trial in Colorado for assaulting his housekeeper. As the jury was sworn in, one juror indicated he might believe a Muslim would more likely break the law under certain circumstances. Al-Turki's lawyer asked if he could probe further, but the judge said no. During the trial, the prosecutor showed the jury a mannequin dressed in "Muslim women’s clothing." Allusions were made to Osama bin Laden, Ramadan, and 9/11. The jury convicted and Al-Turki was sentenced to 28 years in prison.

Al-Turki blamed his conviction on anti-Muslim sentiment, and the case sparked international controversy. But the conviction was upheld on appeal, and earlier this year the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the case.

What does psychology have to offer about the potential effect of jurors' religious bias on verdicts, and how implicit cues might activate such bias?

This month's Judicial Notebook, a regular column in the Monitor magazine published by the American Psychological Association, addresses this timely issue. Note authors Marc Pearce and Samantha Schwartz of the University of Nebraska-Lincoln:
Research indicates that information associating Muslims with negative attributes (such as terrorism) can create implicit biases that are difficult to detect with explicit measures… [T]he prosecution’s use of negative associations during a trial might foster an implicit bias against a Muslim defendant.
The full column is online HERE.

Related blog post:

July 29, 2010

Race salience and juries: It’s complicated

Samuel R. Sommers of Tufts University is one of the leading experts on "race salience," or the study of under what conditions defendant race influences white jurors. In the decade since he and colleague Phoebe Ellsworth first published on this topic, their research has garnered widespread interest both among researchers and in the courts. In the current issue of The Jury Expert, he clarifies some misconceptions about the theory, including:
  • Misconception #1: "Race salient" means simply informing mock jurors of the defendant's race.
  • Misconception #2: White juror bias cannot occur when racial issues are salient at trial.
  • Misconception #3: Salient racial issues at trial always lead to White juror leniency.
  • Misconception #4: All race-salience manipulations have equal impact.
Related blog posts:
Other interesting articles in this issue of The Jury Expert:
Of related interest:

Sam Sommer's excellent blog, The Science of Small Talk

July 21, 2010

Race, class, and self defense

Berkeley fraternity case spotlighted

Remember the "Killing and Culpability" reader participation exercise I presented in April, featuring the case of a young man in Berkeley, California, who stabbed a fraternity man during a street brawl? If so, you may recall that Andrew Hoeft-Edenfield was found guilty of second-degree murder and sentenced to 16 years in prison. Now, I am gratified to see that the troubling case is getting national play as part of renewed debate over what constitutes self defense.

"Had Hoeft-Edenfield been tried in Florida, things might have turned out differently," asserts Brooklyn-based freelance writer Lisa Riordan Seville in a column first published at Crime Report and now reposted at Salon.com. That's because Florida eliminated the "duty to retreat" requirement for self defense that played a role in Hoeft-Edenfield's conviction. Unlike California, Florida and 29 other states now have "stand your ground" laws that allow people to "meet force with force" anywhere they have a “legal right to be."

The essay is pegged to the U.S. Supreme Court's 5-4 ruling in McDonald v. City of Chicago, reaffirming gun ownership as a Constitutional right. Although that case did not pertain to self defense, legal analysts say it may ultimately help to "reshape the boundaries of the kind of force individuals can use to defend themselves," Seville notes.

Race, class, and social status in self defense claims

My local news is reporting on a bizarre rally in the overwhelmingly white San Francisco suburb of Walnut Creek. The protesters were there to support Johannes Mehserle, the transit cop who shot African American train passenger Oscar Grant to death in Oakland, California. Yes, that's right. To support the maligned killer. You will recall that Mehserle was convicted of only involuntary manslaughter, based on his claim that he had meant to fire his taser. (He is currently awaiting sentencing.) Counter-protesters lay face down in the street with their hands behind their backs to show Grant's position when he was shot in the back of the head. It reminded me of the quip going around Twitter just after the verdict highlighting race and relative social rank as factors in jury verdicts: "Hey, if Oscar Grant had shot a cop in the back, do you think he could have gotten off by saying, 'Oops, I thought I was texting on my cell phone'?"

One of my goals in the reader participation exercise was to showcase how implicit values and relative social status influence contested claims of self defense. Thus, I was intrigued by Seville's discussion of race and class in self defense claims. This was the focus of Justice Clarence Thomas's concurring opinion in the McDonald case. Thomas pointed out the importance of firearm ownership for black citizens in the South in the post-Reconstruction era, during which African Americans were "tortured and killed for a wide array of alleged crimes, without even the slightest hint of due process."

Massad Ayoob, a police captain and firearms trainer in New Hampshire, also acknowledged the role of race, class, and other circumstances in the outcomes self-defense claims:
He pointed to the case of Ronnie Barlow, a young black man from Arizona who was in 1990 convicted of second-degree murder for what he said was a self-defense shooting. He said he was attacked by 21-year-old Robert Lockwood, a white man with a long criminal history and the son of a local judge, but the jury didn’t buy it. The judge, however, saw it differently and reduced the jury verdict to manslaughter. Two years later, Barlow was released."
What would the "reasonable person" have done?

Subtle social and moral values quickly slip into jury deliberations because of the supposedly objective question of what the "reasonable person" would have done in the defendant's situation. Writes Seville:
The "reasonable man" -- or, now, "reasonable person" -- doctrine is the cornerstone of a self-defense case, explains Cynthia Lee, a law professor at George Washington University. Juries must decide if the sequence of events was reasonable not only in the defendant’s mind but also from an outside perspective.

"The reasonableness requirement is imposed to lend an air of objectivity to the defense," says Lee, the author of Murder and the Reasonable Man, a study of how beliefs and social norms play out in criminal cases, including self-defense trials. "The problem is of course that reasonableness is in the eye of the beholder," she says. "What’s reasonable to one person is not reasonable to another.”
Battered person’s syndrome

Seville goes on to discuss the role of the battered women's defense in broadening conceptions of self defense in the courtroom:
In recent years, the courts and state legislatures have opened up more room for questions about what constitutes an "imminent" threat and whether a reasonable person must try to flee before using force.

Increased legal acceptance of the "battered person’s syndrome" in the early 1990s allowed juries to hear how an abused person -- often, a woman -- might feel she had no choice but to kill to save her life. This challenged the long-standing notion that the threat to one's life had to be imminent. A battered person may, some believe, kill because the abuse is perceived to be life-threatening even if it isn't happening right then.

Like "stand your ground laws," battered-person defenses show that societal views can come into play in the long-standing right to self-defense, but nothing may indicate that better than the juries themselves.

Self-defense cases offer juries a lot of leeway to decide what they believe is reasonable and just, regardless of the law. "What the law on the books requires and what happens in action may be two different things,” Lee says. "Prosecutors, cops, jury members. We’re all people -- and stereotypes about certain groups affect us all."

The McDonald decision means that courts throughout the country will grapple for years with interpretations of the Second Amendment and the right of self-defense. But when the cases make it in to court, justice may depend less on the letter of state law than on the state of mind of the 12 people seated in that jury box.
Related blog posts:
Photo credits: (1) family photo of Andrew Hoeft-Edenfield, credit The Crime Report
(2) Mehserle counter-protesters, credit Brant Ward, San Francisco Chronicle

(3) "The Second Amendment," credit ianturton (Creative Commons license)

June 29, 2010

APA 2010: Exciting forensic programming

I was vacillating about whether to attend the upcoming American Psychological Association convention in San Diego, but browsing through the schedule sold me. The American Psychology-Law Society (Division 41) is sponsoring almost two dozen top-notch sessions featuring timely topics and appearances by many forensic psychology luminaries. Especially timely is the focus on juvenile justice issues. Here's a sampling of the great offerings:

Juvenile justice track
  • "Life Without Parole for Juvenile Offenders: Current Legal, Developmental, and Psychological Issues" features Thomas Grisso, Bryan Stevenson, Barry Feld, and Chrisopher Slobogin, dissecting the recent Sullivan and Graham cases and discussing the role of forensic examiners.
  • Judicial Panel on Reducing Racial and Ethnic Disproportionality, hosted by forensic psychology scholar Richard Wiener, features three juvenile court judges and an attorney from the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges
  • "The Construct of Empathy in the Treatment of Adolescents in the Juvenile Justice System," moderated by Lois Condie of Harvard Medical School, will include a presentation by forensic psychologist and professor Frank DiCataldo, whose outstanding book The Perversion of Youth I reviewed here.
Other Div. 41 hot picks
  • "Forensic Assessment": Scholars Daniel Murrie, Richard Rogers, and others will discuss the reliability of forensic evaluations in sanity evaluations, misassumptions regarding Miranda waivers, evaluating the competence of violence risk assessors, and other timely forensic assessment issues.
  • "Mental Health Courts -- The MacArthur Research" features stalwarts John Monahan, Hank Steadman, and others.
  • "Long-Term Solitary Confinement's Impact on Psychological Well-Being -- The Colorado Study" looks to be an especially powerful panel including presentations by Stuart Grassian, an early scholar of segregation psychosis, AP-LS fellow Joel Dvoskin, and Jamie Fellner, an attorney with Human Rights Watch, talking about "Supermax Confinement and the Mind."
  • "Juror Decision Making": Margaret Bull Kovera and other scholars will present recent empirical findings in jury research.
  • "Social Cognition in Court -- Understanding Laypersons' Interrogation Schemas and Prototypes" features false confession scholars Saul Kassin, Solomon M. Fulero, and others.
Early registration ends Wednesday (after which the price goes up), so register now if you plan to attend. Now that you know which panels I am attending, I hope to see many of y'all down in sunny San Diego in just a couple of months.

June 16, 2010

"Killing and culpability" sentences handed down

You readers who completed the "Killing and Culpability" exercise a while back may be interested in the sentences that were handed down:

"Avenging a Wrong"

Remember Aaron Vargas? He was the man who went to the home of the older man whom he said had molested him as a child, shot the man once in the chest, and then waited half an hour to be sure he died. The Northern California community of Fort Bragg had rallied around Vargas, and he was expecting a lenient sentence after his guilty plea to manslaughter.

The judge said no dice; the fact that the victim was a child molester was largely irrelevant. "To grant probation in this case would put a stamp of approval on the defendant's actions, which I cannot do," he told a courtroom packed with Vargas supporters. "The use of violence to correct a wrong only encourages more violence."

The sentence: 9 years in the state pen.

"Street Brawl"

The other case featured in the exercise was that of Andrew Hoeft-Edenfield, age 20, who stabbed a University of California at Berkeley fraternity man to death during a drunken street brawl. A jury had rejected his plea of self defense, and convicted him of second-degree murder. Although he cried and pleaded for leniency, the judge noted that he fled from the scene after the stabbing, discarded his knife and hid out at a friend's house.

The sentence: 16 years of hard time.

Reactions, readers? Were either of the sentences surprising? Were they just?

The "Killing and Culpability Exercise" is HERE

May 19, 2010

Will antigay expert witness's scandal cause legal fallout?

By now, I expect all of you know about the antigay "expert" caught flouncing around Europe with a cute little "rent boy." Most of the commentary I've seen has focused on George Rekers's audacity and hypocrisy. (My favorite of these is by English professor Christopher Lane, author of the book, Shyness: How Normal Behavior Became a Sickness, an expose on the inner workings of the American Psychiatric Association, writing over at his Side Effects blog.)

But today's New York Times has the story I've really been curious to see, about the potential legal ramifications. Rekers has been a high-profile expert witness for years, jetting around the country to testify about how gay people are mentally imbalanced and their children troubled. Florida paid him $120,000, for example, to testify in support of a state ban on gay adoptions; he also wrote an expert declaration in California's legal battle over same-sex marriage.

As John Schwartz reports:
[T]he scandal may affect more than Dr. Rekers’s reputation. They say it places obligations on those who have relied on Dr. Rekers to inform the court in at least one continuing case to modify or withdraw their arguments.

"Each lawyer must tell the court if he comes to know that one of his witnesses has given 'false' testimony," said Stephen Gillers, an expert in legal ethics at New York University. That could come into play if the expert is discredited, he added….

The practical effect of the Rekers scandal on the legal movement to restrict gay rights is unclear. He is not the only expert espousing such views. Another Arkansas case concerning restrictions on gay adoption is under way, for example, and Dr. Rekers is not part of that case.

The universe of such experts, however, may not be large. In describing Dr. Rekers's selection in the Florida case, [Attorney General Bill McCollum, a Republican gubernatorial candidate] told reporters last week, "There were only two willing to step forward and testify, and we searched a long time."
The full story is HERE.

Photo credit: Brandon K. Thorp, Miami New Times

May 4, 2010

"CSI Effect": Fact or fiction?

Since introduced by Time magazine in 2002, the "CSI Effect" has become a cultural staple, imbued with the imprimatur of fact. The judicial system and media discuss it as a grave problem; the FBI has even produced a video warning of its impact. Just last week, the Economist of London issued an uncritical report asserting the reality of the effect, based on an upcoming article in Forensic Science International.

However, as Mind Hacks pointed out, both the Economist story and the underlying FSI article rely mainly on anecdotal evidence. The scientific verdict is not yet in.

Indeed, when I last discussed the phenomenon here, two years ago, a study by Michigan Judge Donald Shelton was raising doubts. Judge Shelton found scant evidence to support claims by prosecutors that jurors' unrealistic demands for hard scientific evidence were causing unjustified acquittals. As the debate continues, I thought it time for an update.

I find it ironic that a phenomenon being blamed for injecting a biased expectation of science into the courtroom has not in itself been subjected to much scientific scrutiny. After all, anecdotes are not science; they can be used to prove almost anything.

As it turns out, some legal scholars are putting the CSI Effect to empirical scrutiny, and -- guess what -- a measurable effect in the predicted direction is hard to prove. In fact, if Crime Scene Investigation and other enormously popular forensic TV shows are having any effect, it may be in the opposite direction -- toward making juries more conviction-prone.

Mind Hacks provided links two excellent scholarly analyses, both available online and well worth reading. The first, by Simon Cole, a Criminology, Law and Society professor at UC Irvine, and doctoral student Rachel Dioso-Villa, was published last April in the Stanford Law Review. The second, by media law professor Kimberlianne Podlas of the University of North Carolina, was published in October in the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review.

Podlas initially devised a creative plan: She would ask prosecutors to give her details of cases in which they believed an acquittal was due to the CSI Effect; then she would have defense attorneys review the case files for alternate explanations. But, she found, 19 of the 20 cases provided to her by prosecutors had actually resulted in convictions, thereby disproving the effect.

Lacking any "real" CSI cases to analyze, she devised a mock jury case in which she manipulated the strength of the scientific evidence. She found no evidence of a difference in outcome between heavy and light viewers of the TV show Crimes Scene Investigation. As she wrote:
"What is labeled a CSI Effect may more accurately be described as a rationalization embraced by members of law enforcement who find themselves on the losing side of a prosecution. By attributing a loss to CSI's wrongful influence, a prosecutor can obtain an explanation yet maintain a belief that an acquittal was misguided. Although this cognitive rationalization is understandable, it should not be mistaken for empirical proof that the CSI Effect operates anywhere other than in the minds of those proposing it."
In their excellent critical overview, Cole and Dioso-Villa go further, suggesting a propaganda parallel between the CSI Effect and the "litigation explosion" myth promulgated in the 1970s through a well-funded insurance industry campaign against civil plaintiff's attorneys. As in that instance, popular belief persisted even after social scientists thoroughly debunked the claimed explosion in litigation:
"Tort reformers' narratives captured a much greater share of media attention than did those of scholars…. Indeed, in the wake of media claims about the litigation explosion, socio-legal scholars documented that media coverage of civil law overwhelmingly emphasized plaintiff victories and high punitive damage awards. Thus, the supposed existence of a litigation explosion became educated common sense among jurors and even judges."
Remember the McDonald's coffee spill and the microwaved poodle, urban legends still infamous today? These tales, Cole and Dioso-Villa argue, are akin to the "horror story" anecdotes of the CSI Effect, such as the supposed case in which a jury acquitted a rapist despite incriminating DNA evidence, just because soil found in the victim's cervix was not tested:
"Echoing the litigation explosion, CSI effect discourse is widely disseminating through the American public the belief that television drama is disadvantaging criminal prosecutions. And yet, the available evidence does not support this claim. Indeed, the available evidence suggests that the opposite may just as easily be the case: forensic-themed police procedural dramas may actually advantage the prosecution in criminal cases."

As shown in the above table, Cole and Dioso-Villa's analysis of several hundred media reports since 2002 revealed not one, but six claimed effects of forensic television shows on popular culture, depending upon the constituency doing the talking. The most dominant of these, the "strong prosecutor's effect," maintains that watching crime dramas makes jurors more likely to acquit guilty defendants. But, the scholars argue, the available evidence suggests an opposite effect:
"Jurors who are consumers of the popular media might believe that prosecutors are typically disadvantaged in criminal trials; that high expectations for forensic evidence are 'unreasonable'; and that criminal convictions are becoming increasingly rare and difficult to achieve. Jurors who believe these things might be more sympathetic to prosecutors out of sympathy for the perceived underdog or in attempt to correct for the perceived excesses of antecedent juries. Claiming to be disadvantaged is a familiar trope in trial advocacy, especially in opening and closing arguments; prosecutors frequently point out that they bear the burden of proof, whereas defense attorneys often refer to their lack of resources or to the awesome power of the state."
This is a similar conclusion to that of Podlas, who wrote:
"If there is a CSI Effect, narrative theory and common sense suggest that it will benefit law enforcement. CSI features the fantastical world of forensics and smart police work. …This story may cultivate the notion that forensic scientists and their methods are legitimate and reliable, thus bolstering the prosecution’s case…. Indeed, scientific evidence is very seductive to jurors, and they tend to overvalue its probity and overestimate its infallibility."
Although the CSI Effect pertains to criminal court while the Litigation Explosion myth targeted the civil realm, they share a similar distrust of jurors, that is, of the ability of common citizens to be fair and find the truth. This lack of faith, from my experience as a court observer over several decades, is misplaced.

Hat tip: Mind Hacks