Surprise reversal in "killing and culpability" self-defense case

Judge slams defense lawyer as inept, dishonest 

Four years ago, I presented a reader participation exercise, "On Killing and Culpability," featuring the case of a young working-class man who stabbed a drunken Berkeley fraternity man to death during a street brawl. Even though 20-year-old Andrew Hoeft-Edenfield only pulled out a knife after he was surrounded by a large and hostile crowd that was closing in on him, jurors rejected his self-defense claim and found him guilty of second-degree murder. In a case that later garnered national attention as part of the debate over what constitutes self defense, he was sentenced to 16 years in prison. 

Yesterday, a judge pulled no punches in overturning the conviction, which he described as a product of the defense attorney's incompetence and deceit. The ruling came in response to a state Supreme Court mandate that the case be reviewed for possible attorney misconduct.

It turns out that there was a lot more going on behind the scenes of the legal case than the public was privy to at the time.

Attorney Yolanda Huang demonstrated a "breathtaking level of disingenuousness, evasiveness and apparent dishonesty," wrote Alameda County Superior Court Judge Larry Goodman in his scathing opinion; her lack of qualifications coupled with her "unexplainable arrogance" created "a complex web of deception, misrepresentation, disloyalty, and self-interest."

Huang's son and the defendant were close friends, and Huang accepted the case pro bono. Her ultimate goal, Judge Goodman noted, was to sue the UC Berkeley fraternity system, which she believed was arrogantly undermining the safety and security of Berkeley residents.

She'll get no argument from me on that score. As revealed in a powerful Atlantic expose, tragedies such as this are endemic to the Greek system, which typically escapes culpability for the results of the drunken debauchery that many fraternities promote.

The problem was that her "apparent obsession" with the fraternity system created a profound conflict of interest: If Hoeft-Edenfield admitted culpability by accepting a plea bargain, her chances of a successful lawsuit would be greatly diminished.

Thus, as the judge meticulously delineated in his 56-page opinion, she rejected all efforts to strike a deal, despite her client's wishes to do so and despite a reasonable offer from the prosecution of a 12-year sentence in exchange for a guilty plea to manslaughter.

Her missteps were not for lack of good advice.

In remarkable testimony at a four-day evidentiary hearing last month, two defense attorneys and a prominent jury consultant testified that at a strategy session convened by Huang, they correctly forecasted that her client would be convicted if he did not take the witness stand to explain his actions on that fateful night. When Huang responded that Hoeft-Edenfield, a special education student, was too unintelligent and easily led to testify, prominent defense attorney M. Gerald Schwartzbach advised her to settle the case. Also present at that meeting were experienced homicide attorney Rebecca Young of the San Francisco Public Defender's Office and a senior litigation consultant, Lois Haney.

Judge Larry Goodman / Photo: Christina Koci-Hernandez

Instead of following the sage advice of these experienced professionals, Huang -- who had never handled a murder case -- barreled ahead to trial, so confident of Hoeft-Edenfield's vindication that she failed to warn her client of the risks. Instead, "she continued to mislead [him] into thinking that the worst possible consequence of going to trial is that he would get a voluntary manslaughter conviction," even going so far as to send his parents to the jail to talk him into proceeding to trial. 

I've made the opinion available online (HERE). By way of full disclosure, I've known Judge Goodman from way back in my days as a newspaper reporter and have always found him to be a straight shooter.

The Alameda County District Attorney's Office now has 30 days to decide whether to offer Hoeft-Edenfield its original 12-year plea deal; otherwise, the case could proceed to a retrial for second-degree murder. (The jury acquitted the defendant of first-degree murder.) Meanwhile, the State Bar of California will review Judge Goodman's findings to determine whether Huang should face discipline.

* * * * *

Thanks to Henry Lee of the San Francisco Chronicle for breaking the news. My prior reports on the case include:

• Killing and culpability: A reader participation exercise (April 14, 2010) 
• Race, class, and self defense: Berkeley fraternity case spotlighted (July 21, 2010) 
• "Killing and culpability" sentences handed down (June 16, 2010)

(c) Copyright Karen Franklin 2014 - All rights reserved

RadioLab explores criminal culpability and the brain

Debate: Moral justice versus risk forecasting

After Kevin had brain surgery for his epilepsy, he developed an uncontrollable urge to download child pornography. If the surgery engendered Klüver-Bucy Syndrome, compromising his ability to control his impulses, should he be less morally culpable than another offender?

Blame is a fascinating episode of RadioLab that explores the debate over free will versus biology as destiny. Nita Farahany, professor of law and philosophy at Duke, is documenting an explosion in the use of brain science in court. But it's a slippery slope: Today, brain scanning technology only enables us to see the most obvious of physical defects, such as tumors. But one day, argues neuroscientist David Eagleman, we will be able to map the brain with sufficient focus to see that all behavior is a function of one perturbation or another.

Eagleman and guest Amy Phenix (of Static-99 fame) both think that instead of focusing on culpability, the criminal justice system should focus on risk of recidivism, as determined by statistical algorithms.

But hosts Jad and Robert express skepticism about this mechanistic approach to justice. They wonder whether a technocratic, risk-focused society is really one we want to live in.

The idea of turning legal decision-making over to a computer program is superficially alluring, promising to take prejudice and emotionality out of the equation. But the notion of scientific objectivity is illusory. Computer algorithms are nowhere near as value-neutral as their proponents claim. Implicit values are involved in choosing which factors to include in a model, humans introduce scoring bias (as I have reported previously in reference to the Static-99 and the PCL-R), and even supposedly neutral factors such as zip codes that are used in crime-forecasting software are coded markers of race and class. 

But that’s just on a technical level. On a more philosophical level, the notion that scores on various risk markers should determine an individual’s fate is not only unfair, punishing the person for acts not committed, but reflects a deeply pessimistic view of humanity. People are not just bundles of unthinking synapses. They are sentient beings, capable of change.

In addition, by placing the onus for future behavior entirely on the individual, the risk-factor-as-destiny approach conveniently removes society’s responsibility for mitigating the environmental causes of crime, and negates any hope of rehabilitation.

As discussed in an illuminating article on the Circles of Support and Accountability (or COSA) movement in Canada, former criminals face a catch-22 situation in which society refuses to reintegrate them, thereby elevating their risk of remaining alienated and ultimately reoffending. Yet when surrounded by friendship and support, former offenders are far less likely to reoffend, studies show.

The hour-long RadioLab episode  concludes with a segment on forgiveness, featuring the unlikely friendship that developed between an octogenarian and the criminal who sexually assaulted and strangled his daughter.

That provides a fitting ending. Because ultimately, as listener Molly G. from Maplewood, New Jersey, comments on the segment’s web page, justice is a moral and ethical construct. It’s not something that can, or should, be decided by scientists.

* * * * *

The episode is highly recommended. (Click HERE to listen online or download the podcast.)

'Digital lynch mob' assaults expert witness in televised murder trial

Imagine you are testifying in a high-profile murder case being live-streamed over the Internet. Suddenly, an angry mob swarms all over you. More than 10,000 people sign an online petition urging a boycott of your lecture contracts. Your book gets a thousand negative hits on Amazon. You are stalked, and a photo of you dining with the trial attorney is posted on Facebook, implying unethical conduct. You even get death threats.

That is the social media-coordinated avalanche that hit domestic violence expert Alyce LaViolette, testifying for the defense in the capital murder trial of Jodi Arias. The unrelenting cyber assaults so rattled LaViolette that she suffered an anxiety attack that landed her in the emergency room.

But the ER visit may only encourage the cyber-stalkers, who revel online over her discomfiture and obvious emotional deterioration over the course of seven grueling days of court testimony.

This type of Internet mobbing, in which cyber-posses enforce social norms through public shaming, is becoming more and more commonplace. One of the most widely known examples of such Internet vigilanteism was the 2005 case of "Dog Poop Girl," a South Korean woman who gained infamy after she refused to clean up after her dog on a Seoul subway; the harassment eventually escalated to the point that she was forced to quit her university job. 

But what was LaViolette's crime?

The domestic violence counselor had the audacity to opine that Jodi Arias was a victim of domestic violence -- that she was dominated and abused (physically, emotionally and sexually) by the man she eventually killed. Such an opinion bolsters Arias's claim that she killed her ex-boyfriend in self defense.

Murder tragedies as entertainment

Unfortunately for LaViolette, her analysis runs counter to the dominant narrative in a gendered morality play produced by media conglomerate Turner Broadcasting and distributed through its cable channels HLN, CNN and In Session. In this good-versus-evil melodrama, Arias is a psychopathic female who killed a morally righteous man in a fit of jealous rage. Period. End of story. Airbrushed out are all the nuances, the shades of grey inevitably present in any such violent tragedy. 

The burgeoning infotainment industry has perfected a profit-making formula of sensationalized true-crime "reporting" that plays on viewers' emotions, whipping audiences into a frenzy of self-righteous indignation in which they clamor for guilty verdicts -- very often against female transgressors. Nancy Grace's shrill ranting over the Casey Anthony murder acquittal garnered HLN a record of almost three million viewers. More recently, HLN went after another woman, Elizabeth Johnson, suspected in the mysterious disappearance of her baby. 

The Arias case seems Heaven-sent for this voyeuristic style of entertainment, in which vulturous pundits mete out tantalizing morsels of crime "facts" to their addicted audience. Travis Alexander provides titillation from the grave via thousands of graphic emails, instant messages, texts and phone chats in which he degrades his paramour as a "whore," "slut," "corrupted carcass" and "three-hole wonder" whom he can sexually violate at will. For her part, Arias is a demonstrable liar. When her ex-boyfriend was found with a gunshot wound to the head, a slit throat, and more than two dozen stab wounds, she initially claimed innocence. After police demolished her alibi defense, she then claimed that two intruders broke into the home and killed Alexander, before finally admitting to the killing but claiming self defense.

Cast in the starring role of swashbuckling hero in this sordid drama is prosecutor Juan Martinez, a dapper man with a quick mind and an acerbic style, whose meteoric rise from the son of Mexican immigrants to a top government attorney is the stuff of American legend. Women line up outside the Maricopa County, Arizona courthouse, swooning at the sight of him as they jockey for photographs and autographs.

"This is murder trial as entertainment," Josh Mankiewicz, a correspondent for NBC's Dateline program (which ran two segments on the case), told reporter Michael Kiefer of the Arizona Republic. "This is not a trial like O.J. (Simpson's) that sheds new light on society. This is not about race or money. It's a perfect tabloid storm. It is occurring in the absence of any other tabloid storm."

Nancy Grace, "Dr. Drew" and the other pundits capitalizing on such trials foster a false sense of intimacy by calling everyone by first names. They encourage vicarious audience participation on Facebook, Twitter, online polls and other social media. But this is no value-neutral production. This is an archetypal trope that requires a guilty verdict; as one insightful media critic noted, acquittals do not produce the desired catharsis.

Public shaming run amok

In such an emotionally charged climate, anyone affiliated with the defense automatically becomes a villain. However, it is interesting to observe the disparate treatment of LaViolette as compared with a male expert witness, psychologist Richard Samuels. The prosecutor aggressively attacked them both. Playing not only to the jurors but to his sizeable out-of-court fan base, Martinez paced back and forth like a tiger smelling blood, demanding of his cornered prey that they give only "yes or no" answers to his myriad questions. Under his withering cross-examination, both witnesses came across as defensive and evasive. Both were vulnerable due to their confirmatory biases -- a failure to seek out evidence that might disconfirm their case theories. But, objectively, Samuels would seem to invite at least as much criticism as LaViolette, due to his bumbling style, his test scoring errors, and his questionable case formulation (he diagnosed posttraumatic stress disorder using a rating scale on which Arias endorsed a fictitious trauma, of witnessing Alexander's murder at the hands of imaginary intruders).

However, the public's palpable fury against LaViolette far outstrips that targeting Samuels. Consistent with the Turner Network's gendered narrative of criminal villainy, the cyber-posse is fueled by a potent combination of misogyny and homophobia: The expert witness in their crosshairs is "emasculating," "a bull dyke," "a man-hater," "fat," "buck-teethed," "a bitch."

The Internet fosters this culture of hate. Its cloak of anonymity is disinhibitory, emboldening people to spew bile with impunity. In The Cult of the Amateur, Andrew Keen warns that the deluge of anonymous online content is altering public debate, manipulating opinion, blurring the boundaries between experts and the uninformed and weakening the vitality of professional media -- newspapers, magazines, music and movies.

The proliferation of bottom-feeders on Twitter and YouTube is one thing. But it is quite another thing when cyber-bullying seeps into the courtroom, intimidating witnesses and threatening the presumption of innocence.

Can inundated jurors remain unbiased?

Legal experts worry that a virtual deluge of unreliable and biased information -- readily available at the click of the mouse or a TV remote -- is undermining jurors' neutrality. In their off hours, curious jurors in the Arias case can tune in not only to the cable TV and social media debacle, but can watch the defendant's entire videotaped police interrogation -- including excised portions -- as well as a police interview with Arias's parents, in which they speak of her mental problems. Pro- and anti-Arias websites have sprung up. And it's not just outsiders who are furiously Tweeting, texting and blogging about the case.  Witnesses are watching the trial from home and texting the prosecutor with suggestions for cross-examination. Jodi Arias herself is tweeting from the jail, through a friend. ("HLN is an acronym for Haters Love Negativity," she tweeted.)

It would be naive to suppose that the Arias jury is immune to the inflammatory rhetoric swirling around the Internet. Some of the more sarcastic questions that jurors submitted for the expert witnesses sounded scripted by Nancy Grace. For example, one juror asked psychologist Samuels whether a bad haircut could induce posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), Samuels's diagnosis for Arias.

Yet trial judge Sherry Stevens -- who allowed cameras into the courtroom in the first place -- is now relying on the honor system rather than regaining control by sequestering the jury.  Complained defense attorney Kirk Nurmi: "The court asks the question of the jurors every morning, 'Have you seen anything on the media?' No one raises their hand... It is a fairy tale to assume that this jury is not hearing any of this. It is all over the news."

Kiefer, the Arizona Republic reporter who broke the story of witness LaViolette's cyber-bullying, gave examples of juror social-networking misconduct in other cases: A Michigan juror who posted a Facebook preview of her verdict ("Gonna be fun to tell the defendant they're GUILTY"); a juror in Britain who polled her social-media "friends" as to whether she should find a defendant guilty.

With more and more successful appeals of verdicts due to such Internet or social-media interference, according to a Reuters Legal survey, an appeal of any guilty verdict in the four-month Arias trial is a virtual certainty.

But any appeal will not mend the reputations of the expert witnesses called by the defense. As a retired Maricopa County Superior Court judge told Michael Kiefer, the Arizona Republic reporter, "it's the electronic version of a lynch mob."

Sree Sreenivasan, a journalism professor at Columbia University, told Kiefer he had never seen anything like the attack on LaViolette, but that it likely will become "standard operating procedure in prominent cases" -- witness intimidation taken to its logical extreme in a public culture of shaming and vilification.

If so, experts may think long and hard before about accepting referrals in high-profile cases. That, in turn, could have a chilling effect on defendants' rights to a fair trial.

Michael Kiefer's insightful Arizona Republic reports on the social media debacle are HERE, HERE and HERE. A full collection of the live-streamed trial videos is located HERE.

SVP verdict overturned for prosecutorial misconduct -- again

Prosecutor impugned defense witness in hebephilia case

In a highly unusual development, a California appeals court has overturned the civil commitment of a convicted sex offender for the second time in a row due to egregious prosecutorial misconduct.

The prosecutor in the most recent trial engaged in a "pervasive pattern" of misconduct and "flagrantly" violated the law by implying that jurors would become social pariahs if they did not vote to civilly commit sex offender Dariel Shazier, the appellate court wrote.

Prosecutor Jay Boyarsky, now the second in command of the district attorney's office in Santa Clara County (San Jose), also improperly impugned the reputation of the forensic psychologist who testified for the defense, according to the scathing opinion by the Sixth District Court of Appeal.

Prosecutor Jay Boyarsky

"This is not a case in which the prosecutor engaged in a few minor incidents of improper conduct. Rather, the prosecutor engaged in a pervasive pattern of inappropriate questions, comments and argument, throughout the entire trial, each one building on the next, to such a degree as to undermine the fairness of the proceedings. The misconduct culminated in the prosecutor flagrantly violating the law in closing argument, telling the jury to consider the reaction of their friends and family to their verdict, implying they would be subject to ridicule and condemnation if they found in favor of defendant."

This was the second civil commitment verdict against Dariel Shazier to be overturned on appeal due to prosecutorial misconduct. The license of the previous prosecutor, Benjamin Field, was suspended in 2010 based on his severe misconduct in several cases, including Shazier's 2006 trial. In the first of Shazier's three trials, a jury deadlocked as to whether the convicted sex offender qualified for civil detention as a sexually violent predator.

The case revolves around the controversial diagnosis of hebephilia. Shazier served nine years in prison for sexual misconduct with teenage boys. At the end of his sentence, in 2003, the district attorney began efforts to commit him indefinitely to a locked hospital based on his risk of reoffense. At Shazier's most recent trial, two state evaluators testified that he suffered from hebephilia, thereby making him eligible for civil commitment. However, they admitted that hebephilia was highly controversial and had only come into vogue with the advent of civil commitment laws.

Incendiary questioning of defense expert witness

The appellate court chastised the prosecutor for stepping far over the line in his questioning of a psychologist who was called by the defense to rebut the diagnosis of hebephilia. Psychologist Ted Donaldson testified that hebephilia is not a legitimate mental disorder, and that socially unacceptable or immoral conduct does not constitute a mental illness.

On cross-examination, Boyarsky questioned Donaldson about previous cases in which he had testified that sex offenders were not mentally disordered. Naturally, Donaldson had not brought the files from all of his old cases to court with him. This, the appellate court wrote, gave the prosecutor an excuse to recite inflammatory facts from select cases, which the defense correctly complained "were only brought up to incite the passions and prejudice of the jury."

The appellate court also chastised Boyarsky for impugning Donaldson's character. In his closing argument, the prosecutor described Donaldson as "completely biased and not helpful," called his opinion "laughable," and implied that he was biased because he had repeatedly testified for the defense:

"He has got a streak that would make Cal Ripken jealous. Cal Ripken the baseball player and the Iron Man that played in something like 4,000 straight games. Dr. Donaldson’s streak of 289 straight times testifying exclusively for the defense. Now he would like to tell you that is not his fault, because he offered to teach the State of California all his wisdom. His brilliance has yet to be fully appreciated by this society. It is appreciated by defense attorneys who pay him...."

Boyarsky also improperly attacked a psychiatric technician at Atascadero State Hospital (where Shazier was undergoing sex offender treatment while awaiting the outcome of his case) who testified for the defense. The appellate court critiqued "rhetorical attempts to degrade and disparage" that witness during cross-examination. The justices highlighted Boyarsky's question: "Mr. Ross, you don't know what you’re talking about, do you?"

"Here, the prosecutor’s questioning … was clearly argumentative, and was not intended to glean relevant information. 'An argumentative question is a speech to the jury masquerading as a question. The questioner is not seeking to elicit relevant testimony. Often it is apparent that the questioner does not even expect an answer. The question may, indeed, be unanswerable. . . . An argumentative question that essentially talks past the witness, and makes an argument to the jury, is improper because it does not seek to elicit relevant, competent testimony, or often any testimony at all.'(People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 384.)"

The appellate opinion strongly rebuked trial judge Alfonso Fernandez for overruling repeated objections by defense attorney Patrick Hoopes. "Defense counsel objected to all of the prosecutor's improper questions, statements and arguments. We observe that not one of counsel's well-taken objections was sustained by the court. The court erred in overruling these objections."

Who’s grooming who?

In a humorous twist, Boyarsky was also reprimanded for misusing the loaded term "grooming" during his closing argument.

During the trial, a government expert had testified that Shazier "groomed" his victims by slowly manipulating them into situations in which he could violate sexual boundaries with them.

The prosecutor tagged off this in his closing argument, warning the jury that Shazier had "groomed" them during his testimony. "The grooming behavior, the manipulation, it still continues," Boyarski stated.

The appellate court agreed with the defense that this statement was "intended to inflame the jury, making them each feel like victims in the case." The justices went even further, noting that Shazier was not necessarily the one doing the grooming:

"During trial, Dr. Murphy defined grooming as a 'slow, steady manipulation to get a person in a compromising position or violate boundaries without awareness.' The irony here is that the prosecutor's conduct toward the jury throughout the trial closely fit Dr. Murphy's definition of grooming."

The unanimous appellate ruling is HERE. San Jose Mercury News coverage is HERE; the San Francisco Chronicle's, HERE.

Jail confidentiality, Part II: Open season on insanity consultants

Do insanity consultations fall under the attorney-client privilege? 
Not in DeKalb County, Georgia

POSTSCRIPT: In 2015, the Georgia Supreme Court overturned Henry Neuman's murder conviction based on the trial court's harmful error of violating attorney-client privilege by forcing the defense consultants to turn over their records to prosecutors. My blog post on this ruling is HERE.  

In civil court, expert consultants may be kept secret under attorney-client confidentiality rules. Even with testifying experts, an amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence allows civil attorneys to avoid handing over the experts' reports until they are in their final form.

Is the situation similar in criminal court? Criminal attorneys often assert that the work product of an expert who is retained only as a consultant -- not as an expert witness -- can be kept confidential under the attorney-client privilege doctrine. But consider this scenario:

An attorney wants to know whether insanity might be a viable defense in a murder case. He decides to retain a psychologist as a consultant. The psychologist agrees to meet with the defendant and give the attorney an initial assessment.

Being an ethical practitioner, the psychologist obtains informed consent from the defendant. He explains that since he is just a consultant and won’t be testifying as an expert in the case, the information that he collects will only be shared with the attorney.

But he is wrong. The next thing he knows, he has been slapped with a subpoena ordering him to bring his notes and test data to court and be prepared to be questioned by the district attorney about his findings. If he refused to cooperate, the prosecutor threatens to search his office and seize the records; a search warrant is already in hand.

Peter Thomas. Photo credit: Chris 
North, Reporter Newspapers

This was the rude introduction to forensic psychology that greeted Peter Thomas of Georgia, a novice to criminal work and court proceedings. He was yanked into the middle of the headline-grabbing case of Hemy Neuman, a high-level General Electric manager who had ambushed and shot to death a subordinate's husband, entrepreneur Russell "Rusty" Sneiderman, outside a preschool in a wealthy suburb of Atlanta, Georgia.

The prosecutor in the Neuman case learned of Thomas's involvement through an old trick -- underhanded but effective -- of monitoring the jail's visitor logs.  

Neuman's attorneys vigorously objected to the subpoena and the legality of the pretrial discovery hearing. Allowing prosecutors to interview Thomas would have a "chilling effect" on defense attorneys' ability to use experts, lest they do their clients "more harm than good," attorney Robert Rubin argued to the court. 

"Mr. Neuman was told, at the beginning of his meeting with Peter Thomas, that his disclosures during the course of that interview would be disclosed only to his legal team," Rubin and co-counsel Douglas Peters wrote in a legal motion objecting to the disclosure. "Mr. Neuman was NOT given the standard warnings usually given during a court ordered evaluation that by cooperating in the evaluation he was waiving his Fifth Amendment privilege. Mr. Neuman did not knowingly waive any privilege, including Fifth Amendment or attorney-client."

But DeKalb Superior Court Judge Gregory Adams was unmoved. He ordered Thomas and, later, a second psychologist, to hand over their evaluation notes forthwith. He said he would first view the materials to protect any information that might fall under the protection of the attorney-client privilege.

Case law murky

The U.S. Supreme Court has never clarified whether the prosecution can discover and use evidence generated by non-witness defense psychiatric experts when criminal defendants raise the insanity defense, leaving lower courts divided on the issue, according to an overview in the Fordham Law Review.

The Third Circuit is an example of an appellate court that has ruled that attorney-client privilege applies in this situation. In its 1975 ruling in U.S. v. Alvarez, it held that "effective assistance of counsel with respect to the preparation of an insanity defense demands recognition that a defendant be as free to communicate with a psychiatric expert as with the attorney he is assisting." In that case, a psychiatric consultant rendered an unfavorable opinion regarding the viability of an insanity defense for a defendant facing trial for kidnapping. The defense went ahead with an insanity defense anyway, without calling the expert to testify. Knowing of the initial expert's opinion, the government subpoenaed him and, over defense objection, the trial court compelled him to testify. The Third Circuit overturned the conviction.

Other courts, however, "have held that merely by asserting the insanity defense, criminal defendants waive all claims of privilege with respect to any prior psychiatric evaluations," reports Elizabeth Maringer in the law review. A prime example was the 1976 case of Edney v. Smith, involving a man facing trial for kidnapping and murdering his ex-girlfriend's 8-year-old daughter. Edney pleaded insanity and called a psychiatrist who testified in support of this plea. The court then allowed the prosecution to call, in rebuttal, the original psychiatrist who had examined Edney for trial preparation purposes and who did not believe that Edney was mentally ill. The New York Court of Appeals upheld Edney’s conviction, ruling that pursuing an insanity defense automatically waives the attorney-client privilege.

The threat of prosecutorial discovery puts defense attorneys in a Catch-22 situation as they weigh options in cases in which mental illness is a potential issue. On the one hand, as Maringer notes, counsel “risk creating witnesses for the prosecution” when they investigate a mental health defense, especially if they use court-appointed experts. On the other hand, they risk violating their client's rights if they do not thoroughly investigate this line of defense.

"The obvious chilling effect upon defense attorneys' willingness to investigate and pursue the insanity defense for their clients conflicts with the policies underlying the Sixth Amendment," Maringer states. "In addition, risk of disclosure diminishes defendants' willingness to cooperate with counsel and psychiatric experts."

'Celebrity angels and demons made me do it'

Hemy Neuman

Neuman's insanity defense was ridiculed in the press. The love-struck defendant claimed that he had heard the voice of a demon who sounded like Barry White and seen an angel who looked like Olivia Newton-John, who ordered him to kill the husband of his love interest.

The defense called at least three mental health experts. Psychologist Adriana Flores testified that in her expert opinion Neuman was suffering from erotomanic delusions and was insane at the time of the killing. Neuman told her he had been visited by a "she-demon" who told him the Sneidermans' children were his.

"He believed he was the father of the children, they were his children and were in danger," Flores testified. "It was his duty to rescue them, to protect them by killing Rusty [Sneiderman], then he could be with his children. 

Another defense expert, psychiatrist Julie Rand Dorney, testified that Neuman showed signs of "paranoia, depression, social isolation, confusion and magical thinking, which could mean psychosis."

The prosecution, meanwhile, painted Neuman as a calculating killer who planned Sneiderman's shooting for months, going to gun shows, taking a gun safety course, going to target practice, renting a car for the shooting and wearing a disguise, according to ABC News coverage.

Psychiatrist Pamela Crawford, called by the government, said she believed Neuman was faking his symptoms. "His discussion of [the demons] was inconsistent," she testified. "At one point he says, 'I know they are not real,' then later says, 'I just want the demons to go away.' He's not even consistent in the same interview."

"The defendant is serving up an insanity sandwich and he's been serving it up since 2010 and he wants you to eat it," District Attorney Robert James told the jury.

Not too surprisingly, the jury rejected Neuman's insanity bid. Neuman was found guilty but mentally ill and sentenced to life in prison without parole.

Appeal may clarify law - at least in Georgia

The judge's decision to turn over Thomas's assessment data to the prosecution will likely figure prominently in Neuman's appeal.

Neuman’s attorney, Robert Rubin, said the prosecution's pretrial subpoena ploy forced the defense to change strategies, and to call Thomas as a witness in order to prevent him from becoming a prosecution witness. Thomas, who had never before testified in court, conceded under cross-examination that he did not test for malingering, and that Neuman may have been faking insanity.

The case should serve as a cautionary one for pretrial consultants. Unless and until this murky area of the law gets cleared up, it is prudent when conducting an insanity evaluation -- even if you are just a consultant and not expected to testify -- to let the defendant know that the information you are collecting may ultimately be discoverable.

After all, you never know who is looking over your shoulder when you sign your name on the jail log. It could be a prosecutor with a subpoena in one hand and a search warrant in the other.

The law review article, available online, is: "Witness for the prosecution: Prosecutorial discovery of information generated by non- testifying defense psychiatric experts" by Elizabeth F. Maringer, Fordham Law Review 62 (3), 1993.

Confidentiality and jail forensic evaluations (Part I of II)

Prosecutor secretly records forensic psychology evaluation 

Alameda County Courthouse, Oakland

The other day, I was evaluating an inmate at the county jail, when we both heard a series of faint clicking sounds. He immediately jumped to the conclusion that "they" were eavesdropping on us.

Nonsense, I thought.They were probably just opening the door of an adjacent visiting room.

But in the nearby county of Alameda (Oakland, California), the legal community is abuzz over an incident in which jail deputies actually did eavesdrop on at least one confidential interview between a forensic psychologist and a criminal defendant.

What's most astonishing is that the prosecutor who requested the surveillance, an experienced trial attorney, did not seem to realize she was doing anything wrong. Several days after ordering the tape-recording, Deputy District Attorney Danielle London presented it to the defendant's attorney, apparently planning to use it as leverage in the case.

The expert who was illegally recorded was conducting an evaluation aimed at determining whether "intimate partner syndrome" (synonymous with battered women’s syndrome) was relevant to explaining why defendant Marissa Manning stabbed her husband to death during a fight.

Santa Rita Jail deputies routinely eavesdrop on conversations between inmates and their friends and families, and audiotapes of such conversations can be used as evidence against defendants. But attorney-client conversations are supposed to be off limits. The district attorney's nonchalance about such a basic violation of attorney-client privilege has observers wondering whether this is a one-off situation or part of a larger pattern.

"This incident has placed the Public Defender's Office on red alert," Diane Bellas, the county's chief public defender, told a newspaper reporter. "It is a felony to record the conversation between an inmate and her attorney or others who are presumed to maintain confidentiality on the inmate's behalf.”

"A prosecutor's intrusion into a defense preparation in this way severely undermines the right to counsel and the ability of a defendant to investigate a case" agreed Charles Weisselberg, a professor of law at the nearby Boalt Law School of the University of California in Berkeley. "It's pretty egregious and striking."

London has been suspended pending an internal investigation.

Coming up in Part II: Confidentiality and jail sign-in logs

Forensic psychologist blackballed over competency opinions

Imagine that every time you evaluated a criminal defendant, a partisan advocate was standing by your shoulder, ready to accuse you of bias if you thought the defendant was incompetent to stand trial. To make matters worse, imagine you were assigned those defendants most likely to be impaired, due to developmental disabilities that interfere with their ability to understand their cases or work with their attorneys.

That's the pressure being applied to Ray Hendrickson, a respected forensic psychologist in the state of Washington. Accusing him of bias, local prosecutors have succeeded in getting him barred from examining criminal defendants in one Washington county.

"We have made it very clear that we don't approve of Dr. Hendrickson,"' a representative of the Pierce County (Tacoma) prosecutor's office told the local newspaper.

Prosecutors accuse Hendrickson of endangering public safety by finding too many defendants incompetent to stand trial. Hendrickson is a lead psychologist and training director at the Center for Forensic Services at Western State Hospital, one of two state hospitals where criminal defendants undergo competency and sanity evaluations and treatment under Washington’s centralized system.

The beleaguered psychologist is one of the only in-house experts qualified to evaluate defendants who have developmental disabilities as well as mental illness. As a hospital spokesperson pointed out, such defendants often are found incompetent to stand trial because they are too impaired to understand their cases or assist their attorneys in their defense.

The hospital said it acceded to prosecutors' demands under duress, because state law entitles the prosecuting attorney to approve one of the two experts appointed to conduct a competency or sanity evaluation.

To challenge Hendrickson, prosecutors pored over felony cases in which defendants were found incompetent to stand trial. Hendrickson was involved in almost half of 30 such cases over a 3-year period, they claim. One case highlighted in the news involved a developmentally disabled man accused of stabbing his girlfriend. After being found unrestorable to competency, the man was ultimately released from the hospital.

(The local news article incorrectly states that defendants found incompetent to stand trial on violent felony charges typically have their cases dismissed. In actuality, most stand trial after undergoing competency restoration treatment; only a small percentage are found unrestorable after one year of treatment, making them eligible for civil commitment if they remain dangerous.)

Defense attorneys are livid, calling the attack on Hendrickson a naked power play intended to strip criminal defendants of their right to an impartial evaluation. This is at least the second time in recent memory that Pierce County authorities have successfully objected to a respected and skilled evaluator with whom they did not see eye to eye.

Such partisan interference will only increase the pressure faced by many evaluators in state hospital settings, where beds are increasingly scarce, to find defendants competent in order to help the criminal justice process speed things along.

Having done my forensic postdoctoral fellowship in the forensic unit at Western State Hospital in the 1990s, I find this news especially sad. Back when I was there, the unit was a top-notch training site, where evaluators were given the resources, training and support to perform neutral, high-quality forensic evaluations.

Although even back then the state evaluators had a reputation of prosecutorial bias, in reality we had the independence to let the chips fall where they may. As prosecutors were fond of eliciting from us under direct examination, we didn't have to worry about earning referrals, and we got paid the same no matter which side won or lost a case.

But if prosecutors blackball experts with whom they disagree, it will be hard for them to honestly claim that their hand-picked psychologists are truly independent.

Even more ominous is a bill being considered by the state’s legislature that would require only one expert -- approved by the state -- in competency cases. The defense could request a second expert under the proposed law, but such a request would not be automatically granted.

Such a move might seem to make fiscal sense. But, given the poor rates of agreement among competency evaluators, it may be penny-wise but pound-foolish. According to a new study out of Hawaii, for example, competency evaluators disagree in about two or three cases out of every ten. That's in part because competency is nuanced. Evaluators tend to concur in obvious cases involving florid psychosis, but may arrive at different opinions in gray cases in the middle of the competency continuum.

Since judges tend to rubber-stamp experts' opinions, having only one evaluator will substantially increase rates of error. Some cases will be unnecessarily delayed while defendants undergo needless (and costly) treatment; at the other end of the spectrum, some defendants will  be unfairly convicted, undergoing trials without understanding the proceedings or being able to assist their attorneys.

Winnowing the process down to one potentially idiosyncratic opinion, or forcing out well qualified evaluators based upon their rates of incompetency findings, will make the process more unreliable and, in the end, hinder justice.

Related blog post:

How competent are the competency evaluators? Largest real-world study finds modest agreement among independent alienists (Jan. 21, 2011)

Hat tip: Ken Pope

What does it take to prove innocence?

Thomas Haynesworth hugs his mother.
Photo: P. Kevin Morley, Richmond Times-Dispatch

One Sunday morning in February 1984, Thomas Haynesworth’s mother sent him to the Trio supermarket to pick up some bread and sweet potatoes. He never got there. Instead, he was stopped and questioned in connection with a recent rape. That began a 27-year odyssey through false accusation, arrest, prison and pain.

So begins yet another Kafkaesque story set in the United States, whose criminal justice system seems to have gone totally berserk. When I was traveling abroad this summer, overseas colleagues expressed amazement about practices they've heard about in our country -- juveniles sent to prison for life, young men placed on lifelong sex offender registries for consensual relationships with teen girlfriends, criminal prosecution of young children. Last week's execution of Troy Davis despite mounting doubts about his guilt is the latest case that has international observers scratching their heads.

But the Haynesworth case is unusual in that prosecutors and even a state attorney general are going to bat for the wrongfully convicted man, yet that still isn't enough to get him an exoneration. 

To recap the facts:

When he was 18, Haynesworth was arrested for five rapes in his neighborhood. He had no criminal record, but that didn't matter. He was prosecuted for four rapes, convicted of three, and sentenced to 84 years in prison.

Two years ago, a broad review of old cases in Virginia turned up a DNA match to a serial rapist who was already in prison for a string of rapes that occurred in that same neighborhood after Haynesworth's arrest.

Haynesworth was released this March, on his 46th birthday, and everyone thought his exoneration would follow swiftly.

But, no. 

Instead of apologizing to Haynesworth for robbing him of most of his adult life, what is the court doing? It's asking for more proof of innocence.

Only, there's a slight catch: The state has disposed of the DNA evidence from the other rapes, evidence that could conclusively clear his name.

"It seems paradoxical to demand 'conclusive' evidence from Haynesworth when the commonwealth has deprived him of the opportunity to produce such evidence," said the attorney general of Virginia, a staunch conservative who has even given Haynesworth a job in his office.

Meanwhile, as his bid for exoneration languishes on, Haynesworth must remain on the sex offender registry, with all of the stigma and restrictions that carries. He cannot move without permission, and he must even get approval to visit his nieces.

The trial penalty

This is yet the latest in a string of similar cases focusing public attention on the reliability problems plaguing eyewitness identification and, more broadly, on racial inequities in the administration of justice here in the Land of the Free.

But things are likely to get worse before they get better. That's because across the United States, legal changes have concentrated more and more power in the hands of prosecutors, who can now coerce defendants into pleading guilty by threatening much harsher penalties for those who insist on a trial.

As Richard Oppel reports in an in-depth analysis in the New York Times, prosecutors now wield more discretionary power than judges, and are using that power to punish defendants for exercising their right to a trial:

Threats of harsher charges against defendants who reject plea deals often are the most influential factor in the outcome of a case, but this interplay is never reflected in official data.

Even defendants with winnable cases are opting to plead guilty because the stakes are so high if they lose. The ratio of guilty pleas to trials has nearly doubled in the past two decades, according to Bureau of Justice Statistics reported by Oppel. And the number of acquittals in federal cases has dropped even more dramatically, from one out of every 22 cases 30 years ago to only one out of 212 last year.

So if a young Haynesworth came along today and had the audacity to insist that he was innocent and wanted a trial, he would likely be punished with multiple life prison terms, rather than a mere 84 years.

We may never know how many Haynesworths are being sentenced every year based on faulty eyewitness identification and/or racially biased prosecution. 

New York Times reporter John Schwartz's only-in-America report on the Haynesworth case is HERE.

Richard Oppel's excellent report, Sentencing Shift Gives New Leverage to Prosecutors, is HERE.

Hat tip: J and B

Judge denies defense expert in capital case

Death penalty cases are expensive.

I spoke with a condemned man on San Quentin Prison's death row who had done the math: The money spent on his trial and appeals could have paid for a year of public education for all of the children in his home town.

The high cost is causing many prosecutors around the United States to think twice before seeking the ultimate penalty. In the Midwestern state of Indiana, for example, capital prosecutions are down in the wake of a state study showing the cost is 10 times more than if the government seeks a sentence of life without parole.

But one crusading prosecutor in Indiana has a more novel solution: Prevent the accused from mounting a defense.

"I feel very strongly about defense death penalty costs," said prosecutor Stan Levco of Vanderburgh County in objecting to a defense request to hire a psychologist.

Astoundingly, the trial judge agreed, and declined the defense request for a psychologist to assist in the defense of Jeffrey Weisheit. The defendant faces trial for murder and arson in the death of his girlfriend's two young daughters. Judge Daniel Moore approved the limited use of a psychologist, just through November, in order to help decide whether Weisheit should plead insane, according to the Evansville (Indiana) Courier and Press.

This puts the defense attorneys in a bind. The standard of practice in capital cases is to hire a team of experts to explore the defendant's life for evidence of mitigating circumstances that can then be presented to the jury. In fact, not to do so may violate a defendant's Constitutional right to effective representation, according to the 2003 case of Wiggins v. Smith.

Expert assistance is even more critical in cases like this one, in which the defendant's mental state may be at issue.

But the financial burden of the trial has been on the public's mind in these cash-strapped times. When a defendant is indigent, as most are, the state public defender pays half of the trial costs, and the other half comes directly from county coffers. According to the state analysis, the average death case in Indiana costs about $450,000; defense attorneys in this case estimate costs may run almost twice that average.

In June, the local paper even ran an opinion poll:

As a taxpayer, are you OK with seeking the death penalty for Jeffrey Weisheit if the estimated cost of approximately $800,000 is used in his defense?

Of the 461 people who voted, 78 percent said "YES." Two-thirds of these thought "there should be a cap on what public defenders can spend on defense.”

Public opinion is hard to ignore.

The prosecutor, meanwhile, says he is so concerned about defense expenses in death penalty cases that he has formed a special prosecutorial committee to study the issue. With such deep concern, it is interesting that he decided to seek the death penalty in the first place. After all, most such efforts are a waste of money. They add years to the process and do not ultimately result in an execution. Between 1990 and 2000, according to the Indiana study, only about one out of six capital prosecutions resulted in a death sentence, and only four of those has led to an actual execution. Indiana currently has 15 prisoners on death row, and six other capital cases pending.

Levco may care about the cost, but I'll bet he cares even more about winning. And he has found an innovative way to improve his odds.

It will be like shooting ducks in a barrel.

Charging youth as adults costly and unjust, study finds

Waiving youth into adult courts for prosecution is unscientific, racially biased, and may increase crime, according to a Maryland study released today by the Just Kids Partnership to End the Automatic Prosecution of Youth as Adults.

The researchers tracked 135 youths who were charged as adults in Baltimore. They found that more than two-thirds were ultimately sent back to the juvenile system or had their cases dismissed outright, but not before spending an average of five months in adult jail. Only 10 percent ended up in adult prison. African American youth were disproportionately likely to be transferred to adult court.

The study comes as Maryland weighs whether or not to spend more than $100 million on a new facility for youth awaiting trial in adult court.

Based on their findings, the researchers recommend reducing the prosecution of youths in adult courts, and instead providing teenagers with more treatment opportunities.

"Youth who go into the adult correction system are significantly more likely to commit further and more violent crime than their peers who are treated as juveniles," they state.

The Just Kids Partnership is a consortium consisting of the Public Justice Center, Community Law in Action and United Parents of Incarcerated Children and Youth.

The full report is available HERE. An executive summary is HERE. Additional background is available at the Just Kids Partnership website.

Can implicit religious bias affect jury verdicts?

Homaidan Al-Turki, a Saudi Arabian citizen pursuing his doctoral degree in Colorado, was on trial in Colorado for assaulting his housekeeper. As the jury was sworn in, one juror indicated he might believe a Muslim would more likely break the law under certain circumstances. Al-Turki's lawyer asked if he could probe further, but the judge said no. During the trial, the prosecutor showed the jury a mannequin dressed in "Muslim women’s clothing." Allusions were made to Osama bin Laden, Ramadan, and 9/11. The jury convicted and Al-Turki was sentenced to 28 years in prison.

Al-Turki blamed his conviction on anti-Muslim sentiment, and the case sparked international controversy. But the conviction was upheld on appeal, and earlier this year the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the case.

What does psychology have to offer about the potential effect of jurors' religious bias on verdicts, and how implicit cues might activate such bias?

This month's Judicial Notebook, a regular column in the Monitor magazine published by the American Psychological Association, addresses this timely issue. Note authors Marc Pearce and Samantha Schwartz of the University of Nebraska-Lincoln:

Research indicates that information associating Muslims with negative attributes (such as terrorism) can create implicit biases that are difficult to detect with explicit measures… [T]he prosecution’s use of negative associations during a trial might foster an implicit bias against a Muslim defendant.

The full column is online HERE.

Related blog post:

• Prominent expert testifies about implicit bias (April 15, 2008)

Race, class, and self defense

Berkeley fraternity case spotlighted

Remember the "Killing and Culpability" reader participation exercise I presented in April, featuring the case of a young man in Berkeley, California, who stabbed a fraternity man during a street brawl? If so, you may recall that Andrew Hoeft-Edenfield was found guilty of second-degree murder and sentenced to 16 years in prison. Now, I am gratified to see that the troubling case is getting national play as part of renewed debate over what constitutes self defense.

"Had Hoeft-Edenfield been tried in Florida, things might have turned out differently," asserts Brooklyn-based freelance writer Lisa Riordan Seville in a column first published at Crime Report and now reposted at Salon.com. That's because Florida eliminated the "duty to retreat" requirement for self defense that played a role in Hoeft-Edenfield's conviction. Unlike California, Florida and 29 other states now have "stand your ground" laws that allow people to "meet force with force" anywhere they have a “legal right to be."

The essay is pegged to the U.S. Supreme Court's 5-4 ruling in McDonald v. City of Chicago, reaffirming gun ownership as a Constitutional right. Although that case did not pertain to self defense, legal analysts say it may ultimately help to "reshape the boundaries of the kind of force individuals can use to defend themselves," Seville notes.

Race, class, and social status in self defense claims

My local news is reporting on a bizarre rally in the overwhelmingly white San Francisco suburb of Walnut Creek. The protesters were there to support Johannes Mehserle, the transit cop who shot African American train passenger Oscar Grant to death in Oakland, California. Yes, that's right. To support the maligned killer. You will recall that Mehserle was convicted of only involuntary manslaughter, based on his claim that he had meant to fire his taser. (He is currently awaiting sentencing.) Counter-protesters lay face down in the street with their hands behind their backs to show Grant's position when he was shot in the back of the head. It reminded me of the quip going around Twitter just after the verdict highlighting race and relative social rank as factors in jury verdicts: "Hey, if Oscar Grant had shot a cop in the back, do you think he could have gotten off by saying, 'Oops, I thought I was texting on my cell phone'?"

One of my goals in the reader participation exercise was to showcase how implicit values and relative social status influence contested claims of self defense. Thus, I was intrigued by Seville's discussion of race and class in self defense claims. This was the focus of Justice Clarence Thomas's concurring opinion in the McDonald case. Thomas pointed out the importance of firearm ownership for black citizens in the South in the post-Reconstruction era, during which African Americans were "tortured and killed for a wide array of alleged crimes, without even the slightest hint of due process."

Massad Ayoob, a police captain and firearms trainer in New Hampshire, also acknowledged the role of race, class, and other circumstances in the outcomes self-defense claims:

He pointed to the case of Ronnie Barlow, a young black man from Arizona who was in 1990 convicted of second-degree murder for what he said was a self-defense shooting. He said he was attacked by 21-year-old Robert Lockwood, a white man with a long criminal history and the son of a local judge, but the jury didn’t buy it. The judge, however, saw it differently and reduced the jury verdict to manslaughter. Two years later, Barlow was released."

What would the "reasonable person" have done?

Subtle social and moral values quickly slip into jury deliberations because of the supposedly objective question of what the "reasonable person" would have done in the defendant's situation. Writes Seville:

The "reasonable man" -- or, now, "reasonable person" -- doctrine is the cornerstone of a self-defense case, explains Cynthia Lee, a law professor at George Washington University. Juries must decide if the sequence of events was reasonable not only in the defendant’s mind but also from an outside perspective.

"The reasonableness requirement is imposed to lend an air of objectivity to the defense," says Lee, the author of Murder and the Reasonable Man, a study of how beliefs and social norms play out in criminal cases, including self-defense trials. "The problem is of course that reasonableness is in the eye of the beholder," she says. "What’s reasonable to one person is not reasonable to another.”

Battered person’s syndrome

Seville goes on to discuss the role of the battered women's defense in broadening conceptions of self defense in the courtroom:

In recent years, the courts and state legislatures have opened up more room for questions about what constitutes an "imminent" threat and whether a reasonable person must try to flee before using force.

Increased legal acceptance of the "battered person’s syndrome" in the early 1990s allowed juries to hear how an abused person -- often, a woman -- might feel she had no choice but to kill to save her life. This challenged the long-standing notion that the threat to one's life had to be imminent. A battered person may, some believe, kill because the abuse is perceived to be life-threatening even if it isn't happening right then.

Like "stand your ground laws," battered-person defenses show that societal views can come into play in the long-standing right to self-defense, but nothing may indicate that better than the juries themselves.

Self-defense cases offer juries a lot of leeway to decide what they believe is reasonable and just, regardless of the law. "What the law on the books requires and what happens in action may be two different things,” Lee says. "Prosecutors, cops, jury members. We’re all people -- and stereotypes about certain groups affect us all."

The McDonald decision means that courts throughout the country will grapple for years with interpretations of the Second Amendment and the right of self-defense. But when the cases make it in to court, justice may depend less on the letter of state law than on the state of mind of the 12 people seated in that jury box.

Related blog posts:

• Killing and culpability: A reader participation exercise (April 14, 2010)
• "Killing and culpability" sentences handed down (June 16, 2010)

Photo credits: (1) family photo of Andrew Hoeft-Edenfield, credit The Crime Report
(2) Mehserle counter-protesters, credit Brant Ward, San Francisco Chronicle
(3) "The Second Amendment," credit ianturton (Creative Commons license)