Sex addiction: Science or pop fad?

Thirty-one years ago, when Patrick Carnes walked onto the Phil Donahue television show to promote his new book on sexual compulsivity as an addiction, his notion was – in his own words – “widely perceived as a joke.” 

But Carnes got the last laugh. With the mainstreaming of the addiction industry (eating, gambling, exercising and working are all potential addictions now), Carnes has risen to become guru of a lucrative empire with dozens of rehab centers staffed by thousands of paraprofessionals. Media outlets including Newsweek have uncritically jumped aboard, warning of a grim, pornography-fueled plague afflicting up to 5 percent of the U.S. population.  

With neuroscience all the rage, celebrities including Bill Clinton and Tiger Woods have been recast from mere cads to tragic victims of a progressive and often-fatal “brain disease.” The push for scientific legitimacy reached a zenith in 2013, with an unsuccessful bid to legitimize “hypersexuality” by adding it to the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5).

So, what changed over the course of the last three decades that made the public more receptive to seeing sexual misconduct through the lens of addiction?

In their meticulously researched Sex Addiction: A Critical History, three cultural historians from the University of Auckland in New Zealand trace the rise of this social movement primarily to a politically conservative, sex-negative backlash against the sexual liberation movement of the 1960s and 1970s. 

One clue to its underlying cultural values, historians Barry Reay, Nina Attwood and Claire Gooder observe, is the movement's enduring strand of homophobia. Even before Carnes's 1983 book Out of the Shadows popularized sexual addiction, the term had been invoked by Lawrence Hatterer, a psychiatrist whose work in the 1950s-1960s focused on curing the “illness” of homosexuality. Heteronormativity remains prominent in the field, with gay men who violate heterosexual norms of sexuality labeled as sex addicts.

Unlike many purported disorders that are promoted by researchers or the pharmaceutical industry, sex addiction is a bottoms-up movement, with people self-diagnosing themselves via self-help books or quick-and-dirty Internet surveys. Its infiltration into popular culture owes in large part to the media’s abdication of its role as scientific gatekeeper, argue the authors of Sex Addiction. As the Columbia Journalism Review also pointed out in a critique of the Newsweek puff piece, “The problem with relying on therapists, as most of the articles over the years have done, rather than qualified experts in academia, is that they have a vested interest in promoting the idea that there’s a widespread problem. The more people believe it, the more money they make."


In contrast to the lay public, academic scholars have remained skeptical of a construct that is too broad and amorphous to have any scientific validity; everything from viewing pornography or having an illicit affair to feeling ashamed about one's sexuality can count toward a diagnosis. Indeed, research studies have found that people’s anxiety over their sexual behavior is tied more to their moral values and level of religiosity than to the actual intensity of their behavior.

It is findings such as these that open sexual addiction up to ridicule. One prominent critic, David Ley, author of The Myth of Sex Addiction, has mocked sexual addiction literature as "valley-girl science" -- a hodge-podge of anecdote and metaphor rather than any provable theory. As he told a Salon interviewer:

“All of these behaviors have been happening for millennium — people cheating, people having lots of sex…. There’s nothing new about this…. For every one of the behaviors they raise as addictive — whether it’s porn, strip clubs, masturbation, infidelity, going to prostitutes — I can present 10,000 people who engage in the exact same behavior and have no problems, and they can’t explain why that is.”

Historically, hysteria over sexual depravity is somewhat cyclical. Way back in the 1870s, a crusade against "smut" by a U.S. Postal Inspector and politician named Anthony Comstock resulted in thousands of arrests and the destruction of 15 tons of books. Interestingly, Comstock's passion for moral purity stemmed from his own personal demons; as a youth, he was said to have masturbated so compulsively that it almost drove him to suicide.

Treating a case of "Madness of the Womb" (1600s)

The pathologizing of female lust has a particularly long tradition, dating back hundreds if not thousands of years. In the late 1600s, women were diagnosed with nymphomania (a diagnosis that still exists in the World Health Organization's International Classification of Diseases, or ICD), or “madness of the womb," a disease said to be triggered by amorous courtings, lascivious books and dancing. As with today’s sexual addiction, the condition was considered progressive; if not promptly treated it would lead to “true and perfect madness.” Treatment included bleeding, cool baths with lettuce and flowers, marriage to "a lusty young man" or -- no kidding -- rubbing of the afflicted woman's genitals by "a cunning midwife."

Nowadays, as then, there is a common pattern in the way proponents of scientifically questionable new problems attempt to establish their legitimacy. First, they announce discovery of the problem; next, the problem’s lineage is traced back through time to show that it existed all along but was overlooked or neglected. Finally, and most critically, alarmist claims are made about a growing epidemic.

This pattern could be observed in the 2013 campaign to legitimize “hypersexuality” by making it a DSM disorder. For example, the claims-making process included articles by psychiatrist Martin Kafka  tracing hypersexuality’s lineage back to the pioneering sexologists of the 19th century. But in their first-rate scholarship, the Auckland historians scoured those primary sources – the writings of early sexology heavyweights such as Magnus Hirschfeld, Havelock Ellis, Richard von Krafft-Ebing and Iwan Bloch – and found that their descriptions of the sexually compulsive bore little resemblance to contemporary hypersexuality or sex addiction. Rather, the early sexologists described tortured souls who were both rare and bizarre, typically suffering from more global psychiatric or organic maladies rather than a primary sexual disorder. For example, writing in 1908 about the “sexually insane,” Iwan Bloch described him as resembling a “wild animal” who:

“rush[es] at the first creature he meets … to gratify his lust …. He seizes in sexual embrace any other living or lifeless object, and in this state may perform acts of paederasty, bestiality, violation of children, etc. In these most severe cases we can always demonstrate the existence of mental disorder, general paralysis, mania, or periodical insanity … as a cause.”

Judging from singular descriptions like this, the early hypersexual was an extraordinary creature, a far cry from the mundane individual proposed for the DSM-5. Indeed, the proposed operational definitions for contemporary hypersexuality are striking in their breadth. For example, one diagnostic criteria proposed for the DSM-5 was experiencing seven or more orgasms per week by any method. Based on one survey of the general population in Sweden, this arbitrary cutoff would have pathologized almost half of all men (44%) and more than one out of five women.

Despite official rejection of hypersexuality by the American Psychiatric Association in 2013, the ideology of sexual addiction is gradually seeping into forensic quarters. For example, in some civil detention sites for sex offenders, minimally trained "treatment providers" play the role of moral arbiters, determining what forms of sexual desire are "appropriate" based not on their illegality or potential harm but whether the providers find them "healthy."

To be deemed “healthy” in some such programs, captive patients are required to develop vanilla “masturbation fantasy scripts” that resemble a corny Hallmark card:

"My masturbation fantasy involves Amanda. She is 40* years old, with flowing auburn hair and large green eyes. We enjoy cuddling by the fireplace, taking long walks on the beach in the moonlight, and gazing into each other’s eyes by candlelight."

(*The fantasy object must be the same approximate age as the offender; if she is more than five years younger, he will be told to rewrite his script to make it more "appropriate.")

Despite the enduring popularity of teachers, nurses and -- especially -- librarians as objects of male fantasy, in the burgeoning sexual offender treatment industry, even these cultural tropes may be labeled as "deviant." In one case I was involved in, a man's fantasy of seducing a librarian was advanced as evidence of sexual danger, based on the notion that the library (even after hours) is a public setting.

Of course, this not-so-thinly veiled moralism masquerading as treatment has no empirical support as a method to reduce former sex offenders’ risk to the public. But it does comport with popular cultural notions of addiction and sexual compulsivity, however unproven -- even bizarre -- they may at times be.

* * * * *

Sex Addiction: A Critical History by Barry Reay, Nina Attwood and Claire Gooder is as well written as it is insightful; I highly recommend it. Also recommended is clinical psychologist David Ley’s thoughtful work, The Myth of Sex Addiction.  

Research roundup

The articles are flooding in at an alarming rate, threatening to bury me under yet another avalanche. Before I am completely submerged, let me share brief synopses of a few of the more informative ones that I have gotten around to reading.

Assessor bias in high-stakes testing: The case of children’s IQ

I’ve blogged quite a bit about bias in forensic assessment, reporting on problems with such widely used tests as the Psychopathy Checklist and the Static-99R. As I’ve reported, some of the bias can be chalked up to adversarial allegiance, or which side the evaluator is working for, whereas some may be due to personality differences among evaluators. Now, researchers are extending this research into other realms -- with alarming findings.

In a study of intelligence testing among several thousand children at 448 schools, the researchers found significant and nontrivial variations in test scoring that had nothing to do with children’s actual intelligence differences. The findings, reported in the journal Psychological Assessment, are especially curious because scoring of the test in question, the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Fourth Edition (WISC-IV), seems relatively straightforward and objective (at least as compared to inherently subjective tests like the Psychopathy Checklist, for example).

The article is:

• Whose IQ Is It? Assessor Bias Variance in High-Stakes Psychological Assessment.  McDermott, Paul A.; Watkins, Marley W.; Rhoad, Anna M. Psychological Assessment, Published online on Nov 4 , 2013. To request a copy from the first author, click HERE.

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Beware pseudo-precision in expert opinions

I’ve never forgotten a video I saw a long time ago, in which the filmmakers drove up to random strangers and asked for directions to a nearby landmark. Some of the good samaritans gave enthusiastic instructions that were completely wrong, while other people gave correct directions but in a more tentative fashion. The trouble is, the more confident someone appears, the more we judge them as knowing what they are talking about.  

One way we gauge a presenter’s confidence, in turn, is by their level of precision. In a new study, researchers found that participants were more likely to rely on advice given by people who provided more precise information. For example, they were more likely to trust someone who said that the Mississippi River was 3,992 miles long, rather than 4,000 miles long.

What this means in the forensic realm is that we should not make claims of false precision, when our evidence base is weak. For example, we should not claim to know that someone has a 44 percent chance of violent reoffense within three years. Such misleading claims-making lends an aura of confidence and expertise that is not warranted.

The article is:

• Show Me the Numbers: Precision as a Cue to Others' Confidence. Jerez-Fernandez, A., Angulo, A. N., & Oppenheimer, D. M. Psychological Science. Published online on 6 Dec. 2013. To request a copy from the corresponding author, click HERE.

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Ethics and the DSM-5

Speaking of avalanches, the volume of critical response to the DSM-5 is lessening now that the tome has been on the bookshelves for eight months. Trying to keep my finger on the pulse because of my training activities on the manual’s forensic implications, I found an interesting summary of the ethical dilemmas of the latest trends in psychiatric diagnosis.

The author, Jennifer Blumenthal-Barby, is an ethics professor at Baylor College of Medicine’s Center for Medical Ethics and Health Policy. In her critique, published in the Journal of Medical Ethics, she focuses on consequence-based concerns about the dramatic expansion of psychiatric diagnoses in the latest edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s influential manual. Concerns include:

• False positives, or over-diagnosis, in clinical (and I would add forensic) practice
• Risks associated with pharmacological treatments of new conditions
• Neglect of larger structural issues and reduction of individual responsibility through medicalization
• Discrediting of psychiatry through the trivialization of mental disorders
• Efforts to eradicate conditions that are valuable or even desirable

Although her discussion is fairly general, she does mention a few of the proposed diagnostic changes of forensic relevance that I’ve blogged about. These include the proposed hypersexual disorder and a proposal to eliminate the age qualifier (of 18 and above) for antisocial personality disorder, to make it consistent with all of the other personality disorders.

It’s a good, brief overview suitable for assignment to students and professionals alike.

The article is: 

• Psychiatry’s new manual (DSM-5): ethical and conceptual dimensions. Journal of Medical Ethics. Published online on 10 Dec. 2013. To request a copy, click HERE.

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Dual relationships: Are they all bad?

We’ve all seen the memo: Dual relationships are to be avoided.

But is that always true?

Not according to ethics instructor Ofer Zur.

Multiple relationships are situations in which a mental health professional has a professional role with a client and another role with a person closely related to the client. In a new overview, Zur asserts that, not only are some multiple relationships ethical, they may be unavoidable, desirable, or even -- in some cases -- mandated.

In delineating the ethics and legality of 26 different types of multiple relationships, Zur stresses that in forensic settings, most multiple relationships should be avoided.

The article, Not All Multiple Relationships Are Created Equal: Mapping the Maze of 26 Types of Multiple Relationships, is another good teaching tool, and is freely available online at Zur’s continuing education website.

By the way, if you are in California and are looking for more ethics training, Zur and two of my former colleagues from the state psychological association’s Ethics Committee -- Michael Donner, PhD and Pamela Harmell, PhD -- are co-presenting at an interactive ethics session at the upcoming California Psychological Association convention. The convention runs April 9-13 in Monterey, and the ethics conversation -- “Ethics are not Rules: Psych in the Real World” -- is on Saturday, April 12.

DSM-5: Forensic applications (Part II of II)

Courts cling to DSM as "bible"

As alluded to yesterday, in Part I, mental health professionals know not to take the DSM (or the ICD, for that matter) too seriously. It's just convenient fiction, or at best "useful constructs," mainly used to attain insurance reimbursement.

Only, there's this curious phenomenon: In the legal system, where the consequences of error can be grave, DSM diagnoses have taken on a mantra of grand truth. Increasingly, I find myself being asked during court testimony about some nit-picky little criterion or another (such as the six-month specifier for pedophilia) as if it is sacred gospel, rather than the arbitrary creation of some idiosyncratic back-room committee.

One bold colleague, when asked on the witness stand to confirm that the DSM is indeed "the bible of psychiatry," answers with a resounding "YES!" But, he adds, "Bible is Greek for 'book,' and the DSM's are a collection of books or chapters submitted by sundry subcommittees and approved or not based on politics. As with the Christian Bible, some known books (like the Book of Thomas) did not make the cut."

I don't recommend that tactic unless you are well grounded in theological studies. I myself cannot state under oath that the DSM is "the bible," when the attorney is really seeking to have me confirm its status as a learned treatise, that is, sufficiently authoritative that it should be relied upon in court. It may be the only game in town, but it's hardly known for its empirical fidelity. The text's assortment of vague generalities are not even referenced, so we don't know where they came from. If you are going to testify about a specific mental condition, such as delusional disorder, I recommend relying on empirical research from reliable sources that you can cite. 

Turning now to specific changes in the DSM-5 of most potential relevance to forensic work....

The good news is that some of the more outlandish proposals -- such as parental alienation syndrome and hebephilia -- got a resounding thumbs-down. So, here's my first-glance summary of what's new and different. 

Sexual paraphilias

An attempt by an ambitious minority to add a slew of new sexual disorders fell flat. So, you won’t find hebephilia, paraphilic coercive disorder or hypersexuality in the DSM-5. They didn’t even make the appendix for "conditions for further study" (which is populated by such non-starters as caffeine use disorder, internet gaming disorder, and the more worrisome attenuated psychosis syndrome).

These defeats are a big blow for the civil commitment industry, which lobbied for them to replace the shady "not otherwise specified" diagnoses being used to justify indefinite detention of offenders who don't have legitimate mental illnesses.

The section does, however, contain a few pesky little wording changes that may come into play in forensic cases. Each  disorder except pedophilia in the paraphilias chapter now has two remission qualifiers. If the person has not been impaired for five years, the disorder can be said to be "in full remission." This is a nod to the reality that sexual kinks often come and go over time. But there's a catch: The remission must be while the person was "in an uncontrolled environment." Otherwise, a new remission specifier of "in a controlled environment" can be applied. I anticipate that government evaluators in sexually violent predator trials may use this language to argue that a prisoner whose predicate offense was decades in the past is still disordered and at risk today, despite no objective evidence of such.

Another important change is in the text accompanying sexual sadism disorder, which now reads more like it was written for adversarial deployment. There are now two types of sadists -- "admitting individuals" and deniers. For deniers, the fact of having "inflicted pain or suffering on multiple victims on separate occasions" may be sufficient for a diagnosis. As a "general rule," the text instructs, recurrent can be interpreted to mean "three or more victims on separate occasions."

As discussed yesterday in Part I, the DSM-5 does not provide citations to empirical research to back up its recommendations. This is especially problematic in the case of sexual sadism, because even most chronic rapists are not necessarily aroused by a victim's suffering; rather, the victim's suffering fails to inhibit their arousal as it would for other men. The fact of inflicting pain or suffering also says nothing about what is going on in the mind of the inflicter, and three is just an arbitrary number pulled from a hat. These new guidelines will only complicate a problematic diagnosis with abysmally poor reliability and no predictive validity.

Antisocial personality disorder

Early buzz was that this pejorative label -- which can be applied to essentially any chronic offender -- would be revised to more closely align it with the even more pejorative and controversial construct of psychopathy. But the APA abandoned all proposed personality disorder changes (including a radical move to drop half of them altogether and to place the rest of them on a dimensional spectrum), so this diagnosis remains unchanged.

The real news here comes from the field trials. In regard to reliability, antisocial personality disorder came in at the bottom of the barrel, down there with the new mixed anxiety-depressive disorder with a kappa reliability rating of only 0.2. Historically, kappas below 0.4 have been considered poor. Although DSM-5 chief statistician Helena Kraemer is arguing that lower kappas should be deemed "acceptable," a 0.2 essentially means that even trained professionals cannot agree on whether a given individual has a disorder. This makes antisocial personality disorder far too unreliable for use in court.

Speaking of empirically dubious disorders, intermittent explosive disorder got a change worth noting. Whereas the aggressive outbursts at the core of this disorder used to require physical aggression, now "verbal aggression" suffices. If you've ever reviewed psychiatric hospital charts, you know that this is how hospital technicians chart episodes of disquiet among patients. For example, I recently saw a chart notation that "John Doe was verbally aggressive" stemming from an incident in which the involuntarily hospitalized Mr. Doe muttered profanities at hospital orderlies who had barged into his room while he was sleeping and confiscated the gauze pads he was using for an acute injury. In short, look for upticks of this disorder wherever the powerless are concentrated.

Posttraumatic stress disorder

Psychologist Richard Samuels checks his DSM
"bible" during testimony in Jodi Arias murder trial

PTSD got some significant tweaking in the DSM-5, mostly in directions that could increase its prevalence. The requirement of experiencing “fear, helplessness or horror” in reaction to the trauma was eliminated. There are now four "symptom clusters" rather than three. A new symptom of "reckless or self-destructive behavior" has been added, and the symptom of irritable behavior or angry outbursts has some added language, "typically expressed as verbal or physical aggression toward people or objects" and "with little or no provocation" (have fun explaining that one in court!).

In clinical practice, these changes won’t much matter. As Greenberg noted, "Mostly we’re content to find a label that matches people in some vague way and then get on with the business of helping them figure out what's going on in their lives that landed them in our offices." However, in court the devil is in the details. Difference between an "and" or an "or," or a three-month versus a six-month time specifier, can be critical. Unfortunately, there are no side-to-side charts with the changes from DSM-IV to DSM-5 highlighted or crossed out. The biggest benefactor of all this tweaking will be psychological test companies, whose psychometric tests for PTSD will have to be revamped. So get out your pocketbooks now.

Intellectual functioning and the death penalty

Last but not least, changes to the developmental disabilities section could make more criminals eligible for execution. Under the U.S. Supreme Court's Atkins standard, an IQ score of below 70 had been like a magic line in the sand, below which one becomes ineligible for capital punishment. However, the DSM-5's intellectual developmental disorder (renamed from mental retardation) drops IQ scores in favor of the more subjective construct of adaptive functioning, or the ability to live independently in the world.

"There are a lot of courts that are hostile to the basic legal doctrine the Atkins case established," death penalty lawyer David Dow told Reuters. "When you replace a test that is one part objective, one part subjective with a solely subjective test, it becomes easier for courts that are hostile to the constitutional principle of Atkins to evade that criterion."

"We believe that we are providing the courts with a more fine-grained means to consider adaptive functioning more comprehensively and more meaningfully," countered James Harris, of the DSM-5 work group.

Other specified or unspecified disorder

As I just mentioned, the devil is in the details. When a person does not meet minimum criteria for a diagnosis, clinicians can choose between the new categories of other specified disorder and unspecified disorder (the listed example being the unwieldy "other specified depressive disorder, depressive episode with insufficient symptoms"). These quick-and-dirty options are meant for use in the emergency department, where clinicians have little time and not much background information to go on. But the DSM-5 authors open the door for forensic misuse by stating their desire for "maximum flexibility for diagnosis." How's this for a loophole large enough to drive a Mack truck through:

"When the clinician is not able to further specify and describe the clinical presentation, the unspecified diagnosis can be given. This is left entirely up to clinical judgment."

Look to shady evaluators to misuse these "other" and "unspecified" labels to create nonexistent disorders for forensic use. That won't be anything new; it's essentially the same phenomenon we now see in sexually violent predator proceedings with the deployment of the DSM-IV-TR classifier "paraphilia not otherwise specified (NOS)," which these new categories replace. Such improper diagnosis may be legal, but that doesn't make it ethical.

Forensic caveat

One welcome change in the new manual is that the old cautionary statement about use of the DSM in forensic contexts gets more prominent play. Rather than being buried in the introduction, it's got its own little page in the DSM-5:

"... In most situations the clinical diagnosis of a DSM-5 mental disorder ... does not imply that an individual with such a condition meets legal criteria for the presence of a mental disorder or a specified legal standard...."

But when push comes to shove, judges and juries are going to do what they want to do, forensic cautions or no. As Texas lawyer Susan Orlansky -- whose client is slated for execution despite a lower-than-70 IQ -- told Reuters, "If the Texas court system is willing to ignore the DSM-IV, I don't know why they wouldn't be just as willing to ignore the DSM-5."

By all means take a moment to familiarize yourself with the changes in the new diagnostic manual that are relevant to your work. Just don't be conned into taking this whole diagnostic enterprise too seriously. After all, that's what the American Psychiatric Association is counting on to keep itself financially solvent.

I welcome comments, especially if you know of other changes of potential forensic relevance that are not listed here, or if you have a different take on the changes I highlighted.

And, if you are planning to attend the American Psychological Association convention in Honolulu, I invite you to my full-day CE training on psychiatric diagnosis in legal settings on July 31.

DSM-5: Much ado about nothing? (Part I of II)

Ambitious "paradigm shift" fizzles 

By now, you've seen the bad press about the American Psychiatric Association's new diagnostic codebook: Media pundits are labeling it "a manual run amok," so ambitious in scope that almost everyone qualifies for some mental illness or another.

But browsing through my crisp new copy, I find myself curiously dispassionate. Sure, it's even more bloated than the DSM-IV. But mainly, they just moved the chapters around and renamed a diagnosis here and there (dysthymia, for example, is now persistent depressive disorder). Even the typefaces will look familiar.

It's downright anticlimactic.

Remember when they first announced work on the new DSM? It was going to be a revolutionary "paradigm shift," aligning diagnoses with modern science. Disorders were going to be dimensional rather than categorical. All kinds of novel proposals were in play: Parental Alienation Syndrome. Paraphilic Coercive Disorder. Psychosis Risk Syndrome.

Then came the backlash. Prominent work group members walked out over the lack of science in the revision process. Petitions were launched. Special interest groups lobbied. ("Aspies," for example, were furious that psychiatry had bequeathed them an identity and were now taking it back.) The field trials fell apart. Even the National Institute of Mental Health announced it was breaking away from the DSM's diagnostic schema (although switching to its biology-worshipping Research Domain Criteria is like jumping from the frying pan to the fire).

Ultimately, the psychiatrists retreated. With both drug money and membership numbers down, the last thing the American Psychiatric Association needed was more negative flak. Especially when the DSM rakes in a steady profit, $5 to $6 million per year, giving them "fabulous riches" over time.

So, you'll find a few notable changes: There’s disruptive mood dysregulation disorder, a belated effort to undo the damage wrought by overdiagnosis of childhood bipolar disorder. Hoarding disorder and the Big-Pharma-inspired premenstrual dysphoric disorder made the cut. But overall, it's just business as usual.

In the short term, the new manual will give the APA's coffers a big boost. The book alone retails for $130 or more, and -- like a blockbuster Disney movie -- there will be ancillary products including cell phone apps, how-to guides, trainings, and such.

Eventually, however, the DSM will become increasingly irrelevant. It's already being superseded by the World Health Organization's International Classification of Diseases, which even on the APA's home turf of the United States is now required for insurance reimbursement. While some tout ICD codes as preferable, the only real advantage of the ICD is that it is freely available online.

By design, the DSM codes are almost precisely parallel to the ICD's. And the entire diagnostic enterprise, as psychotherapist Gary Greenberg explores in The Book of Woe, is an elaborate fiction -- a shell game perpetrated by psychiatrists on patients, insurance companies, and (most critically for our purposes here) the courts. Greenberg spent two years mucking about in the DSM-5 development trenches, where work group members frankly acknowledged that psychiatric diagnoses are just "fictive placeholders" or "useful constructs" rather than real conditions that carve nature at its joints.

Tomorrow, in Part II, I will highlight some specific changes (and non-changes) potentially relevant to forensic practice. 

If you are planning to attend the American Psychological Association convention in Honolulu, I also invite you to my full-day CE training on psychiatric diagnosis in legal settings on July 31.

Military sexual assault scandal unearths "illegal" psychiatric diagnoses

If you haven't been following the sexual assault scandals in the U.S. military, tune in: It’s yet another arena where bogus psychiatric diagnoses are playing a sordid role.

Women soldiers who report sexual assault are diagnosed with psychiatric conditions such as borderline personality disorder or bipolar disorder that get them drummed out. Not only are their careers ruined, but they are denied benefits and sometimes must even repay any bonuses they got for enlisting.

Because the symptoms of these "preexisting" disorders overlap with the emotional sequelae of trauma -- anger, fear, depression, anxiety, avoidance -- it can be hard to tell the difference.

Women in every branch of the U.S. military are being disproportionately discharged with personality disorders, according to an investigative series, Twice Betrayed, in the San Antonio (Texas) Express-News. The Air Force has the widest disparity: Women make up 20 percent of the force, but 35 percent of personality discharges.

Sometimes, as in one case featured in the Express-News series, military psychologists and psychiatrists are being influenced by officers in the accused's or accuser's chain of command to view accusers as mentally unstable and/or sexually promiscuous.

In a report on "illegal" psychiatric diagnoses, the Vietnam Veterans of America say that in addition to rape victims, many combat soldiers with organic brain trauma or posttraumatic stress disorder continue to be drummed out of the military with bogus personality disorders and adjustment disorders that block their disability benefits, despite Congressional efforts to crack down on this abuse (for example, by requiring that the diagnoses be issued by psychiatrists or PhD-level psychologists).

It was a bit incongruous to find myself sitting in an Air Force courtroom, consulting on a sexual assault case, when the news broke that the chief of the Air Force's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response program had been arrested for sexually assaulting a female stranger in a parking lot.Talk about the fox guarding the hen coop.

That bizarre twist came on the heels of a headline-grabbing survey documenting skyrocketing rates of sexual assault in the military: An estimated 26,000 soldiers were sexually assaulted in 2012, up from 19,000 the year before. Women in the military face about twice the risk of sexual assault as civilian women (one in three versus about one in six). And only a tiny fraction of assaults -- 3,374 last year-- are reported.

That's likely due to the fact that women who do report rape are shunned, disbelieved, and retaliated against, and their assailants are rarely punished. The seven-month investigation by Karisa King of the San Antonio Express-News found that only about 10 percent (302 of 2,900) of the accused were court martialed, with only 177 sentenced to confinement. (The airman in my case was one of those rare few, but then again he was a low-level airman, not an officer. And it probably didn't help his case that all of these scandals were busting out that very week.)

It’s no coincidence that the San Antonio paper ran the series: Outside that city sits the sprawling Lackland base, the Air Force's basic training center for enlisted personnel. In an unfolding investigation there, at least 33 training instructors are suspected of sexually assaulting 63 or more trainees.

If this latest scandal isn't enough to convince people of the link between sexual violence and a climate of hostile masculinity (as researchers such as Neil Malamuth have been arguing for decades), I don't know what is. On the other hand, if psychologists in the sex offender treatment industry got their hands on these training officers, they'd probably label them with some fictional disorder like "paraphilia not otherwise specified (nonconsent)" that decontextualized their behaviors beyond recognition. 

Consulting in a military court martial one week and a sexually violent predator civil commitment hearing the next, I can't help but notice how mental illness strikes in clusters, afflicting sexual assault victims in one setting and offenders in the other. The clue that situational exigency is in play is that in neither case is the diagnosis about helping the supposed sufferer. It's all about punishment, with diagnosis as the weapon.

I highly recommend the series, Twice Betrayed. An in-depth report by the The Vietnam Veterans of America on the misuse of psychiatric diagnoses in the military, Casting Troops Aside, is HERE.

Training: Controversies in sexually violent predator evaluations

I am excited to announce that the American Psychology-Law Society has accepted a panel that I put together on "Emergent controversies in civil commitment evaluations of sexually violent predators." I hope some of you will join me at the annual conference in Portland, Oregon on March 7-9.

The symposium will address three areas of controversy in the sex offender civil commitment field:

• Mental abnormality and psychiatric diagnosis in court (my topic)

• Recidivism risk assessment (addressed by my esteemed colleague Jeffrey Singer)

• Volitional control (Frederick Winsmann, clinical instructor at Harvard Medical School, will present a promising new assessment model)

Here's the symposium abstract:

Over the past three decades, Sexually Violent Predator litigation has emerged as perhaps the most contentious area of forensic psychology practice. In an effort to assist the courts, a cadre of experts has proffered a confusing array of constantly changing assessment methods, psychiatric diagnoses, and theories of sex offending. Now, some federal and state courts are beginning to subject these often-competing claims to greater scrutiny, for example via Daubert and Frye evidentiary hearings. This symposium will alert forensic practitioners, lawyers and academics to some of the most prominent minefields on the SVP battleground, revolving around three central areas of contestation: psychiatric diagnosis, risk assessment, and the elusive construct of volitional control. The presenters will review recent scholarly literature and court rulings addressing: (1) the reliability and validity of psychiatric diagnoses in sexually dangerous person litigation, (2) forensic risk assessment tools and how risk data should be reported to triers of fact, and (3) how best to address the issue of volitional impairment, a Constitutionally required element for civil commitment. The focus will be on how to assist the courts while remaining within the limits of scientific knowledge and our profession's ethical boundaries.

The conference schedule hasn't been issued yet so I don’t know which day our panel is presenting, but I will keep you posted when I find out, probably in January. In the meantime, if you are looking to pick up Continuing Education (CE) credits, the pre-conference workshops are a good way to get some high-quality forensic training:

• The ever-informative Randy Otto on "Improving Clinical Judgment and Decision Making in Forensic Psychological Evaluation," with a heavy focus on identifying and reducing bias (full-day workshop) 

• Paul J. Frick on "Developmental Pathways to Conduct Disorder: Implications for Understanding and Treating Severely Aggressive and Antisocial Youth" (full-day workshop)

• Amanda Zelechoski on "Trauma-Informed Care in Forensic Settings" (full-day workshop)

• Kathy Pezdek on "How to Present Statistical Information to Judges and Jurors" (half-day workshop)

• Steven Penrod on "Things That Jurors (and Judges) Ought to Know About Eyewitness Reliability" (half-day workshop)

Portland is a lovely city, especially in the spring, so register now, and mark your calendars for what is sure to be a lively and educational event.

APA rejects "hebephilia," last standing of three novel sexual disorders

To hear government experts on the witness stand in civil detention trials in recent months, the novel diagnosis of "hebephilia" was a fait accompli, just awaiting its formal acceptance into the upcoming fifth edition of the influential Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM).

They were flat-out wrong.

In a stunning blow to psychology's burgeoning sex offender processing industry, the Board of Trustees of the American Psychiatric Association rejected the proposed diagnosis outright, not even relegating it to an appendix as meriting further study, its proponents' fall-back position.

The rejection follows the failure of two other sexual disorders proposed by the DSM-5's paraphilias subworkgroup. These were paraphilic coercive disorder (or a proclivity toward rape) and hypersexuality, an inherently hard-to-define construct that introduced the committee members' value judgments as to how much sex is within acceptable limits.

After abandoning those two disorders, the subworkgroup clung tenaciously to a whittled-down version of its proposed expansion of pedophilia to cover sexual attraction to early pubescent youngsters (generally in the age range of 11-14), ignoring widespread opposition from both within and outside of the APA.

The buzz is that senior psychiatrists in the APA were unhappy with the intransigence of psychologists in the subworkgroup who communicated the belief that if they just stuck to their guns, they could force the ill-considered proposal into the new manual, despite a lack of scientific support.

All three proposed sexual disorder expansions were widely critiqued by mental health professionals, especially those working in the forensic contexts in which they would be deployed. They led to a spate of critical peer-reviewed publications (including a historical overview of hebephilia by yours truly, published in Behavioral Sciences and the Law), and an open letter to APA leadership from more than 100 professionals, including prominent forensic psychologists and psychiatrists in the U.S. and internationally.

The unequivocal rejection sends a strong signal of the American Psychiatric Association's continuing reluctance to be drawn into the civil commitment quagmire, where pretextual diagnoses are being invoked as excuses to indefinitely confine sex offenders who have no genuine mental disorders. In marked contrast with the field of psychology, psychiatry leaders have expressed consistent concerns about the use of psychiatric labels to justify civil detention schemes.

Next time around, the APA might want to do a better job selecting committee members in the first place. The "paraphilias subworkgroup" was heavily biased in favor of hebephilia because of its domination by psychologists from the Canadian sex clinic that proposed the new disorder in the first place, and is the only entity doing research on it. But what a waste of time and energy to create a committee that comes up with wild and wacky proposals that are only going to end up getting shot down when the rubber meets the road.

Backpedaling on paradigm shift

As regular readers of this blog know, the DSM-5 developers' grand ambitions to bring forth a revolutionary "paradigm shift" produced alarm among mental health professionals and consumer advocacy groups both in the United States and internationally. The British Psychological Society, the UK's 50,000-member professional body, issued a strongly worded critique, and a coalition of psychological associations garnered more than 14,000 signatures on a petition opposing the wholesale lowering of diagnostic thresholds for disorder.

Yesterday's news release marked an about-face, with the APA now stressing that diagnostic changes in the DSM-5 were intended to be "very conservative."

"Our work has been aimed at more accurately defining mental disorders that have a real impact on people’s lives, not expanding the scope of psychiatry," said David J. Kupfer, MD, chair of the DSM-5 Task Force.

Consistent with this, several of the proposed changes that generated the most widespread alarm were rejected. The Board of Trustees rejected the highly controversial "attenuated psychosis syndrome" that could have created an epidemic of false positives, stigmatizing eccentric young people and lowering the threshold for prescribing potentially harmful antipsychotic drugs. It also backed away from an equally controversial, and complex, revamping of the personality disorders. These conditions, as well as a contentious Internet gaming disorder, will all be placed in "section 3" of the new manual as conditions meriting further study.

Allen Frances, the DSM-IV Task Force chair and a high-profile critic of the DSM-5 project, called the spin that the DSM-5 will have minimal impact on psychiatric diagnosis and treatment "misleading":

"This is an untenable claim that DSM 5 cannot possibly support because, for completely unfathomable reasons, it never took the simple and inexpensive step of actually studying the impact of DSM on rates in real world settings…. Except for autism, all the DSM 5 changes loosen diagnosis and threaten to turn our current diagnostic inflation into diagnostic hyperinflation. Painful experience with previous DSM's teaches that if anything in the diagnostic system can be misused and turned into a fad, it will be. Many millions of people with normal grief, gluttony, distractibility, worries, reactions to stress, the temper tantrums of childhood, the forgetting of old age, and 'behavioral addictions' will soon be mislabeled as psychiatrically sick and given inappropriate treatment."

Among the controversial diagnostic changes that will go forward in the DSM-5, due to be published in mid-2013:

• Asperger’s syndrome is being eliminated as a separate disorder (it will be folded into an autism spectrum disorder)
• Depression is being expanded to include some grief reactions
• A brand-new "disruptive mood dysregulation disorder" has critics fearing psychiatric labeling of children who have temper tantrums

Two other sets of changes have particular relevance to forensic practitioners. Substance abuse disorders have been reframed as "behavioral addictions," which Frances warns could be a "slippery slope" leading to "careless overdiagnosis of internet and sex addiction and the development of lucrative treatment programs to exploit these new markets."

Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) will be included in a new chapter on trauma and stress-related disorders, with four distinct diagnostic clusters instead of the current three, and "more attention to the behavioral symptoms that accompany PTSD." Some worry that the reconfigured PTSD may lend itself to misuse of the hot-button diagnosis in forensic cases.

Yesterday’s APA news release outlining the changes can be found HERE. My hebephilia resource page is HERE.

Hebephilia update: DSM-5 workgroup stubbornly clinging to pet diagnosis

Salvador Dali*: The Average Bureaucrat

A few weeks ago, I reported on an open letter to the American Psychiatric Association, calling for it to reject three controversial expansions of sexual paraphilia diagnoses that are being promoted by government evaluators in civil commitment cases.

A lot has happened since then. The only one of the three controversial diagnoses still in the running for official status has been altered for the umpteenth time. An esteemed journal is issuing a scathing critique. And the open letter is generating buzz in the blogosphere.

The open letter has garnered more than 100 signatures, many from prominent forensic psychologists and psychiatrists in the U.S. and internationally. If you intend to sign on but haven’t yet, act now because I understand it will be submitted very soon. (Click HERE to review the text; click HERE to email your name and professional title to co-author Richard Wollert.)

Hebephilia gets yet another makeover 

This week, the Sexual Disorders Workgroup for the upcoming fifth edition of the APA's diagnostic manual toned down its proposal to turn sexual attraction to young teens into a mental disorder. As psychiatrist Allen Frances explains at his DSM5 in Distress blog, hebephilia is still there -- you just have to read the small print to see it:

Dali: Enchanted Beach with Three Fluid Graces

Confronted by universal opposition from the rest of the field, the DSM 5 group has been forced progressively to whittle down their pet, but they so far have refused to just drop it altogether. 'Hebephilia' first lost its free-standing independence and was cloaked as Pedohebephilia. When this didn't fly, the term was dropped altogether in the title but the concept was slipped into the definition of Pedophilia -- which was expanded out of recognition by having a victim age cut-off of 14 years. No one accepted this outlandish suggestion and now finally the work group comes back with ‘early pubescent children' and tries to keep 'hebephilia' as a term in the subtype. The instability of the criteria sets associated with this concept is additional evidence that the fervor for its adoption stems from emotional loyalty rather than reasoned review of its weak conceptual and research base. How can the group vouch for the reliability of the diagnosis when the concept and criteria are changing every month? This is no way to develop a diagnostic system.

The staunch insistence on this transparent attempt to turn statutory rape into a mental disorder owes in large part to the makeup of the sexual disorders workgroup. As Frances notes, "the most wayward of all the DSM 5 work groups" is "lopsidedly dominated" by psychologists from a sex clinic up in Toronto, whose ambition is "to find a place in DSM 5 for their pet diagnosis."
Although the group's other outlandish proposals, Paraphilic Coercive Disorder and Hypersexuality, have been shelved for the time being, Frances worries that putting them in the appendix "for further study" is still risky:

Recognizing that the jig is up on the grand design, members of the DSM 5 sexual disorders work group have been heard saying they may have to settle for an Appendix placement for their three hothouse creations. This would create forensic dangers. We have learned from the abuse of "Paraphilia Not Otherwise Specified" in Sexually Violent Predator cases that any (even remote) legitimization by DSM 5 is certain to be misconstrued and misused in the courtroom. 

Come on guys. This is absolutely absurd just on the face of it…. So back to the drawing board, DSM 5 sexual disorders work group. The grand dream is lost -- now at least make sure you don't mess up on the fine print.

On the professional listservs today, some conspiracy theorists were speculating that the new wording signifies a plot to enhance the standing of physiological testing in sex offender assessment. The latest proposed criteria for "pedophilia, hebephilic type" require "equal or greater sexual arousal from prepubescent or early pubescent children than from physically mature persons." How to determine that fuzzy standard? Enter the penile plethysmographer, a new niche career track, penis cuff at the ready to measure who is aroused by what.

"There is withering criticism already that the DSM is being expanded to sell more drugs," wrote one colleague. "Now it appears that psychiatry and psychology are conspiring to use the DSM to spur PPG tests -- tests which risk leaving patients with traumatic and indelible memory traces. Do most psychiatrists really want to open this door?!"

Orwellian thought police? 

The mere idea of allowing the American Psychiatric Association to dictate "normal" sexuality frightens English Professor Christopher Lane. Lane, whose book Shyness: How Normal Behavior Became a Sickness exposed the unscientific inner workings of the DSM-III committee, expressed shock over the first listed criterion for the shelved disorder of hypersexuality: "Excessive time is consumed by sexual fantasies and urges, and by planning for and engaging in sexual behavior." On his Side Effects blog, Lane mused:

Dali: Femme a Tete de Roses

"Excessive time"? What exactly does that mean, and according to whose standards? That's not a small or trivial matter to settle when the APA is talking in vague generalities about the nation’s libido -- how much sex it wants and how much sex the APA thinks it should think about wanting. The APA is talking about how much time Americans can devote to sexual fantasy before it suggests that we’re mentally ill if our preoccupations are stronger than those set by the relevant task force.

Does that initiative seem to overreach a bit, even to the point of sounding almost Orwellian? It does so to me. If we're to have criteria, are quotas next, including for fantasy? It’s as if the East Coast offices of the APA had morphed into those of the Thought Police in Orwell's 1984, warning citizens that they’d overstepped their "sexual thought quota" for the week and must be rationed -- or punished accordingly.

Lane analyzed hebephilia through his characteristic historical lens:

It's an archaism, a throwback literally to 19th-century psychiatry, but refers to practices that were as central to the Classical age -- and thus to Western democracy -- as were Socrates, Plato, and especially Plato’s Symposium, one of the foundational books in the West on eros and love.

The APA is already trying to determine how long normal grief should last before it’s thought pathological. Its brisk, jaw-dropping answer: two weeks. Do we really want the same organization dictating how often we can think about sex? These kinds of proposals can only end badly.

Leading journal tackles the controversy

The good news this week, which should have all of us jumping up and down with joy, is that the APA has caved in under massive public pressure and dropped its plan for a new psychosis risk disorder. This disorder would have put thousands if not millions of youngsters at risk of being dosed up with dangerous antipsychotic drugs based on a suspicion that they might go crazy in the future. Mixed Anxiety Depression has also bit the dust.

Dali: Daddy Longlegs of the Evening Hope

But, as featured in a special issue of the esteemed Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases due out in June on the raging diagnostic controversies, there are still many battles ahead as the bloated DSM-5 enters the final stretch. The special issue will tackle diagnostic inflation, pharmacological conflicts of interest, controversies with the newly revamped personality disorders, and problems with diagnostic reliability in the recent field trials. Hebephilia, often neglected amidst controversies with wider impact such as psychosis risk syndrome and the pathologization of normal grief, merited an article in this special issue.

 In "Hebephilia and the Construction of a Fictitious Diagnosis," forensic psychologists Paul Good and the late Jules Burstein make a strong case for abandoning this faux disorder, which will only make the APA more of a laughingstock in the future.

Good and Burstein catalog an assortment of empirical problems. These range from the difficulty of reliably measuring "recurrent and intense" sexual arousal to problems determining the pubertal status of a young teenage victim. They also challenge the very idea that sexual attraction to pubescent minors is a mental illness, rather than merely illegal.

Although the Sexual Disorders Workgroup hides behind a fictive notion of a pure and ethereal "science," Good and Burstein clearly believe that hebephilia, if added to the DSM-5, will be mainly invoked in a partisan manner in forensic proceedings, in order to justify harsher punishment and involuntary civil detention. Because of its power to do harm, they say, its scientific grounding should be especially strong. If it does manage to worm its way into the DSM, they say, it should still be challenged in court:

We believe the admissibility of the proposed revision to DSM-5 that would include Hebephilia as a type of Pedophilia could be challenged in a court of law based on current legal standards. For example, since there is no professional consensus or general acceptance in the scientific community to support the notion of Hebephilia as a mental disorder, it would have difficulty passing the Frye test for admissibility. Similarly, without a widely established body of peer-reviewed, validation research and repeated studies showing inter-rater reliability in the laboratory and among clinicians in the field, Hebephilia would also have difficulty meeting the criteria specified in the Daubert standard.

Indeed, this is just what has been happening to hebephilia in federal court, where at least three civil detention petitions in a row have been thrown out due to the level of controversy in the field over this purported condition.

With all of this tumult, it seems that the DSM-5 excesses are producing a backlash against the American Psychiatric Association and, indeed, fueling disenchantment with the whole enterprise of psychiatric diagnosis.

As Frances writes, the turnaround on psychosis risk syndrome came about due to a combination of:

• extensive criticism from experts in the field
• public outrage
• uniformly negative press coverage
• abysmal results in DSM-5 field testing

For the first time in its history, DSM 5 has shown some flexibility and capacity to correct itself. Hopefully, this is just the beginning of what will turn out to be a number of other necessary DSM 5 retreats. Today's revisions should be just the first step in a systematic program of reform.… This is certainly no time for complacency. Much of the rest of DSM 5 is still a mess. The reliabilities achieved for many of the other disorders are apparently unbelievably low and the writing of the criteria sets is still unacceptably imprecise.

Who needs reliability? 

Frances calls for slowing down the process to allow for additional field testing and, more importantly, an independent scientific review of all the remaining controversial DSM-5 changes. But the DSM-5 folks are taking a different tack. Faced with field trial results showing very poor reliability -- not much better than chance -- for many of their proposed diagnoses, they want to change the definition of what counts as minimally adequate.

Dali: Autumn Cannibalism

It’s pretty ironic: The DSM-III went down in history for elevating the importance of reliability at the expense of validity. Remember, diagnostic reliability just means that similarly trained raters see a certain symptom presentation and call it by the same label. It says nothing about external validity, or whether the label is meaningful in explaining a real-world phenomenon. But reliability is basic. If a diagnostic label cannot be reliably applied, you can't even start talking about its validity. And now, the same psychiatric organization that reified the kappa reliability statistic as the be-all, end-all of science is trying to tell us that traditional kappa levels are unrealistically high for psychiatric research.

Historically, psychiatric reliability studies have adopted the Fleiss standard, in which kappas below 0.4 have been considered poor. In the January issue of the American Journal of Psychiatry, Helena Kraemer and colleagues complained that this standard is unrealistically high, and lobbied for kappas as low as 0.2 -- traditionally considered poor -- to be deemed "acceptable."

Former DSM-III guru Robert Spitzer and colleagues object to this proposal in a letter in the latest issue of the Journal. "Calling for psychiatry to accept kappa values that are characterized as unreliable in other fields of medicine is taking a step backward," they state. "One hopes that the DSM-5 reliability results are at least as good as the DSM-III results, if not better."

Alas, just wishing won't make it so. Despite its grandly stated ambitions, the DSM-5 will likely go down in history as a major gaffe by American psychiatry in its continuing struggle for world dominance.  

Remember to check out the open letter 

and send in your name, if you are in agreement with it.

Further reading:

• American Sex and American Psychiatry: The APA is trying to determine how much sex we can fantasize about by Chris Lane at Side Effects
• DSM 5 Rejects 'Hebephilia' Except for the Fine Print: Now the devil is in the details by Allen Frances at DSM5 in Distress
• Wonderful News: DSM 5 Finally Begins Its Belated and Necessary Retreat: Perhaps this will be the beginning of real reform by Allen Frances at DSM5 in Distress

*Salvador Dali: "One day it will have to be officially admitted that what we have christened reality is an even greater illusion than the world of dreams."