Ranking forensic journals through content analysis

Illustration credit: Jock Alexander, The Australian

You have no doubt heard of journal "rankings." A journal's rank conveys information about the impact and quality of a journal. This can be useful information for both authors and consumers. An author might want to consider a journal's prestige, and the difficulty getting published in it. For consumers -- including expert witnesses who might be relying on a particular article in court -- ranking can serve as a proxy for the accuracy and reliability of a journal's content. How much should the trier of fact trust the information in this journal?

But there are lots of methods for ranking journals -- the Impact Factor, the Eigenfactor, the h-index, just to name a few. And with the proliferation of journals in forensic psychology, it gets hard to keep track. Which journals have the best reputations? Which are the most cited? Which provide the broadest coverage of forensic psychology topics?

One popular way to rank-order journals is based on reference counts. How many times a journal is cited is an indicator of its reputation. In forensic psychology, according to an unpublished study by S. Black, the top-referenced journals are (in rank order):

1. Law and Human Behavior
2. Behavioral Sciences and the Law
3. British Journal of Psychiatry
4. Journal of Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology
5. American Journal of Psychiatry
6. Criminal Justice and Behavior

Now, a researcher with training in both psychology and library science has taken a somewhat different approach, devising a clever content-analysis procedure to rank-order journals in our field.

Chris Piotrowski started by screening several texts in the field and choosing terms that are popular both in research and practice. The 16 terms were: eyewitness testimony, competency to stand trial, alcoholic blackouts, infanticide, sentencing, forensic evaluations, polygraph, malingering, jury selection, homicide, diminished capacity, insanity defense, child abuse, Daubert standard, child custody and expert witness.

Next he used PsycNET, "the recognized major bibliographic resource in the social and behavioral sciences that indexes scholarly and professional journals," to run keyword searches on his 16 terms. For each search term, he rank-ordered journals based on the frequency of hits; a journal's total ranking was obtained by summing across all 16 terms.

The winners were (in rank order):

1. Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and Law
2. PsycCRITIQUES (formerly, Contemporary Psychology)
3. Law and Human Behavior
4. Behavioral Sciences and the Law
5. American Journal of Forensic Psychology
6. Journal of Psychiatry and Law
7. Bulletin of the American Academy of Psychiatry and Law
8. Mental & Physical Disability Law Reporter
9. American Journal of Psychiatry
10. American Psychologist
11. Journal of Forensic Psychology Practice
12. International Journal of Psychiatry and Law
13. Journal of Criminal Justice
14. Professional Psychology: Research and Practice
15. Journal of Applied Psychology
16. Archives of Clinical Neuropsychology
17. Psychological Reports
18. British Journal of Psychology
19. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law

I would be a little cautious about relying on this method, because the choice of keywords -- which is open to manipulation -- might influence the rankings. But as you can see, there is overlap between this method and the more traditional citation-count method used by Black. For instance, Law and Human Behavior and Behavioral Sciences and the Law made it into the top four, no matter which method was used. There are some noticeable differences as well, with several journals that were highly cited in Black's study not ranking high using this content analysis method.

For more information on the method and the exact scores for each journal, feel free to contact Dr. Piotrowski (HERE); I'm sure he will be happy to share a copy of the article, which is published in the current issue of the American Journal of Forensic Psychology.

Oh, in case you were wondering, that journal is number five on his list.

The article is: Top cited journals in forensic psychology: An analysis of the psychological literature (2012), American Journal of Forensic Psychology 30 (2), 29-38.

SCOTUS to tackle capital habeas competency right

At a criminal trial, a defendant who lacks rational understanding cannot be forced to proceed. Likewise, a person who is sentenced to death cannot be executed unless he is sane enough to grasp why he is being punished.(1)

But what happens if a prisoner loses his mind between the bookends of trial and execution, as he languishes on Death Row while his appeals wind slowly through the appellate courts? Does a prisoner have a right to be competent during the course of habeas proceedings, or can his appeals proceed without him?

After officials in 17 states urged the U.S. Supreme Court to clarify this issue, the Court signaled it would do so by agreeing to review two cases, one from Arizona and the other from Ohio.

Lawyers will be battling over various legal precedents, from English Common Law to a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling from 2003 to an obscure Supreme Court ruling from 1966.

In the case of Ernest Valencia Gonzales, Arizona attorneys contend that the Ninth Circuit “created a competency right out of thin air,” and that prisoners do not have a right to competency during federal appeals.

Gonzales

Gonzales was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death in 1991. His appeal was stayed 15 years later, after his attorneys said he had lost the ability to rationally communicate and to assist them, due to a progressive deterioration in his mental health.

In halting Gonzales’s case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which handles federal appeals in the nine western states, relied upon its earlier ruling in the case of Rohan ex rel. Gates v. Woodford (334 F.3d 803). In that 2003 decision, the court ruled that a capital habeas petitioner has a right to competency if he is pursuing “claims that could potentially benefit from his ability to communicate rationally.” That case effectively halted the execution of Oscar Gates of California, who was condemned to die for a 1979 murder.

The lawyers for the state of Arizona say the Rohan ruling plays into the hands of convicted prisoners, who “have an incentive to adopt delaying tactics to avoid execution,” thus circumventing states’ interests in carrying out their death sentences.

Gonzales's attorneys call this claim "hysterical," stating that the right to competency under Rohan is narrow in scope and has only been granted in a handful of cases. They say the right to be competent from the time of arrest all the way through to execution is well established:

An incompetent condemned prisoner’s inability to assist counsel was recognized under English Common Law…. If the condemned prisoner became of unsound mind at any point before execution, the proceedings were to be stayed. The rationale behind this rule was that the condemned prisoner’s mental disorder might prevent him from sharing with his lawyer a fact, known only to him, that could result in his life being spared. This rationale is just as relevant today.

The level of competence required during federal habeas proceedings falls "somewhere between the right to be competent to stand trial and the right to be competent to be executed," they said in their reply brief.

The U.S. Supreme Court declined a request to review the Rohan ruling, and up until now -- with one small exception -- has studiously avoided stepping in to clarify the competency rights of prisoners during federal appeals.

Carter

That exception, an obscure case back in 1966, is at the heart of the state of Ohio’s appeal in the case of Sean Carter, who is awaiting execution for the 1997 rape and murder of his adoptive grandmother.

The case, Rees v. Peyton, involved Melvin Davis Rees, Jr., a Virginia jazz musician convicted in the 1959 massacre of a family of four. When he announced that he wanted to stop all further appeals, his lawyers said they doubted his mental competency to make that decision. A psychiatrist retained by Rees's attorneys opined that Rees was mentally incompetent, while psychiatrists selected by the state expressed doubts. In a short ruling, the Supreme Court directed the federal district court to, as a first step, "make a judicial determination as to Rees' mental competence and render a report on the matter to us." The question, the high court said, was "whether [Rees] has capacity to appreciate his position and make a rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation or on the other hand whether he is suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect which may substantially affect his capacity in the premises."

Rees

Accordingly, the lower court held a hearing and determined that Rees was indeed incompetent to abandon his appeals. In a one-line order the following year, the Supreme Court put the matter on hold, and never returned to it. Rees died in prison three decades later, in 1995.

"To this day, the Rees case is shrouded in mystery," says the government’s brief in the Carter case, with different circuit courts hold starkly different views of its breadth. To the Sixth Circuit, it stands for the proposition that prisoners have a right to be competent during their appeals. Other circuits, according to the brief, have interpreted it more narrowly, to guarantee a competency right only to prisoners who have decided to abandon further appeals.

Lawyers for the state of Ohio raise similar concerns to those in Arizona, saying the stay of Carter's case, if upheld, "will improperly bring Ohio’s capital litigation to a halt. Under the Sixth Circuit's extraordinarily loose standards, any prisoner can make a minimal showing of incompetence, demand a hearing, and secure an indefinite stay of his habeas proceedings." The Sixth Circuit handles appeals from Ohio, Kentucky, Michigan and Tennessee.

The cases are Ryan v. Gonzales and Tibbals v. Carter. All of the briefs are available online, by clicking on these case links.The Supreme Court will hear arguments in the two cases during the term that begins in October, with a decision likely early next year. So far, I haven't heard much speculation on which way the wind is blowing.

Footnote 1: This is the minimalist "Ford standard" set out by the U.S. Supreme Court's 1986 opinion in Ford v. Wainwright.

Open letter opposing DSM-5 paraphilias expansion

Photo credit: Dr. Joanne Cacciatore

As readers of this blog are aware, proposals to expand the sexual disorders in the American Psychiatric Association's upcoming DSM-5 have generated significant controversy among forensic psychologists and psychiatrists. Now, forensic psychologists are banding together to urge APA President John Oldham to reject the proposed diagnoses of pedohebephilia, paraphilic coercive disorder and hypersexual disorder. The text of an open letter drafted by Richard Wollert, an Oregon psychologist with extensive experience in sex offender treatment and evaluation, follows. If, after reading it, you would like to become a signator, just click on the indicated link, and provide Dr. Wollert with your name and professional credentials. Don't delay, as I understand that this important letter is being submitted very soon. 

CLICK HERE TO ADD YOUR NAME TO THE LETTER

 

Dear Dr. Oldham:

As a mental health professional and/or sex educator I am writing to you to encourage the American Psychiatric Association to leave invalid sexual disorders out of DSM-5. 

In 1999, the Dangerous Sex Offender Task Force of the American Psychiatric Association issued a strongly worded statement about psychiatry's failed efforts to meaningfully define and classify sexual deviance. In contrast to the cautious approach advised by the Task Force, a Paraphilias Subworkgroup of the DSM-5 is vigorously lobbying for the adoption of three highly controversial expansions of sexual disorders (Hebephilia, Paraphilic Coercive Disorder, and Hypersexual Disorder). The expansions would be a major mistake, due to poor reliability, unproven validity and -- most of all -- the potential for vast and harmful unintended consequences. 

The Subworkgroup is now proposing to add a "Hebephilic" type to Pedophilia, extending the diagnosis of Pedophilia from covering those with sexual attractions to prepubescent children to those with sexual attractions to pubescent children under age 15. It also proposes to add new diagnoses of "Paraphilic Coercive Disorder" and "Hypersexual Disorder" to the Appendix as "Criteria Sets for Further Study." I am dismayed by each of these recommendations for the following reasons. 

Hebephilia lacks conceptual coherence. Most men are attracted to sexually maturing 14-year-olds, as reflected in the large number of industrialized countries where the age of sexual consent is 14 (Green, 2010). Normative attractions may be criminal when acted upon, but they should not be labeled as mental disorders. "Hebephilia" is an archaic term that languished in psychiatric obscurity until the passage of modern civil commitment laws in the United States (Franklin, 2010). Since then, some evaluators who confuse statutory rape with mental disorder have invoked Hebephilia as a condition that justifies civil commitment (Ewing, 2011). Such usages do not provide a cogent explanation for behavior that is illegal in the United States but legal in other countries being classified as a mental disorder. Finally, Hebephilia lacks adequate diagnostic reliability (Wollert and Cramer, 2011). Most of the research has been conducted by a single Canadian research team that is overly represented on the Paraphilias Subworkgroup. Although the DSM-5 Task Force has indicated that final decisions about proposed revisions will be made on the basis of field trial data, a November 2011 change in the proposed criteria for the diagnosis rules out the application of even this meager safeguard. 

Paraphilic Coercive Disorder (PCD) was initially proposed for inclusion in DSM-5 as a diagnosis that would be limited to men who preferred rape over consensual sex. Because only a very small percentage of rapists prefer rape over consensual intercourse (American Psychiatric Association, 1999), clinicians are unable to reliably apply this label (Wollert, 2011). This is one reason for the American Psychiatric Association's consistent rejection of rape-based paraphilias in three previous editions of the DSM (Zander, 2008). In the face of overwhelming opposition, the Subworkgroup has taken the fallback position of recommending PCD only for inclusion in the Appendix as a condition meriting "further study." However, this would confer an undeserved back-door legitimacy to the invalid construct. Rather than a mental disorder, rape is a crime for which the proper placement is prison. 

The proposed criteria for Hypersexual Disorder (HD) are the product of a recent ad hoc literature review by Martin Kafka, a member of the Subworkgroup. His review indicated their validity has not been empirically confirmed. Given the inherent difficulty in determining at what point a normal human drive becomes abnormal, it is not surprising that the proposed diagnosis is marred by conceptual confusion and vague verbal anchors (Moser, 2011). Its poor reliability and validity will translate to a high rate of false positives in both civil commitment trials and outpatient clinics that serve the community in general. With the proposal becoming a magnet for ridicule both by academic scholars and the popular press, it too has been relegated to the Appendix. However, the Appendix was not intended as a storage site for criteria sets that, like Hypersexuality Disorder, have never been tested. 

These three proposals all lack adequate empirical support. They will increase false positive diagnoses by labeling behaviors that are normative, developmental, or criminal as mental disorders. Promoting the misclassification of juveniles and other vulnerable populations as dangerous sex offenders, they will undermine the reputation of forensic practitioners and those who study sexual behavior. Collectively, professions that endorse the use of unreliable diagnoses run the risk of losing their credibility. 

The British Psychological Society, the American Counseling Association, and the Society for Humanistic Psychology and many other divisions of the American Psychological Association have all submitted petitions or letters of concern to the American Psychiatric Association regarding revisions proposed for the DSM-5. These documents express concerns about the lack of empirical support for many DSM-5 proposals, the likelihood of “false-positive epidemics” flowing from decreased diagnostic thresholds, and the negative effects of "over-medicalizing" human behavior. They also point out that the prevention of false-positive epidemics should take precedence over "nomenclatural exploration" and that the temptation to adopt new diagnoses should be tempered by the recognition that diagnostic labels tend to be confounded with normative social expectations. 

I share these concerns as they apply to sexual disorders. I further support the adoption of sexual disorder criteria sets only after they have been established to have high true positive rates and acceptable false positive rates. Therefore, I urge the DSM Task Force to remove the Hebephilia qualifier from the proposed diagnosis of Pedophilia, and to eliminate Paraphilic Coercive Disorder and Hypersexual Disorder from any inclusion in the DSM-5. 

Sincerely, 

CLICK HERE TO ADD YOUR NAME TO THE LETTER

(email your name and professional credentials to Dr. Wollert)

References 

American Psychiatric Association (1999). Dangerous sex offenders: A task forcereport of the American Psychiatric Association. Washington D. C.: American Psychiatric Association.

Ewing, C. P. (2011). Justice perverted: Sex offense law, psychology, and public policy. New York: Oxford University Press. 

Franklin, K. (2010). Hebephilia: Quintessence of diagnostic pretextuality. BehavioralSciences and the Law, 28, 751-768. 

Green, R. (2010). Sexual preference for 14-year-olds as a mental disorder: You can’t be serious!! [letter to the editor]. Archives of Sexual Behavior, 39, 585-586. 

Moser, C. (2011). Hypersexual Disorder: Just more muddled thinking [letter to theeditor]. Archives of Sexual Behavior, 40, 227-229. 

Wollert, R. (2011). Paraphilic Coercive Disorder does not belong in DSM-5 forstatistical, historical, conceptual, and practical reasons [letter to the editor]. Archives of Sexual Behavior, 40, 1097-1098. 

Wollert, R. & Cramer, E. (2011). Sampling extreme groups invalidates research on the Paraphilias. Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 29, 554-565. 

Zander, T. (2008). Commentary: Inventing diagnosis for civil commitment of rapists. The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, 36, 459-469.

Hebephilia bites the dust -- again

  Federal judge rules that faux diagnosis cannot be basis for civil detention 

In yet another blow to those seeking to expand mental illness in order to civilly detain U.S. citizens for possible future crimes, a judge has again held that the faux diagnosis of  "hebephilia" is not valid for this purpose.The Good Friday ruling was one in a string of defeats for the federal government in its efforts to civilly detain ex-convicts under the Adam Walsh Act.

Judge Terrence Boyle rejected the testimony of two government psychologists who had diagnosed George Hamelin with hebephilia based on his sexual misconduct with one 13-year-old boy and another boy under the age of 13 (whose precise age was not specified).

Calvin Klein billboard: Fashion industry banking on hebephilia

As opposed to pedophilia, hebephilia involves sexual attraction to youths who have reached puberty. The controversial diagnosis was first proposed by a team of psychologists at a sex clinic up in Toronto. Two members of the Canadian team also belong to the sexual disorders work group for the DSM-5, the upcoming revision of the American Psychiatric Association’s influential diagnostic manual. With sexually violent predator statutes enacted by the federal government and 20 U.S. states requiring a mental disorder as a prerequisite for civil commitment, government evaluators have taken to invoking the label against sex offenders who are neither pedophiles nor rapists.

Wrote the judge in rejecting the label as a basis for civil commitment:

Hebephilia is not listed as an accepted mental disorder in the DSM-IV-TR. Although hebephilia has been proposed to be included as a mental disorder in the revision of the DSM, it has been rejected as a proper mental disorder by numerous psychologists…. [N]oted mental health professionals have opined that sexual arousal to pubescent and post-pubescent minors is not an inherently deviant sexual interest, albeit one that, in this country, if acted on might violate the law.

The Court finds persuasive the testimony of Dr. [Joseph] Plaud on this issue, who states in his report that "a possible diagnosis of a deviant sexual interest in pubescent/post-pubescent males, termed by some psychologists as 'paraphilia NOS hebephilia/ephebophilia,' ... is an invalid diagnosis."

Given that the characterization of hebephilia is a contested issue in the mental health community, the Court finds that it would be inappropriate to predicate civil commitment on a diagnosis that a large number of clinical psychologists believe is not a diagnosis at all, at least for forensic purposes.

I hope the American Psychiatric Association is listening. If they let the proposed diagnosis of pedohebephilia sneak into the DSM-5, it will only contribute to the already massive outpouring of criticism being leveled against them for expanding the range of mental illnesses. A grassroots petition protesting the diagnostic expansions has garnered almost 13,000 signatures to date.

My report on Judge Boyle's January ruling rejecting hebephilia in the case of Jeffrey Neuhauser (Federal judge tosses hebephilia as basis for civil detention) is HERE. My online resource page on hebephilia is HERE. Wikipedia has further background and links on the controversial diagnosis. A USA Today probe of the beleaguered federal SVP program is HERE.

New competency resources

Case report added to resources page

Thanks to colleague Denis Zavodny, who found this report on the web, I have added another competency case to the rogue's gallery. For those of you who don't know, this is a collection of publicly accessible resources on legal competencies that I put together some time back. For training purposes, I have found that it's hard to beat real-life reports and videos, especially from high-profile or otherwise fascinating cases.

 

The newest report is on Thomas A. Shay (bottom right photo, above), arrested in 1991 for a bomb blast that killed one Boston police officer and maimed another.  A Bridgeport State Hospital psychologist found nothing wrong with him other than a bad case of immaturity and self-centeredness.

CLICK HERE TO GO TO THE COMPETENCY RESOURCES PAGE 

New review of competency assessment tests

Marvin Acklin

The Journal of Personality Assessment has just published a handy overview of three competency assessment instruments. The report, by Hawaii forensic psychologist (and forensic psychology blogger!) Marvin Acklin, focuses on the psychometric properties of two tests that are fast becoming standards, as well as a newer test of response style that’s still on shakier ground.

Acklin describes the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool-Criminal Adjudication (MacCAT-CA) and the Evaluation of Competency to Stand Trial–Revised (ECST-R) as indispensable to the forensic clinician's toolbox, a statement with which we would all likely agree. 

He especially lauds the MacCAT-CA, "the queen of CST instruments," because its vignette method enables us to drill down into the defendant's core reasoning skills, essential to decisional competency. The ECST-R, meanwhile, is most useful when the issue is psychosis and malingered psychosis. On the negative side, he points out, neither instrument provides sufficient sampling of basic legal knowledge, which must be ascertained through a detailed interview.

Acklin is less sanguine about the new Inventory of Legal Knowledge (ILK), developed to assess for malingered incompetency. Echoing Steve Rubenzer's astute critique in the Open Access Journal of Forensic Psychology, he notes concern about the its potentially high rate of false positives, or people falsely labeled as malingerers. This has been a concern of mine, too; the recommended cut score of 47 lends itself to overdiagnosis of malingering in adversarial settings.

The article, The Forensic Clinician's Toolbox I: A Review of Competency to Stand Trial (CST) Instruments, may be requested directly from the author (HERE).

"Mental Competency: Best Practices Model"

And since we're on the topic of competency resources, don't forget to check out the National Judicial College's newly launched website. It's got a lot to offer. My previous blog post on the site, with links to it, is HERE.

180-year sentence overturned over lack of mental health testimony

  Lawyer erred by not calling psychologist, appellate court holds   

A trial counsel’s failure to call a psychologist to testify at the sentencing hearing of a Missouri man with borderline intelligence constitutes reversible error, an appellate court has ruled.

The court upheld a trial court decision that the attorney's performance was deficient, and that the failure to present psychological evidence may have prejudiced the defendant.

A jury deliberated for just a little over an hour at the sentencing hearing of 24-year-old Skylor Radmer before recommending a prison sentence of 180 years. Earlier, the jury had convicted him of two counts of statutory sodomy for molesting his 5-year-old niece.

In upholding the lower-court ruling reversing the sentence, the Court of Appeals for the Western District of Missouri said that psychological testimony about Radmer's borderline intelligence might have resulted in a different outcome.

Radmer's attorney, Bert Godding, knew about Radmer's intellectual handicap because he had represented him in a prior case in which his comprehension of a police Miranda warning was at issue. In that case, he retained psychologist Bill Geis, who testified at an evidentiary hearing that Radmer was functioning at the borderline intellectual level, with an IQ score of 75.

At a hearing on the ineffective assistance claim, Dr. Geis testified that Radmer's low intelligence might have been relevant to explaining his sex offending as a product of poor judgment rather than pedophilia.

The trial attorney also testified at the hearing, admitting that he had no strategic reason for not calling a mental health expert to testify at the sentencing phase of the trial: "I don't believe that I necessarily had a reason not to or to do that," he testified. "I don't know why I didn't call someone like that."

The appellate court rejected the prosecution’s argument that the jury would have found Dr. Geis biased because he had worked for the public defender in the past. Geis is a research professor at the University of Missouri-Kansas City.

The defense lawyer's "failure to call Dr. Geis or a similar expert during the sentencing phase fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," the appellate court unanimously held.

Hat tip: Ken Pope

Damning reconstruction of notorious false confession case

Here's one from the annals of outrageous true crime cases:

On April 17, 1989, a woman was practicing tai chi in New York's Central Park, when a man sexually assaulted her. The rape was interrupted by a passerby who heard her yelling, but not before the woman was severely beaten to the point of requiring hospitalization. The woman gave police a detailed description of her attacker, including the fact that he had fresh stitches on his chin. Checking local hospitals, a detective found a match to an 18-year-old Puerto Rican man who worked nearby.

Mysteriously, the man was never questioned. The victim left town, the detective was transferred out of the sex crimes unit, and the case was closed as unsolved.

But as it turned out, this wasn't just one more rape in the Big Apple.

The East Side Slasher

The man escalated his attacks, terrorizing women in New York City. Dubbed the "East Side Slasher," he raped at least five other women and murdered one. His pattern was to beat or stab the women around the eyes, so they would not be able to identify him.

He was finally caught, when a woman broke free from him and alerted her doorman and a neighbor, who subdued him. Within hours, he had confessed on videotape to four rapes and the murder. With eyewitness identification and DNA evidence conclusively tying him to the crimes, he took a deal of 33 years to life.

Have you recognized this case yet?

While police knew that Matias Reyes was slashing and raping women around Manhattan's East Side during 1988 and 1989, there was one case they didn't think to link him to. That was the assault on Trisha Meili on April 19, 1989, as she was jogging in Central Park -- an assault that would quickly rivet the world.

Trisha Meili

In hindsight, it seems incomprehensible that Reyes was not a suspect. The crime fit his modus operandi, in that Meili was beaten most heavily around her eyes. The assault occurred just two days after the one on the tai chi practitioner, also in Central Park. And, most amazingly, a police officer who knew Reyes chatted with him as he strolled out of the park just minutes after Meili was raped and left for dead.

On his head, Reyes was wearing the victim’s distinctive headphones.

Reyes left his DNA behind. But police never thought to compare it to him. Not until more than a decade later, after he voluntarily confessed.

As we now know, police failed to consider Reyes as a possible suspect in the infamous Central Park Jogger case because they already had their suspects: A group of African American and Latino boys who were causing trouble in the park that night.

Sarah Burns

Through legal documents and myriad interviews (including with Matias Reyes), author Sarah Burns reconstructs this landmark miscarriage of justice, focusing on the role of racism in generating a collective hysteria that overwhelmed all reason: "Race not only inspired the extreme reactions to the crime; it also made it easier for so many to believe that these five teenaged boys had committed the crime in the first place, and no one was suggesting that they might, in fact, be innocent."

(Actually, a couple of intrepid columnists from New York Newsday, Jim Dwyer and Carol Agus, were expressing public doubts during the trial about the strength of the evidence connecting the youths to the crime, but their voices were not enough to turn the tide of public opinion. "We are waiting to see if there is any believable evidence that will connect these kids to the crime. So far, we haven't heard any," wrote Agus. And when referring to one of the youths' statement to police, both columnists placed quotation marks around the word confession, expressing skpeticism that it was authentic, Burns notes. Wrote columnist Dwyer, "nothing close to the words in this statement ... ever sat on the lips of a 14 and a half year old.")

Burns provides fascinating insights into the investigatory myopia that is so often present in false confession cases. Based on her access to the entire trial transcripts, she also critiques the weak defenses the boys received, which made their convictions all the more guaranteed. And she corrects much of the misleading mythology built up around the case. For instance, these boys were not the serious delinquents that the media portrayed them as, nor did most of them come from broken homes.

The first trial

Perhaps most amazing about this case is the vitriolic manner in which certain media outlets and high-profile people continue to insist that the boys are guilty, despite all evidence to the contrary. I hope this excellent historical reconstruction may help to set the record straight. I'm also looking forward to the documentary, which Burns is now working on with her father, filmmaker Ken Burns.

My Amazon review of The Central Park Five: A Chronicle of a City Wilding, is HERE. (If you like it, please click "yes," this review was helpful.) 

POSTSCRIPT:  You've read (or at least read about) the book; now see the movie. The Central Park Five just premiered at a special screening in Cannes. National broadcast on PBS is planned for 2013 or 2014. Meanwhile, the filmmakers -- who include book author Sarah Burns, her father Ken Burns and David McMahon -- are angling for a theatrical release. The Hollywood Reporter has the Cannes review (HERE).

'Case of the missing militant' resolved

Attorney Paul Harris
reads from  To Kill A Mockingbird.*
Photo credit: San Jose Mercury

A quick update on the case of Ronald Bridgeforth, the man I blogged about who turned himself in on shooting charges after 42 years underground: A judge in San Mateo County imposed a very reasonable sentence of one year in county jail. The judge also ordered Bridgeforth to work with at-risk youth in Alameda County (Oakland), California upon his release. That should be no problem for the 67-year-old former militant, who has dedicated his  life to public service.

My original post, Predicting behavior: The case of the missing militant, is HERE.The San Mateo Times and The Daily Mail (UK) have more on the sentencing. A San Jose Mercury slide show is HERE.

*I don't know what passage from To Kill A Mockingbird the defense attorney was reading from at the sentencing hearing, but I am curious.

USA Today probe: Federal SVP program crumbling

Constitutionality of lengthy sex offender detentions questioned

In the six years since the U.S. government authorized civil detention for dangerous sex offenders, it has sought to commit 136 men. Out of those, it has won civil commitments of only 15, or 11 percent.

In contrast, it has either lost, or been forced to dismiss, 61 cases, or 45 percent. (Actually, make that 62.*)

The remaining 59 men (43 percent) are languishing in prison, locked in legal limbo while their cases await resolution. (A 136th man has died.)

An investigative report by USA Today paints a picture of federal prosecutors and their prison "experts" as flailing in their efforts to establish that they qualify as "sexually dangerous persons." The legal criteria for this designation include a history of sexually violent conduct or child molestation and a mental illness that would cause the person difficulty in refraining from such behavior if released.

I put the word "expert" in quotes because many of the prison psychologists drafted to conduct these evaluations and testify in court had no prior experience and little or no training when the law went into effect. As the former psychologist in charge told USA Today, "It was rushed, and initially, I believe, quality probably suffered."

The government's cases "have crumbled because of weak evidence, faulty psychological evaluations and an inability to convince judges the detainees have mental conditions so serious they will find it difficult to not re-offend," the USA Today reports. Due to the low levels of recidivism among convicted sex offenders, "even when the government can prove someone committed sex crimes, it has struggled to show he remains dangerous."

Brad Heath and Amanda Muscavage reviewed thousands of pages of legal filings and interviewed dozens of attorneys, psychologists and former detainees for their report. Their interactive website includes links to 290 documents that they have made available online.

USA Today reporter Brad Heath

In one amazing quote, the psychologist who formerly ran the civil commitment program at Butner, the prison in North Carolina where the detainees are being held, all but admits that clinicians certified men as sexually dangerous even knowing that they did not meet the legal criteria.

"If we thought someone was really dangerous but there wasn't a strong legal case, we might very well still push it for the public interest," Anthony Jimenez said. "Hopefully justice is served in the end."

This is the "consequentialist" approach advocated by some in the sex offender industry, who claim that sexually violent predator cases represent an exception to general forensic practice, in which the end (protecting the public) justifies the means. If anything, however, the high stakes involved when people are threatened with a loss of liberty for something that they might do in the future would seem to demand the opposite approach, of even greater caution and transparency in diagnosis and risk assessment.

As Fred Berlin, the director of the Sexual Behaviors Consultation Unit at the Johns Hopkins Hospital, told the reporters: "We need to be very, very careful in a free society about a system in which a group of people can make statements that result in someone being deprived of their liberty for a future crime. If it's going to be done, it has to be done in a just and fair manner."

One reason for the government’s quagmire is that the federal cases are decided by a judge, rather than a jury. The seasoned judges hearing these cases are less likely to let their emotional reactions to past crimes, some of them pretty upsetting, distract them from the government's legal burden of proof.

For example, in the recent trial of Markis Revland (which I blogged about HERE), the offender had admitted to 149 child molestations. However, the judge found that the government had failed to prove that any of these incidents actually happened, or that Revland had a genuine mental illness.

Similarly, at the trial of Jeffrey Neuhauser (which I blogged about HERE), the judge rejected the controversial label of "hebephilia" as a legitimate mental illness qualifying someone for involuntary detention.

Unfortunately, because they only had access to records that have been made public, the USA Today team didn't have the 411 on some of the most egregious attempts to civilly detain low-risk prisoners. In one case I am familiar with, the government spent four years pursuing civil commitment against a man who was quite clearly not mentally ill, not a rapist, not a pedophile, and not dangerous, only to dismiss the case on the eve of trial.

This case points to an aspect that I wished the USA Today team had delved into: The unusual nature of the federal sex offender population. Although those eligible for civil commitment are supposed to be the worst of the worst, in reality Butner's population is heavily weighted toward an unlikely admixture of:

• Men convicted of possessing or distributing online child pornography, criminalized in 2003, and

• Native Americans.

The second group was the surprise to me. Unlike routine sex offenses that are prosecuted in state courts, crimes committed on Indian reservations are federal offenses.

Up until now, neither the U.S. Justice Department nor any watchdog agency has expressed public concern with whether the the federal civil commitment scheme, with its haphazard and capricious implementation, passes Constitutional muster.

Hopefully, this USA Today report will bring some much-needed attention to just what is going on down there in North Carolina.

Prior blog posts about the federal civil commitment prosecutions:

• Civil commitment petition against Butner, NC prisoner dismissed (Jan. 5, 2012)
• Federal judge tosses hebephilia as basis for civil detention (Jan. 20, 2012)

*The situation remains fluid. Right after the publication of the USA Today report five days ago, I have learned that the government lost yet another trial. This despite a 200-page report from a government expert assigning Steven Wiseman a panoply of mental disorders, including pedophilia, hebephilia and antisocial personality disorder.

Report: 2,500 serving life for crimes committed as children

United States far out of step with global community

Photo credit: Richard Ross, Juvenile in Justice

"Life without possibility of parole for a 13-year-old?!" a European colleague exclaimed, clearly disbelieving my story.

With the Land of the Free far out of step with the rest of the world, wonderment over our criminal justice policies is not uncommon internationally, but nowhere moreso than regarding our treatment of juveniles. We are the only country in the world who condemns juveniles to spend their entire life behind bars for crimes committed as children.

(We're also way out of step in our overall incarceration rates and in our penchant for solitary confinement, too, but that's another story -- see today's New York Times for more on that.)

Now, the first-ever national survey documents numbers far higher than even I imagined: Not just a handful, but more than 2,500 Americans are serving life without parole for crimes committed before the age of 18.

The oldest prisoner in the survey, now 67, has served half a century in prison so far. Just stop for a moment and ponder the implications of that.

The Sentencing Project's report, The Lives of Juvenile Lifers, comes just weeks before the U.S. Supreme Court hears oral arguments in the cases of two 14-year olds, Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs, which will address questions about the constitutionality of sentencing teens to life without the possibility of parole.

The national survey draws a portrait of severe disadvantage experienced by those serving life sentences without parole: Juvenile lifers were exposed to high levels of violence in their homes and their communities. Among the 45 girls serving life, three-fourths experienced sexual abuse before their crimes.

"Most juveniles serving life without parole sentences experienced trauma and neglect long before they engaged in their crimes," stated Ashley Nellis, research analyst of The Sentencing Project and author of the report. "The findings from this survey do not excuse the crimes committed but they help explain them. With time, rehabilitation and maturity, some of these youth could one day safely re-enter society and contribute positively to their families and their communities."

It will come as no surprise to most of you that race has much to do with who gets this draconian sentence. African Americans, who make up only 12 percent of the U.S. population, represented 60 percent of these children -- five times their proportion of the population, They are especially likely to be serving life without parole if they killed a white person.

From a fiscal standpoint alone, the report notes, the costs to states of incarcerating someone from their teens into their twilight years, when health costs rise steeply, is at least $2 million per prisoner.

The report advocates spending more money on prevention programs, instead of warehousing:

Instead of spending scarce resources on warehousing lives that could be transformed, we could be spending money more wisely, helping victims, and improving public safety. The nonpartisan American Law Institute recommends a “second look” after 10 years of imprisonment for life-sentenced youth. Notwithstanding the probability that most prisoners would not be granted release after only 10 years, if even one eligible inmate was determined to be ready for release upon this “second look,” this could save a typical state $1.8 million in needless incarceration. The money saved could instead be directed at prevention and intervention programs that have a strong evidence-base in lowering crime: preschool programs, parenting skills development, multi-systemic therapy, vocational training, substance abuse treatment, and a host of other effective interventions that would reduce crime and repair families and communities from damage associated with violence.

The full report, which I highly recommend, can be read or downloaded HERE.

Of related interest:

Another Bite at the Graham Cracker: The Supreme Court's Surprise Revisiting of Juvenile Life Without Parole in Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs, by by Scott Hechinger, Georgetown Law Journal

Life, with dementia (New York Times article about the growing problem of dementia behind bars)
 

Hat tip: BRUCE

Internet stings: Does the fantasy defense hold water?

Scott Ritter, the former U.N. weapons inspector, was among the most vocal in insisting that the Bush administration fabricated its claims of “weapons of mass destruction” in order to justify the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

Ritter didn’t receive much public gratitude for his efforts to avert a costly and destructive war. Instead, he lost his career and his life gradually unraveled. Sinking deeper into depression, he fled into chat rooms, where he arranged rendezvous with adult women willing to watch him masturbate. At first, the meetings took place in cars or out-of-the-way places. Later, he switched to using a webcam, according to a profile by Matt Bai in the New York Times Magazine.

Then came that fateful day in February 2009 on which, in a Yahoo chat room for adults, he conversed with “Emily.” Although she told him she was 15, Emily was actually a small-town police officer, trolling for sexual predators online.

After doing his usual thing of masturbating in front of the webcam, Ritter announced he was signing off to take a shower.

Not so fast, retorted the officer:

"U know ur in a lot of trouble, don’t you? I’m a undercover police officer. U need to call me ASAP."

"Nah," Ritter typed back. "Your not 15. Yahoo is for 18 and over. It’s all fantasy. No crime."

"I have your phone number and I will be getting your IP address from Yahoo and your carrier," the officer responded. "We can do this 2 ways call me and you can turn yourself in at a latter date or I’ll get a warrant for you and come pick you up."

Ritter turned himself in. At his trial, he testified that he never for a moment believed he was talking to a minor; he assumed he was chatting with a bored housewife pretending to be 15.

Unfortunately for Ritter, jurors were told of his two prior arrests in similar cases, for which he was never prosecuted. In both cases, undercover police had lured him into meetings with fictional teenage girls. His claim that he knew that he was actually talking to undercover police in both cases likely strained the credulity of jurors, who convicted him in the case of “Emily.”

After hearing testimony from a government evaluator who called Ritter a sexually violent predator, the judge sentenced him late last year to a prison term of 18 months to five and a half years.

Fantasy defense succeeds in Queensland

Had it not been for his two earlier cases, Ritter’s defense might not have been all that far-fetched. After all, it worked for Darryl Plumridge of Queensland, Australia back in 2007.

Just like Ritter, Plumridge engaged in online chat with an undercover police officer posing as a teenage girl, in this case a 13-year-old with the screen name of “Erin Princess Baby.”

His defense was simple, according to a forthcoming article in Psychiatry, Psychology and Law: “He claimed that he knew the person with whom he was communicating was an older male and he was simply role playing.”

At trial, he testified that the covert police operative inadvertently supplied various content cues as to his true age and gender. For example, he signed off by saying "see ya later alligator," something no self-respecting 21st-century girl would say. Even more tellingly, he accidentally said he ("she") was at the office when "she" was supposed to be home from school, a glaring error that "she" immediately corrected.

Plumridge was acquitted. 

Study: Can people see through online deception?

Criminologist Robyn Lincoln of Bond University and forensic psychologist Ian R. Coyle, a Gold Coast practitioner and associate professor of law who testified in the case, decided to conduct a study to test the plausibility of Plumridge’s defense. Given the flat nature of internet communication, lacking in physical or tonal cues, can people actually deduce the true age and gender of someone who is pretending to be someone else?

Bottom line? Yes, they often can.

Lincoln and Coyle randomly assigned 46 students as either "deceivers" or "receivers." Each volunteer participant was met off-site and individually led to one of several private study locations, to preclude chance encounters with other participants. Deceivers were instructed to play the role of a 13-year-old girl. Receivers, in contrast, were misled to believe that they might be talking with individuals ranging in age from young children to the elderly. The pairs then chatted with each other for 30 minutes.

Despite the deceivers' best efforts, the majority of receivers were able to correctly identify the age and gender of the person with whom they were chatting, within a five-year bandwidth. None of the receivers believed they were talking to someone under the age of 16.

Thus, the claims of Plumridge and Ritter, that they knew they were chatting with adults but ignored that reality for purposes of fantasy role-playing, appear to have some scientific basis.

As law enforcement officers increasingly partake in trolling the internet for sexual predators in their spare time, it is probably only a matter of time before the Bond University study is introduced into court as evidence.

The study, "No one Knows you’re a Dog on the Internet: Implications for Proactive Police Investigation of Sexual Offenders," has been accepted for publication in Psychiatry, Psychology and Law. Correspondence may be directed to the first author, Robyn Lincoln.

On providing invited testimony in a legislative hearing

Reflections of a forensic psychologist

Floyd L. Jennings, JD, PhD, a clinical psychologist and attorney with a long-time clinical practice, currently works in county government to address the problems of the chronically mentally ill in the criminal justice system. In this capacity, he testified this week before a state legislative committee. Here, he reflects on that experience:

As special resource counsel to the Mental Health Division of the Harris County Public Defender (Houston, Texas), I was asked to provide testimony to the Texas House Subcommittee on Criminal Jurisprudence -- and did so on 29 February 2012.

For those having a history of legislative contact, serving as a witness in a hearing may be not at all discomforting. But to one for whom it was a new experience it was quite different.

First, the charge of the committee was to address whether alternative sentencing for mentally ill persons would be desirable. I argued simply that no changes in sentencing were needed -- because it would be difficult to craft, impossible to implement as it would trade on definitions of applicability, and moreover, courts already have the option of considering a defendant's state of mind as either mitigating or exculpating. 

On the other hand, diversion strategies for the lower-level misdemeanor offender could have enormous cost benefits and not compromise public safety. As well, pre-trial jail psychiatric services could be provided at modest direct cost through the use of physician extenders, and provide just that opportunity for stabilization necessary to enable rapid disposition of the matter, shortening any period of confinement. Finally, I argued that opportunities for post-disposition placement tiered to the acuity of the person would dramatically reduce recidivism.

Second, the affective dimensions of proffering testimony are profound -- the setting is elegant and the committee is seated above the witness much like justices in a supreme court. Witnesses are presented with questions for which there are often no easy answers, but to which some response must be made. My case was no exception.

Third, I learned that the lucidity of the argument may have little consequence. I was upbraided for failing to provide the legislature with specific means of cost savings through transfer of mental health services to the "private sector", although there is no private sector entity with the duty to provide mental health services to the chronically mentally ill on a statewide basis. And even if existing, no private sector entity has the resources to provide such. The tone of questions made it plain that legislators would prefer to have government provide all the goods and services that governments rightly provide, but at no cost, or with private sector funding.

Fourth, the venue of a public hearing is no occasion for stirring rhetoric or confrontation. I felt I should have reminded the committee that the present moment is not the occasion for abandonment of those functions which are uniquely governmental -- the care of the weakest members of society who are ill equipped to care for themselves. But in retrospect, and having viewed the videotape of the proceeding, it was far the better to have remained on task, and narrowly focused upon the committee's charge.

Finally, the message for psychologists, and mental health providers in general, is multifold: Involvement in the legislative process is to venture into unfamiliar and discomforting territory. However, social change is rarely achieved in a sterile environment, or one involving only warm and supportive exchanges. Moreover, to call upon governmental entities to fulfill their statutory duty as well as higher moral purpose, it to expose oneself to a certain amount of discord. In short, it goes with the territory. 

Would I do it again? 

I hope so, because in the course of the day I realized there were many I knew personally who were also participating in the process and there is also something rewarding about believing that perhaps you touched even one person having decision-making power to effectuate change.

The video of Dr. Jennings’ testimony is online HERE (beginning at 1:44:50).

Australians: Proposed paraphilia diagnoses 'dangerously circular'

Proposed expansions of the sexual disorders in the DSM are getting negative attention Down Under, with critics worried about the blurring of lines between bad behavior and mental illness, according to an article in today's Sydney Morning Herald.

The article in Australia's fourth-largest newspaper focuses on the expansion of pedophilia to include a hebephelic subtype and the placement of a "so-called paraphilic coercive disorder" (rape-proneness) in the upcoming manual's appendix as a proposed condition meriting further study.

Most mental health professionals in Australia use the American Psychiatric Association's diagnostic nomenclature, enshrined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), rather than the International Classification of Diseases (IMD), the international standard promulgated by the World Health Organization.

Australian psychiatrists and psychologists worry that the sexual disorder expansions will pave the way for more civil detention, in violation of the United Nations' International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or, conversely, may be used by sex offenders to minimize or avoid legal punishment.

Indeed, in a case currently in the news in Melbourne, a well-known chef who sexually exploited vulnerable 13- and 14-year-old girls has introduced expert testimony on hebephilia as a mitigating factor. At a presentencing hearing, a defense-retained psychiatrist testified that Simon Humble suffered from hebephilia and would find prison difficult.

In addition to quoting clinicians and scholars in Australia, reporter Amy Corderoy reached across the Pacific to discuss the issue with your faithful blogger, a recent guest in Queensland; her article links back to this blog.