Calif.: Attack on custody evaluators quashed

The California Assembly's Judiciary Committee has quashed the proposal to strip quasi-judicial immunity from family court evaluators in California that I reported on recently. The bill garnered widespread opposition from judges, attorneys, psychologists, mediators, and other professionals involved with the family courts.

In an insightful analysis, Judiciary Committee counsel Leora Gershenzon wrote about the bill's potential unintended consequences to the courts and to the very children it was ostensibly meant to protect:

Suppose the parents are locked in a bitter custody battle, with one parent raising allegations of child abuse. Today, the court may appoint an expert to look into the allegations. If this bill becomes law, the court may not be able to find an expert to assist the court in gathering information on which to base a decision. Even if the court does find a willing evaluator, the evaluator, if he or she does not have absolute proof that the parent is abusing the child, may be very reluctant to raise such claims … for fear of being sued by the potentially abusive parent. Without this information, the court may unknowingly award custody to the child abuser, the very opposite goal of this legislation....

[Or] consider the situation where one parent has significant sums of money. Suppose this parent has been bullying the other parent, and the children, and dragging on the underlying custody litigation for years. The evaluator appointed in this case, again assuming one can be found, would almost certainly know that if she says anything too negative about the wealthy parent that she will be sued down the road. Assuming the evaluator chooses to continue the evaluation, she may, out of fear of future litigation, simply write a vague report with little information to help the court in making its difficult decision. Without that critical information, the court may award custody to the bullying parent and take the children away from the parent who has been trying to protect them.

The California Judges Association vigorously opposed the bill, stating it would cause significant hardship for the courts. It cited the 1990 opinion of Howard v. Drapkin, which held that quasi-judicial immunity was essential for professionals who help the overburdened judiciary: "Without such immunity, such persons will be reluctant to accept court appointments or provide work product for the courts' use. Additionally, the threat of civil liability may affect the manner in which they perform their jobs." Wrote the Judges Association:

Never has the Howard holding been truer than today. Consider the Los Angeles Superior Court, which conducts the largest alternative dispute resolution (ADR) program in the country. Tens of thousands of mediations, arbitrations, evaluations, and settlement conferences take place each year in LA.... Los Angeles Superior Court is already laying off employees and closing courtrooms to make ends meet. It relies heavily on ADR to administer justice efficiently and effectively while reducing the backlog of cases. Strip neutrals of their quasi-judicial immunity and Los Angeles Superior Court, along with the rest of the Judiciary, is sure to be overburdened by the additional weight of having to try all the cases that would otherwise have been taken care of through ADR.

I am informed that at last week's hearing, the bill's author, Assembly member Jim Beall, agreed to amend the bill to instead establish a framework for a statewide grievance system for parents in the family court system.

Some sort of a quality-control mechanism is essential to protect against shoddy child custody evaluations. This benefits everyone -- parents, the courts, and the majority of hard-working, ethical professionals in the field. However, the need for a brand-new grievance mechanism is less clear, because California law already mandates that each county establish grievance procedures for family court cases. (Here are sample forms from San Diego County and Santa Clara County.)

Unfortunately, local compliance with this law (Rule of Court 1257) is uneven, encouraging parents who are dissatisfied with an evaluator's report or testimony to file complaints with the state Board of Psychology. So, rather than setting up an entirely new system with lots of unknowns, a better solution might be for all of the counties to implement the procedures that are already mandated.

The defeat of Beall's poorly thought out proposal is certainly welcome news. As opponents noted, the consequences could have been catastrophic for both family courts and the families who use them. If professionals were stripped of the legal protections that allow them to feel confident enough to issue ethical and neutral opinions, the most qualified and ethical evaluators -- those who are in high demand and have plenty of other types of work to fall back on -- would have fled this high-conflict arena in droves. This in turn would have left only shoddy practitioners, driven the costs of evaluations beyond the reach of all but the rich, and further overburdened other state services.

However, we still don't know what Beall intends with this grievance procedure. Who will be chosen to evaluate the evaluators? What qualifications and knowledge will they have? How will they be appointed and what will assure their neutrality and expertise? What remedies will exist if fault is found with an evaluation? Will this body have the ability to impose sanctions, thereby driving up the cost of malpractice insurance, a cost which will ultimately be passed along to the consumers? Much remains unknown.

Litigious parents are the wealthy extreme

When I reported on this issue two weeks ago, I unwittingly dipped the tip of my pinkie finger into the lake of vitriol in which high-conflict child custody cases float. I was deluged with comments, most of them unpublishable because they contained slanderous comments about individuals involved in specific litigation.

I guess I should have expected this. After all, the parents who end up in high-conflict custody battles are the angriest and most litigious fraction of divorcing parents. The courts call upon psychologists and other experts to assist in only a tiny minority -- somewhere between 2 and 4 percent -- of the messiest and most complex cases. Many of the parents that psychologists evaluate are so consumed by pathological narcissism that they are incapable of seeing their role in damaging or destroying their own children.

An example of the extremes to which parents with the financial resources may go if unchecked is the case of Segal v. Lynch, in the news today. Moses Segal, a developer whom a court described as "an extraordinarily wealthy man" with a net worth of more than $100 million, sued co-parent Cynthia Lynch for allegedly alienating the couple's two children from him. In a potentially precedent-setting case, a New Jersey appellate court has ruled that a parent may sue for infliction of emotional distress, but only if the other parent's conduct is "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Segal did not meet that burden, the court ruled, dismissing the lawsuit under the parens patriae doctrine because of its potential to damage the children. As the New Jersey Law Journal reports:

The court described the case as a novel one, pitting 'the fundamental principles of a child's best interests against the right of a civil claimant to obtain compensation for his or her injuries from a tortfeasor.' The panel found the 'overarching force driving this civil action' was not the best interest of the children, who would be in the middle of a litigation 'tug-of-war' where liability would turn on showing [that] outrageous and malicious acts by Lynch 'severely compromised' Segal's bond with them. As key witnesses, they would be subjected to psychological examination and questions about what their mother and father said and how it made them feel, with their responses used by one parent against the other.

Segal's attorney said the father may appeal the ruling to the state Supreme Court.

In my own brief foray into high-conflict child custody work, I came to regard the professionals who were willing to stick it out with vengeful parents as practically saints. So, it is hard for me to fathom why a public servant such as Assemblyman Beall would want to target these professionals and the overburdened courts that rely on them. As I wrote previously, this is the polar opposite of the trend in other U.S. states, which over the past couple of decades have extended greater statutory protections to custody evaluators who are targeted by frivolous, manipulative and mean-spirited complainants.

Kudos to the Judiciary Committee for its wisdom in rejecting this dangerous proposal.

Recommended reading:

"Tearing the child apart: The contribution of narcissism, envy, and perverse modes of thought to child custody wars," by Michael Donner (a child custody evaluator, special master, and chair of the Ethics Committee of the California Psychological Association, Psychoanalytic Psychology, 2006

Graphics credits: (1) Kungfootv; (2) Oape (Creative Commons license)

"CSI Effect": Fact or fiction?

Since introduced by Time magazine in 2002, the "CSI Effect" has become a cultural staple, imbued with the imprimatur of fact. The judicial system and media discuss it as a grave problem; the FBI has even produced a video warning of its impact. Just last week, the Economist of London issued an uncritical report asserting the reality of the effect, based on an upcoming article in Forensic Science International.

However, as Mind Hacks pointed out, both the Economist story and the underlying FSI article rely mainly on anecdotal evidence. The scientific verdict is not yet in.

Indeed, when I last discussed the phenomenon here, two years ago, a study by Michigan Judge Donald Shelton was raising doubts. Judge Shelton found scant evidence to support claims by prosecutors that jurors' unrealistic demands for hard scientific evidence were causing unjustified acquittals. As the debate continues, I thought it time for an update.

I find it ironic that a phenomenon being blamed for injecting a biased expectation of science into the courtroom has not in itself been subjected to much scientific scrutiny. After all, anecdotes are not science; they can be used to prove almost anything.

As it turns out, some legal scholars are putting the CSI Effect to empirical scrutiny, and -- guess what -- a measurable effect in the predicted direction is hard to prove. In fact, if Crime Scene Investigation and other enormously popular forensic TV shows are having any effect, it may be in the opposite direction -- toward making juries more conviction-prone.

Mind Hacks provided links two excellent scholarly analyses, both available online and well worth reading. The first, by Simon Cole, a Criminology, Law and Society professor at UC Irvine, and doctoral student Rachel Dioso-Villa, was published last April in the Stanford Law Review. The second, by media law professor Kimberlianne Podlas of the University of North Carolina, was published in October in the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review.

Podlas initially devised a creative plan: She would ask prosecutors to give her details of cases in which they believed an acquittal was due to the CSI Effect; then she would have defense attorneys review the case files for alternate explanations. But, she found, 19 of the 20 cases provided to her by prosecutors had actually resulted in convictions, thereby disproving the effect.

Lacking any "real" CSI cases to analyze, she devised a mock jury case in which she manipulated the strength of the scientific evidence. She found no evidence of a difference in outcome between heavy and light viewers of the TV show Crimes Scene Investigation. As she wrote:

"What is labeled a CSI Effect may more accurately be described as a rationalization embraced by members of law enforcement who find themselves on the losing side of a prosecution. By attributing a loss to CSI's wrongful influence, a prosecutor can obtain an explanation yet maintain a belief that an acquittal was misguided. Although this cognitive rationalization is understandable, it should not be mistaken for empirical proof that the CSI Effect operates anywhere other than in the minds of those proposing it."

In their excellent critical overview, Cole and Dioso-Villa go further, suggesting a propaganda parallel between the CSI Effect and the "litigation explosion" myth promulgated in the 1970s through a well-funded insurance industry campaign against civil plaintiff's attorneys. As in that instance, popular belief persisted even after social scientists thoroughly debunked the claimed explosion in litigation:

"Tort reformers' narratives captured a much greater share of media attention than did those of scholars…. Indeed, in the wake of media claims about the litigation explosion, socio-legal scholars documented that media coverage of civil law overwhelmingly emphasized plaintiff victories and high punitive damage awards. Thus, the supposed existence of a litigation explosion became educated common sense among jurors and even judges."

Remember the McDonald's coffee spill and the microwaved poodle, urban legends still infamous today? These tales, Cole and Dioso-Villa argue, are akin to the "horror story" anecdotes of the CSI Effect, such as the supposed case in which a jury acquitted a rapist despite incriminating DNA evidence, just because soil found in the victim's cervix was not tested:

"Echoing the litigation explosion, CSI effect discourse is widely disseminating through the American public the belief that television drama is disadvantaging criminal prosecutions. And yet, the available evidence does not support this claim. Indeed, the available evidence suggests that the opposite may just as easily be the case: forensic-themed police procedural dramas may actually advantage the prosecution in criminal cases."

Cole and Dioso-Villa: Investigating the ‘CSI Effect’ Effect

As shown in the above table, Cole and Dioso-Villa's analysis of several hundred media reports since 2002 revealed not one, but six claimed effects of forensic television shows on popular culture, depending upon the constituency doing the talking. The most dominant of these, the "strong prosecutor's effect," maintains that watching crime dramas makes jurors more likely to acquit guilty defendants. But, the scholars argue, the available evidence suggests an opposite effect:

"Jurors who are consumers of the popular media might believe that prosecutors are typically disadvantaged in criminal trials; that high expectations for forensic evidence are 'unreasonable'; and that criminal convictions are becoming increasingly rare and difficult to achieve. Jurors who believe these things might be more sympathetic to prosecutors out of sympathy for the perceived underdog or in attempt to correct for the perceived excesses of antecedent juries. Claiming to be disadvantaged is a familiar trope in trial advocacy, especially in opening and closing arguments; prosecutors frequently point out that they bear the burden of proof, whereas defense attorneys often refer to their lack of resources or to the awesome power of the state."

This is a similar conclusion to that of Podlas, who wrote:

"If there is a CSI Effect, narrative theory and common sense suggest that it will benefit law enforcement. CSI features the fantastical world of forensics and smart police work. …This story may cultivate the notion that forensic scientists and their methods are legitimate and reliable, thus bolstering the prosecution’s case…. Indeed, scientific evidence is very seductive to jurors, and they tend to overvalue its probity and overestimate its infallibility."

Although the CSI Effect pertains to criminal court while the Litigation Explosion myth targeted the civil realm, they share a similar distrust of jurors, that is, of the ability of common citizens to be fair and find the truth. This lack of faith, from my experience as a court observer over several decades, is misplaced.

Hat tip: Mind Hacks

Criminal Justice and Behavior: Free articles

During the month of May only, Sage Publications is offering free access to select articles from the 2009 volume of Criminal Justice and Behavior. Selections of potential interest to my readers include the following:

The Prediction of Violence in Adult Offenders: A Meta-Analytic Comparison of Instruments and Methods of Assessment
by Mary Ann Campbell, Sheila French and Paul Gendreau

Closing The Revolving Door? Substance Abuse Treatment as an Alternative to Traditional Sentencing for Drug-Dependent Offenders
by Tara D. Warner and John H. Kramer

Inferring Sexually Deviant Behavior from Corresponding Fantasies: The Role of Personality and Pornography Consumption
by Kevin M. Williams, Barry S. Cooper, Teresa M. Howell, John C. Yuille and Delroy L. Paulhus

Credit goes to Jarrod Steffan, a forensic and clinical psychologist in Wichita, Kansas who specializes in criminal forensic psychology, for alerting me to this special offer.

"Hebephilia: Quintessence of Diagnostic Pretextuality"

New from Behavioral Sciences & the Law ...

I never set out to become an expert in this terra incognita. But, alas, here I am. Despite my mixed feelings, I am excited to announce that Behavioral Sciences & the Law has just published my research article deconstructing this pseudoscientific construct. Here is the abstract:

Hebephilia is an archaic term used to describe adult sexual attraction to adolescents. Prior to the advent of contemporary sexually violent predator laws, the term was not found in any dictionary or formal diagnostic system. Overnight, it is on the fast track toward recognition as a psychiatric condition meriting inclusion in the upcoming fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. This article traces the sudden emergence and popularity of hebephilia to pressure from the legal arena and, specifically, to the legal mandate of a serious mental abnormality for civil commitment of sex offenders. Hebephilia is proposed as a quintessential example of pretextuality, in which special interests promote a pseudoscientific construct that furthers an implicit, instrumental goal. Inherent problems with the construct's reliability and validity are discussed. A warning is issued about unintended consequences if hebephilia or its relative, pedohebephilia, make their way into the DSM-5, due out in 2013.

After providing the history and scientific status of hebephilia, I conclude:

Significant unintended consequences are likely if novel syndromes of primary benefit to the sex offender commitment industry are incorporated into the upcoming edition of the DSM. First, at a time of mounting controversy over partisan influence and lack of scientific rigor in the DSM diagnostic system, critics will seize on this as a glaring example of arbitrary and unscientific use of psychiatric diagnosis in the service of a pragmatic goal. This could have the paradoxical effect of reducing the scientific credibility of the DSM and the fields of psychiatry and psychology more broadly. In the forensic arena, where the diagnosis will most often be invoked, it may paradoxically invigorate defense challenges on the grounds that psychiatry is being deployed in a pretextual manner. In the end, hebephilia will come to haunt not only those who are civilly committed on pretextual grounds, but the entire mental health field, for years to come.

Links to more articles on this topic can be found on my HEBEPHILIA RESOURCES PAGE; my blog essay from 2007 on the "Invasion of the Hebephile Hunters" is HERE.

Calif.: Custody evaluators facing lost immunity

Among forensic psychologists, child custody evaluators face the highest rate of licensure board complaints. The courts request their help in the most acrimonious parenting disputes, and it is easy to get caught in the crossfire. Even though 99 percent of all board complaints are ultimately dismissed, defending oneself is stressful, time-consuming, and expensive.

Over the past 20 years, aggrieved parents have deluged psychology licensure boards with frivolous, manipulative and mean-spirited complaints. Fearing that the onslaught would discourage professionals from agreeing to assist courts in high-conflict parenting cases, legislatures in many U.S. states have increased statutory protections. In the past decade, Florida and West Virginia passed immunity statutes for court-appointed evaluators. Colorado went even further, barring licensing board complaints over child custody evaluations, requiring that complainants instead take their claims back to the original trial court.

But legislation being proposed in California would turn in the opposite direction, dismantling quasi-judicial immunity protections for evaluators and other neutral professionals who assist the courts in parenting disputes. The current version of the proposed Assembly Bill 2475, heading to the state Assembly's Judiciary Committee on May 4, would add the following section (43.94) to California’s Civil Code:

"The doctrine of judicial immunity or quasi judicial immunity shall not apply to exonerate any private third party appointed by the court in an advisory capacity based on his or her professional expertise, who provides a report or findings to the Court in a proceeding under the Family Code, with the intention that the Court act in one way or another based on such report or findings, from liability for acts performed within the scope of his or her appointment in violation of laws, rules of court, or professional standards. This section shall apply to private individuals such as special masters, minor's counsel, investigators, therapists, evaluators, receivers, bankruptcy trustees, experts, factfinders, and other persons specifically appointed by the courts in an advisory capacity based on their professional training or expertise."

I was initially suspicious that perhaps the "Men's Rights Movement" had a hand, as this increasingly powerful international lobby is making a concerted effort to reform child custody laws to favor men, and especially men accused of abusing their partners and children. Men's rights advocates claim that a feminist-run court system systematically violates men's civil rights, that a large proportion of abuse allegations are false, and that men "are victims of an unrecognized epidemic of violence at the hands of abusive wives," as reported in an expose in Slate. On the legal front, Respecting Accuracy in Domestic Abuse Reporting (RADAR) claims credit for blocking four federal domestic-violence bills, among them an international expansion of the Violence Against Women Act, according to the Slate report. Extrajudicially, movement members go so far as to applaud acts of violence perceived as retaliation against the feminist status quo.

But Assemblyman James Beall, the sponsor of AB 2475, does not appear allied with this regressive movement. Rather, he bills himself as a progressive Democrat who fights for the rights of children, families, the poor, and the disabled. Previously, he sponsored legislation (AB 612) to ban the use of Parental Alienation Syndrome -- a favorite of the father's rights movement -- from family courts.

NOTE: After I wrote this post, I did a bit more research on AB 612, and realized it was even more extreme than his new proposal. It would have allowed parents to sue any expert witness who relied upon "an unproven, unscientific theory." This would have included not only Parental Alienation Syndrome, its ostensible target, but a gamut of other evidence. After all, not much in any field of science is completely proven and uncontested. Luckily, that bill was defeated, perhaps explaining this new attempt. -- May 8, 2010

As it turns out, AB 2475 is supported by opponents of the men's rights movement, including an organization called the Protective Parents Association. This group lobbies on behalf of mothers who say the courts impede their efforts to protect their children by giving joint or sole custody to abusive fathers. "[T]he court responds to women attempting to protect their children from an abusive father with a knee-jerk reaction, assigning gender-biased labels to women to minimize or ignore the abuse in a reckless disregard of the safety of the child," writes association director Karen Anderson. By gender-biased labels, she is referring, no doubt, to Parental Alienation Syndrome.

So, AB 2475 may turn out to be a case of failure to anticipate unintended consequences. As readers know, politicians often propose a law in a knee-jerk response to a high-profile event, tweaking existing mechanisms without adequate anticipation of potential future deployments. Ironically, the bill could open the floodgates for attacks on neutral evaluators by the very same angry men with money who most often invoke the pseudoscientific construct of Parental Alienation Syndrome in custody cases.

When I telephoned Assemblyman Beall's office today to get more background, a staff member was cagey about the bill's impetus and minimized its intended scope, saying it was meant to only apply to mediators and not to child custody evaluators. Clearly, the current language belies this claim. So far I have been unable to turn up any specific case or cases that prompted this bill. Rather, it may be a misguided effort to stop evaluators from using the construct of Parental Alienation Syndrome against mothers in custody cases.

By way of background, various types of immunity for professionals involved in the legal system have a long history. Judicial immunity (immunity for judges) was implemented on public policy grounds in England all the way back in the 17th century. Similarly, witness immunity enjoys a long history, based on the principle of encouraging people to testify honestly and without fear of reprisal. Prosecutors performing their job duties are protected by qualified immunity, while psychologists and teachers enjoy statutory immunity when the law requires them to report child abuse.

Under the construct of quasi-judicial immunity, courts across the United States have repeatedly held that court-appointed experts must have some protection from intimidation in order to feel confident and free to make neutral and independent findings. As Karl Kirkland and colleagues point out in an enlightening review, this bolsters both the integrity of the judicial process and public welfare more generally.

This does not mean evaluators can say or do whatever they want. Immunity is never absolute, nor should it be. But forensic evaluators actually face enhanced scrutiny and risk as compared with other clinicians due to the adversarial nature of legal cases. As Greenberg and colleagues point out in another excellent review (reference below), errors that might go unnoticed or be addressed constructively in therapy are much more likely to be exposed through the adversary process; the opinions of forensic experts must stand up to intense scrutiny and vigorous cross-examination.

But it seems an error to allow parties whose goal is often to subvert the legal process (for example by getting an evaluator removed from a case) to drive honest, hard-working, and experienced professionals away from child custody work through spurious harassment. Consider the data. California logged the most licensing board complaints over child custody evaluations of any U.S. state during the 1990s. Yet according to the review by Kirkland and colleagues, out of all of those 1,660 complaints, only a single one -- that's right, ONE -- led to a formal finding against the psychologist.

* * * * *

For a good expose of the men's rights movement, see the Slate article by Kathyrn Jones, Men's Rights Groups Have Become Frighteningly Effective: They’re changing custody rights and domestic violence laws. In researching the issue of immunity for expert witnesses, I also consulted the following excellent sources (none, unfortunately, accessible online):

• Quasi-Judicial Immunity for Forensic Mental Health Professionals in Court-Appointed Roles, by Karl Kirkland, Kale E. Kirkland, Glen D. King, and Guy J. Renfro, Journal of Child Custody (2006)
• Lessons for Forensic Practice Drawn from the Law of Malpractice, by Stuart Greenberg, Daniel Shuman, Stephen Feldman, Collin Middleton, and Charles Patrick Ewing. In: Forensic Psychology: Emerging Topics and Expanding Roles (2007)
• A Comprehensive Guide to Child Custody Evaluations: Mental Health and Legal Perspectives by Joanna Bunker Rohrbaugh (2007)
• Clinician's Guide to Child Custody Evaluations, 3rd Edition, by Marc J. Ackerman (2006)

Photo: "The Dads Who Fought Back" (2006 video)

New study: Do popular actuarials work?

Newer instruments outperform Static-99 and RRASOR

If you evaluate sex offenders, you may be overwhelmed by the dizzying array of actuarial risk assessment instruments vying for your vote: Static-99, RM 2000, RRASOR, Static-2002, SORAG, MnSOST-R. The list of weird-looking acronyms grows ever longer, and the validity studies more complex.

For help figuring out which instruments do what, and how well, I recommend a study by two Canadians, Jan Looman and Jeffrey Abracen, just published in the Journal of Interpersonal Violence. The study compared the ability of four leading instruments to predict recidivism among a sample of 419 high-risk Canadian sex offenders. Overall, about 15% of the released offenders were convicted of a new sex offense when the follow-up time period was held at a constant of seven years.

Among the interesting findings:

• When rapists and child molesters were examined separately, none of the instruments were able to predict sexual recidivism (defined as a new conviction) for child molesters.

• The RRASOR (Rapid Risk Assessment for Sex Offense Recidivism) bombed completely as a predictive tool. The Static-99, a descendant of the RRASOR and the most widely used actuarial for assessing sex offender risk, did not do much better. As the authors note, since their sample was similar to U.S. offenders subject to civil commitment as Sexually Violent Predators (SVPs), the lack of predictive validity of these instruments raises concerns about their use in SVP proceedings.

• Two newer instruments -- the Static-2002 and the Risk Matrix 2000, developed in England -- did somewhat better. Especially interesting is how the Static-2002 performed. Overall, only two of the instrument's five subscales predicted sexual recidivism. Not surprisingly, these were Age at Release and Persistence of Sexual Offending. This is rather common sensical, in that sex offending declines dramatically with age, and a high score on the Persistence scale indicates an entrenched pattern of sex offending, with an early onset, a high rate, and multiple convictions. When rapists and child molesters were separated out, instead of being lumped together as generic “sex offenders” as they often are, only the Deviant Sexual Interests scale predicted sexual recidivism for the child molesters.

• Finally, age matters. It really does. The few who continue to deny this obvious fact are just being stubborn. Similar to other studies, only about 2% of offenders over 50 reoffended (one child molester and one rapist, in this case), compared with 20% of those ages 25 to 35.

Of course, this is just one study. Other studies comparing the accuracy of instruments for assessing sex offender risk have come to various and contradictory conclusions. For example, contrast the present findings with those of the Austrian study that I blogged about last month, testing German versions of the RRASOR, Static-99, SORAG, and SVR-20. The publisher of the International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology has just made that study available for free, by the way. Keeping up with this burgeoning literature is a full-time job, unfortunately necessary for practice in this area.

The abstract of the study, Comparison of Measures of Risk for Recidivism in Sexual Offenders, is available at the Journal of Interpersonal Violence's website. You need a subscription to get the entire article, or you can request a copy from the authors.

Prospective Actuarial Risk Assessment: A Comparison of Five Risk Assessment Instruments in Different Sexual Offender Subtypes, by Martin Rettenberger, Anna Matthes, Douglas P. Boer, and Reinhard Eher, is available for free from the International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology. Thanks for that go to journal editor Thomas Mankowski.