Study links childhood trauma and adult aggression

Call for trauma-focused treatment of offenders

Children who experience abuse, neglect and family dysfunction have a heightened risk of developing health problems such as obesity, drug addiction, depression and heart disease in adulthood. That common-sense notion is widely accepted, and has been proven in a series of studies funded by the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and Kaiser Permanente. The Kaiser-CDC project has amassed a large database of the life histories and health trajectories of middle-class residents of San Diego, California.

Now, a San Diego psychologist has deployed that project's Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACE) survey to link these negative childhood experiences with adult aggression and criminality, including domestic violence, sexual assault, stalking and child abuse.

In fact, the correlation is additive, the new study found: The more types of adversities a man underwent in childhood, the higher his likelihood of engaging in criminal aggression as an adult.

Men in the study who were referred to outpatient treatment following convictions for domestic violence, sexual offending, nonsexual child abuse or stalking reported about four times as many adverse childhood events as men in the general population. Men convicted of sex offenses and child abuse were especially likely to report being sexually abused as children.

The link between early damage and later aggression explains why treatment programs that focus primarily on criminal acts are not very effective, say psychologist James Reavis of San Diego, California and his colleagues.

"To reduce criminal behavior one must go back to the past in treatment, as Freud admonished us nearly 100 years ago," wrote Reavis and co-authors Jan Looman, Kristina Franco and Briana Rojas in an article slated for the Spring 2013 issue of The Permanente Journal. "Fortunately, evidence exists in support of both attachment-based interventions designed to normalize brain functioning and in the efficacy of psychoanalytic treatment."

Why the link between abuse and aggression?

Cumulative experiences of abuse and neglect disrupt both a child's ability to form secure attachments to others and his ability to regulate his emotions, the researchers posit. Thus, men abused as youngsters tend to either avoid intimacy altogether or are at risk to become violent in intimate relationships, due to a "bleeding out" of their suppressed inner rage.


Not only must treatment of offenders focus on healing their "neurobiological" wounds, the researchers say, but the findings also point to the need for more early childhood interventions to stop child abuse before its victims grow up to victimize others.

Stay tuned: A second article being prepared for publication will explore the link between early adversity and dysregulation in the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis that modulates stress responses.

The article, "Adverse Childhood Experiences and Adult Criminality: How Long Must We Live before We Possess Our Own Lives?" can be requested from the first author, psychologist James Reavis of San Diego (HERE). The article includes a copy of the ACE questionnaire, which is potentially useful in forensic cases as a means of quantifying experiences of child abuse and neglect.

Evaluating juveniles: Grisso's classic updated for new era

In the 1990s a moral panic swept through the United States over juvenile "super-predators," ruthless youngsters devoid of empathy or morality who would terrorize the good citizenry -- raping, looting and murdering with abandon. Although the hysterical, racially coded predictions proved unfounded (the spike in violent crime was just a historical blip on the radar screen), politicians passed harsh new laws that set the U.S. apart from all other nations in the magnitude of penal warehousing of children.

At the pinnacle of this frenzied "get-tough era" in juvenile justice, the eminent forensic psychologist Tom Grisso authored Forensic Evaluation of Juveniles, a groundbreaking text that guided practitioners into the burgeoning niche of psychological evaluations in delinquency cases.

Now, in a major overhaul of that influential 1998 text, Grisso writes optimistically of a new trend in juvenile justice that he labels the "developmental era." Social science evidence about adolescent brain development and social maturation will contribute to greater judicial and societal recognition that much delinquency is time-limited, he believes. Although this new direction comes too late for the youths and families shattered by the get-tough policies of the past few decades, Grisso hopes that forensic psychology can help judges, probation officers and policy makers understand the potential of rehabilitation for today's wayward youth.

Photo from Richard Ross's Juvenile In Justice photography project

I'm a little less sanguine about a newer, gentler era. Yes, the U.S. Supreme Court has outlawed the death penalty for juveniles, life without parole for crimes other than murder, and mandatory sentences of life without parole for murder.* But such reversals are a drop in the bucket so long as the punitive architecture remains in place that allows, for example, prosecutorial "direct-files" of juvenile cases to adult courts. We are living in an increasingly repressive culture. About 70,000 young people -- disproportionately poor and non-white -- are currently incarcerated in the U.S., many serving ridiculously long sentences that give them no chance of ever leading productive lives. 

Grisso's practical guide strikes a humanistic tone, refreshing in a field increasingly infiltrated by a gloomy, pathologizing, technocratic worldview. The award-winning director of the Law-Psychiatry Program at the University of Massachusetts Medical School for example cautions evaluators to avoid simple tallies of actuarial risk factors in informing the court of a youth's risk. Rather, evaluators should understand and incorporate the two broad, and complementary, theories of delinquency: The biological and personality-oriented theories of psychology, and the social-environmental theories of criminology, such as the notion of "drift" into delinquency. Evaluators should also understand the individual child's context, and the factors that contribute not only to pathology but also to resilience in the face of adversity.

Perhaps the most radical departure from the first edition is a newfound emphasis on understanding racial, ethnic and cultural factors, historically a major blind spot in forensic psychology. With non-white children comprising the overwhelming majority of those incarcerated in America, this principle cannot be overstated. Grisso addresses the barriers to even basic communication that will become all the more challenging as young immigrants arrive from far-flung lands, many carrying inside them the weight of untold traumas. Although he proffers no facile solutions, he preaches greater awareness of cultural blinders and of the inherent limitations of forensic tools that were not normed on diverse populations.

Disappointingly, given this humanistic tenor and discussion of racial and cultural issues, Grisso soft-pedals criticism of the growing practice of labeling juveniles as psychopaths. He describes evidence for the validity of the psychopathy construct in juveniles as "mixed," yet omits mention of the calamitous -- and often self-fulfilling -- consequences to youths when the psychopathy label is introduced in court.

Like the first edition, this is a practical manual that provides a clearly written historical overview of the field for novice practitioners, and useful review material for more seasoned juvenile evaluators. Chapters address specific types of evaluations, including competency to stand trial, waiver of Miranda rights, risk assessment, waiver to adult court, and rehabilitation and treatment recommendations. New statutes, case law, scientific findings and assessment methods are interwoven throughout, making this an indispensable addition to the juvenile evaluator's bookshelf.

If you found this review helpful, I would appreciate your taking a moment click to visit my Amazon review (HERE) and click on the "YES" button at the bottom ("this review was helpful"). This helps boost the review's ranking. Thanks in advance. 

*The cases are Roper v. Simmons (2005), Graham v. Florida (2010), and Miller v. Alabama (2012), respectively.

Miracle of the day: 80-year-old man recaptures long-lost youth

(Or: How committing a new sex crime can paradoxically LOWER risk on the Static-99R)

"How old is the offender?"

 Age is an essential variable in many forensic contexts. Older people are at lower risk for criminal recidivism. Antisocial behaviors, and even psychopathic character traits, diminish as criminals reach their 30s and 40s. Men who have committed sex offenses become at considerably lower risk for further such misconduct, due to a combination of decreased testosterone levels and the changes in thinking, health, and lifestyle that happen naturally with age.

Calculating a person's age would seem very straightforward, and certainly not something requiring a PhD: Just look up his date of birth, subtract that from today's date, and -- voila! Numerous published tests provide fill-in-the-blank boxes to make this calculation easy enough for a fourth-grader.

One forensic instrument, however, bucks this common-sense practice. The developers of the Static-99R, the most widely used tool for estimating the risk of future sexual recidivism, have given contradictory instructions on how to score its very first item: Offender age.

In a new paper, forensic evaluator Dean Cauley and PsyD graduate student Michelle Brownfield report that divergent field practices in the scoring of this item are producing vastly different risk estimates in legal cases -- estimates that in some cases defy all logic and common sense.

Take Fred. Fred is 80 years old, and facing possible civil commitment for the rapes of two women when he was 18 years old. He served 12 years in prison for those rapes. Released from prison at age 30, he committed several strings of bank robberies that landed him back in prison on six separate occasions.

At age 80 (and especially with his only known sex offenses committed at age 18), his risk for committing a new sex offense if released from custody is extremely low -- something on the order of 3 percent. But evaluators now have the option of using any of three separate approaches with Fred, with each approach producing quite distinct opinions and recommendations.

Procedure 1: Age is age (the old-fashioned method)

The first, and simplest, approach, is to list Fred's actual chronological age on Item 1 of the Static-99R. Using this approach, Fred gets a three-point reduction in risk for a total of one point, making his actuarial risk of committing a new sex offense around 3.8 percent.

Evaluators adopting this approach argue that advancing age mitigates risk, independent of any technicalities about when an offender was released from various periods of incarceration. These evaluators point to the Static-99R's coding manuals and workbook, along with recent publications, online seminars, and sworn testimony by members of the Static-99 Advisory Committee. Additionally, they point to a wealth of age-related literature from the fields of criminology and psychology to support their scoring.

Procedure 2: Reject the Static-99R as inappropriate

A second approach is not to use the Static-99R at all, because Fred's release from prison for his "index offenses" (the rapes) was far more than two years ago, making Fred unlike the members of the samples from which the Static-99R's risk levels were calculated. Evaluators adopting this approach point to publications by members of the Static-99 Advisory Committee, generally accepted testing standards and actuarial science test standards to support their choice to not use the test at all.

Procedure 3: The amazing elixir of youth

But there is a third approach. One that magically transports Fred back to his youth, back to the days when a career in bank robbing seemed so promising. (Bank robbery is no longer alluring; it is quietly fading away like the career of a blacksmith.) The last five decades of Fred's life fade away, and he becomes 30 again -- his age when he was last released from custody on a sex offense conviction.

Now Fred not only loses his three-point age reduction, but he gains a point for being between the ages of 18 and 34.9. A four point difference! The argument for this approach is that it most closely conforms to the scoring methods used on the underlying samples of sex offenders, who were scored based on their date of release from their index sexual offense. These evaluators can correctly point to information imparted at training seminars, advice given by some members of the Static-99R Advisory Committee, and sworn testimony by developers of the test itself. They can also point to an undated FAQ #27 on the Static-99 website to support their opinion.

Fred could rape someone to reduce his risk!

Back-dating age to the time of the last release from a sex offense-related incarceration allows for a very bizarre twist:

Let's say that after Fred was released from prison on his most recent robbery stint, back when he was a vigorous young man of 61, he committed another rape. Being 60 or over, Fred would now get the four-point reduction in risk to which his age entitles him. This would cut his risk by two-thirds -- from 11.4 percent (at a score of 5) all the way down to a mere 3.8 percent (at a score of 1)!

While such a scenario might seem far-fetched, it is not at all unusual for an offender to be released from prison at, say, age 58 or 59, but to not undergo a civil commitment trial for a couple of years, until age 60 or 61. Such an offender's score will vary by two points (out of a total of 12 maximum points) depending upon how the age item is scored. And, as Cauley and Brownfield describe, the members of the Static-99R development team have, at different times, given contradictory advice on how to score the age item.

By completely negating the very substantial body of research on age and crime, this technocratic method creates other very concerning -- and paradoxical -- implications, Cauley and Brownfield argue: As the risk estimate for a more persistent offender is lowered, the offender who does not reoffend is stuck with a risk score that is forever jacked up.

Back-dating an offender's age is also at odds with the research that generated the test itself, they say, because the offenders in the samples used to construct the Static-99R had finished serving their sentences on their index sexual offenses within two years of being studied. In other words, none of the offenders had been released many years earlier, and there was none of this curious time-travel business in regard to their ages. As the instrument's developers noted in a publication just last year, the Static-99 "was developed on, and intended for, sexual offenders with a current or recent sexual offense."

So, if you are evaluating an old geezer in the local pen and he tells you that he is only 30 years old, don't assume that he has a delusional belief that he has discovered the elixir of youth -- or that he's pulling your leg. He just might be reciting the age that he was just assigned by a technocratic Static-99R evaluator.

The paper, "Static-99R: Item #1 -- What is the Offender's Age? A lack of consensus leads to a defective actuarial," is available for download both HERE and HERE.

California high court upholds parolee confidentiality right

Two years ago, I reported on a California appellate opinion upholding the sacredness of patient-therapist confidentiality even for convicted felons who are mandated to treatment as a condition of parole. Today, the California Supreme Court upheld the gist of the ruling -- but with a proviso. Using strained logic, the court held that the breach of confidentiality was not so prejudicial as to merit overturning Ramiro Gonzales's civil commitment, as the Sixth District Court of Appeal had done.

Gonzales is a developmentally disabled man whose therapist turned over prejudicial therapy records to a prosecutor seeking to civilly detain him as a sexually violent predator (SVP). Forensic psychology experts Brian Abbott and Tim Derning testified for the defense; called by the prosecution were psychologists Thomas MacSpeiden and Jack Vognsen.

As I wrote two years ago, the ruling is good news for psychology ethics and should serve as a reminder that we are obligated to actively resist subpoenas requesting confidential records of therapy.

Today's California Supreme Court ruling is HERE. My prior post, with much more detail on the case, is HERE. The Sixth District Court of Appeal opinion from 2011, available HERE, provides a nice overview of both federal and California case law on confidentiality in forensic cases.

 

Hat tip: Adam Alban

Related blog posts:  

• Do sex offenders have right to confidential therapy? (Feb. 22, 2008)

• Confession to prison psychiatrist not confidential (Dec. 11, 2007)

• Treating therapist as police interrogator (Nov. 30, 2008)

• Abandon ethics, all ye who enter here: Special ethics exemption sought for SVP work (Oct. 6, 2010)

Note: Updated version of Sunday's post on "narcoanalysis"

For those of you following the case of Aurora Colorado mass murder suspect James Holmes and the judge's order that he be subjected to a "narcoanalytic interview" if he pleads insanity, I have updated the Psychology Today version of the post. The updated version explains where Judge Sylvester got the idea for this order, and discusses the fascinating landmark case of Ramona v. Ramona, in which a father successfully sued his daughter's therapists for implanting false memories of child sexual abuse during a sodium amytal interview; I've also referenced a curious side note in the Michael Jackson case involving sodium amytal.  Thanks to psychologist Evan Harrington of the Chicago School of Professional Psychology for alerting me to the Ramona opinion, which features an interesting discussion of relevant case law.

"Narcoanalytics" order in Aurora massacre case unprecedented

News flash: There is no such thing as 'truth serum'

The next time the court appoints you to conduct a sanity evaluation, don't forget to order up a vial of truth serum.

In a court order that breaks new legal ground, the judge presiding over the trial of James Holmes ordered the Aurora Colorado massacre suspect to submit to polygraph testing and a "narcoanalytic interview" if he decides to put his mental state at issue.

Chief District Judge William Sylvester ruled that if Holmes elects to pursue an insanity defense, "medically appropriate" drugs can be administered during a forensic examination at the state hospital, presumably to determine whether the mass murder suspect is feigning insanity.

This may be the first time that a court has mandated use of so-called "truth serum" in a sanity evaluation. Indeed, courts have generally taken the opposite stance, of being gatekeepers who exclude the results of both sodium amytal and polygraph examinations from court due to their lack of reliability.

"Mythical aura of infallibility"

In a seminal case, Harper v. State (1982), the George Supreme Court ruled that the use of "truth serum" (sodium amytal) was inadmissible to establish that a murder defendant was being truthful in proclaiming his innocence. "We agree with the trial court that, until it is proven with verifiable certainty that truth serum compels a person to tell the truth, neither the results of truth-serum tests nor the opinions of experts based on the results of these tests shall be admissible in evidence," ruled the court.

Similarly, a defense-retained psychologist published an account of another case from the 1980s in which an appellate court upheld exclusion of "a sodium amytal test" to bolster an insanity defense. The defendant had walked into a nightclub and shot to death a dancer who had jilted him. Under the influence of the barbiturate, the man claimed he thought he was shooting Satan, because the victim had appeared to morph into the devil, "with pitchforks … and fire and everything." In excluding mention of the test, the trial judge expressed worry that a jury "might be overwhelmed by the use of the term 'sodium amytal' and/or 'truth serum' and attribute to it a mythical aura of infallibility."

Back in the 1930s and 1940s, when sodium amytal was all the rage, laypersons and professionals alike believed that people could not lie when under the drug's influence. It turns out that this faith was misguided. Empirical testing showed that although sodium amytal and related drugs lower inhibitions, people remain perfectly capable of lying, withholding information, and exaggerating psychiatric symptoms.

"While it is clear that these substances lower inhibitions and increase loquacity, they provide no assurance as to the truthfulness of the information obtained,” noted attorney Jason Odershoo in a Stanford Law Review analysis focusing on whether such chemicals may legally be deployed against terrorism suspects in the post-9/11 world.

Sodium amytal, or amobarbital, belongs to the same class of barbiturates as Nembutal, Seconal, and Pentothal. As psychiatrist August Piper Jr. describes the procedure, a physician intravenously administers small amounts of the drug (sometimes in tandem with other intravenous drugs like Valium or Ativan) until the subject enters a "twilight state" in which he is relaxed and drowsy but still awake. The drug causes a feeling of warmth and "closeness to the interviewer" that breaks down inhibitions, similar to the effects of acute alcohol intoxication.

However, while sodium amytal makes people more loquacious, it also disrupts memory and increases suggestibility, according to the research summarized by Piper. Reality and fantasy may become hopelessly tangled, such that people cannot distinguish between the two.

Cultural fascination with truth serum in the mid-20th century completely ignored this flawed reality. Rather, the mythology helped to shape the public's understanding of memories as robust and accurate, stored verbatim in the mind just awaiting proper retrieval and extraction. As Alison Winter writes in a 2005 essay on the cultural history of truth serum:

"This view contributed to the production of a public understanding of memory that both diverged from previous claims about memory and recall, and ran counter to the direction of current psychological research. It thus helped lay the groundwork for claims about memory permanence and scientific recall techniques later in the twentieth century."

Perils in Holmes's case

James Holmes's new look

The empirical research suggests not only that Holmes could lie while under the influence of the drugs, but also that subjecting him to a "narcoanalytic interview" could introduce false memories and render his subsequent recall of information potentially even less reliable. As with post-hypnosis statements, this could be a big problem if Holmes decides to testify on his own behalf, either at a trial or a sentencing hearing. Similarly, unreliable information recounted to evaluators during a "narcoanalytic interview" could be given too much credence, thereby jeopardizing the validity of forensic opinions in the case.

But maybe such contamination is the point, writes a commentator at the American Everyman blog. Under the alarmist headline, "Holmes to be Drugged Into Confession -- Apparently Waterboarding is Off the Table," Scott Creighton theorizes: "This 'truth serum' CIA trick will be used to convict Holmes in the court of public opinion before his Vichy lawyers plead him out to life in prison rather than taking it to trial to evaluate the evidence against him." 

Given the recent dispositions of other similar cases such as that of Arizona mass shooter Jared Loughner, maybe the conspiratorially minded blogger is not so far off the mark.

The CIA and a zombie idea

The notion of a magical drug that can ferret out malingering represents a "zombie idea," to borrow a phrase from New York Times essayist Paul Krugman. That is, it is a proposition that has been thoroughly refuted by analysis and evidence, and should be dead -- but stubbornly refuses to stay dead because it serves a political purpose or appeals to public prejudices.

Indeed, Judge Sylvester's court order harkens back to the early to mid-20th century, a time when -- as legal analyst Odershoo recounts -- "the idea of such a magical substance seemed a very real possibility, one holding profound significance for criminal investigation, foreign intelligence, and national security."

The term "truth serum" was coined in the early 1920s by an obstetrician named Robert House, who advocated the use of the barbiturate Scopolamine -- now known as a date-rape drug because of its amnestic properties but at the time administered to women during childbirth to induce a 'twilight sleep' -- in criminal interrogations. Time magazine's 1923 piece, "Medicine: The Truth-Compeller," helped popularize the idea and turned House into a one-hit wonder. In the 1930s, police use of barbiturates on witnesses and criminal suspects became more widespread. During World War II sodium pentothal was used both to treat soldiers suffering from "shell shock" and to detect malingerers trying to duck the military draft.

Then, during the Cold War, the CIA launched a feverish quest for the ultimate "truth drug." Clandestine campaigns with code names such as Projects Chatter, Third Chance, Derby Hat and Bluebird culminated in the ill-fated MK-ULTRA, in which a doctor who was administered LSD leapt to his death from a hotel room window. Revelations of this secret experimentation led to public antipathy towards the spy agency, and a demise in the use of sodium amytal and sodium pentothal as truth serums.

The drugs remain in use as anesthetics, and have also been used by psychotherapists seeking to recover repressed memories. This use has its own sordid history. In 1992, a former patient of eminent Chicago psychiatrist Jules Masserman published an account claiming that the good doctor had repeatedly raped her after administering sodium amytal, purportedly to retrieve her repressed memories of incest. The patient, Barbara Noel, was not the only woman to win a lawsuit over such nefarious abuse.

Legal use officially repudiated 

Use in law enforcement fell rapidly in the wake of a 1963 U.S. Supreme Court ruling that a confession produced under the influence of truth serum was unconstitutionally coerced, and therefore inadmissible. The case of Townsend v. Sain involved a heroin addict who was interrogated after being administered phenobarbital and hyoscine (Scopolamine) to alleviate his withdrawal symptoms. Although India and some other countries still use these drugs in criminal investigations, in the United States their use for that purpose has been "officially repudiated," according to Odershoo.

A scan of the case law suggests that this is by far the most serious case in which narcoanalysis has ever been proposed. Holmes is awaiting trial on 166 felony charges for an attack on Batman moviegoers last July that killed 12 people and wounded 58. His attorneys have mounted a heretofore unsuccessful challenge to Colorado's insanity statute and the judge's interpretation of it. Under Colorado law, the test for insanity is whether the person "who is so diseased or defective in mind at the time of the commission of the act as to be incapable of distinguishing right from wrong with respect to that act." Judge Sylvester has ordered that, if Holmes pleads insanity, he must divulge all information from past mental health treatment. Holmes was seen by a psychiatrist and at least two other mental health professionals at the counseling center of the University of Colorado, where he was a PhD student in neuroscience before withdrawing from school, and his treatment records may contain potentially incriminating information. Such forfeiture of doctor-patient privilege is standard in criminal law when a defendant puts his mental state at issue.

Malingering detection

Holmes's elaborate degree of planning for his attack over at least a four-month period certainly raises a distinct possibility that any claim of mental illness may be feigned. But while no method is foolproof, other techniques have a far better track record at sniffing out deception.

Judge William Sylvester

We have a constantly growing arsenal of formal tools for the assessment of various types of malingering. Especially in high-stakes cases such as this, formal tests are typically augmented by 24/7 observation in psychiatric facilities. It's pretty hard to consistently masquerade as insane when one is under around-the-clock observation by everyone from the doctors and nurses to the janitors. Even one of the most slippery malingerers of insanity, a Mafia don named Vincent "The Chin" Gigante, eventually tripped up and got nailed. 

Judge Sylvester's order is so far removed from both contemporary scientific knowledge and normal legal procedure that it has left many observers scratching their heads. Where did the judge get the wacky idea that truth serum is the way to go? Did he cook it up himself, or was it fed to him by someone who had read a few too many "true crime" books or spy thrillers? Vaughan Bell over at Mind Hacks went so far as to wonder whether "the judge has been at the narcotics himself."

NOTE: An updated version of this essay appears at my Psychology Today blog. That essay explains where Judge Sylvester got this wacky idea, and also references the landmark case of Ramona v. Ramona, in which a father successfully sued his daughter's therapists for implanting false memories of child sexual abuse during a sodium amytal interview, as well as the role of sodium amytal in the Michael Jackson case.  Thanks to psychologist Evan Harrington of the Chicago School of Professional Psychology for alerting me to the Ramona opinion, which features an interesting discussion of relevant case law.

A full set of court documents in the Holmes case is located HERE.