December 14, 2012

Judge bars Static-99R risk tool from SVP trial

Developers staunchly refused requests to turn over data
For several years now, the developers of the most widely used sex offender risk assessment tool in the world have refused to share their data with independent researchers and statisticians seeking to cross-check the  instrument's methodology.

Now, a Wisconsin judge has ordered the influential Static-99R instrument excluded from a sexually violent predator (SVP) trial, on the grounds that failure to release the data violates a respondent's legal right to due process.

The ruling may be the first time that the Static-99R has been excluded altogether from court. At least one prior court, in New Hampshire, barred an experimental method that is currently popular among government evaluators, in which Static-99R risk estimates are artificially inflated by comparing sex offenders to a specially selected "high-risk" sub-group, a procedure that has not been empirically validated in any published research. 

In the Wisconsin case, the state was seeking to civilly commit Homer Perren Jr. as a sexually dangerous predator after he completed a 10-year prison term for an attempted sexual assault on a child age 16 or under. The exclusion of the Static-99R ultimately did not help Perren.  This week, after a 1.5-day trial, a jury deliberated for only one hour before deciding that he met the criteria for indefinite civil commitment at the Sand Ridge Secure Treatment Center.*

Dec. 18 note: After publishing this post, I learned that the judge admitted other "actuarial" risk assessment instruments, including the original Static-99 and the MnSOST-R, which is way less accurate than the Static-99R and vastly overpredicts risk. He excluded the RRASOR, a four-item ancestor of the Static-99. In hindsight, for the defense to get the Static-99R excluded was a bit like cutting off one's nose to spite one's face.

The ruling by La Crosse County Judge Elliott Levine came after David Thornton, one of the developers of the Static-99R and a government witness in the case, failed to turn over data requested as part of a Daubert challenge by the defense. Under the U.S. Supreme Court's 1993 ruling in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, judges are charged with the gatekeeper function of filtering evidence for scientific reliability and validity prior to its admission in court.

Defense attorney Anthony Rios began seeking the data a year ago so that his own expert, psychologist Richard Wollert, could directly compare the predictive accuracy of the Static-99R with that of a competing instrument, the Multisample Age-Stratified Table of Sexual Recidivism Rates," or MATS-1. Wollert developed the MATS-1 in an effort to improve the accuracy of risk estimation by more precisely considering the effects of advancing age. It incorporates recidivism data on 3,425 offenders published by Static-99R developer Karl Hanson in 2006, and uses the statistical method of Bayes's Theorem to calculate likelihood ratios for recidivism at different levels of risk.

The state's attorney objected to the disclosure request, calling the data "a trade secret."

Hanson, the Canadian psychologist who heads the Static-99 enterprise, has steadfastly rebuffed repeated requests to release data on which the family of instruments is based. Public Safety Canada, his agency, takes the position that it will not release data on which research is still being conducted, and that "external experts can review the data set only to verify substantive claims (i.e., verify fraud), not to conduct new analyses,"  according to a document filed in the case.

Thornton estimated that the raw data will remain proprietary for another five years, until the research group finishes its current projects and releases the data to the public domain.

While declining to release the data to the defense, Hanson agreed to release it to Thornton, the government's expert and a co-developer of the original Static-99, so that Thornton could analyze the relative accuracy of the two instruments. 

The American Psychological Association's Ethics Code requires psychologists to furnish data, after their research results are published, to "other competent professionals who seek to verify the substantive claims through reanalysis" (Section 8.14).

At least three five researchers have been rebuffed in their attempts to review Static-99 data over the past few years, for purposes of research replication and reanalysis. As described in their 2008 article, Hanson's steadfast refusals to share data required Wollert and his colleagues, statisticians Elliot Cramer and Jacqueline Waggoner, to perform complex statistical manipulations to develop their alternate methodology. (Correspondence between Hanson and Cramer can be viewed HERE.) Hanson also rejected a request by forensic psychologists Brian Abbott and Ted Donaldson; see comments section, below.


Since the Static-99 family of instruments (which include the Static-99, Static-99R, and Static-2000) began to be developed more than a decade ago, they have been in a near-constant state of flux, with risk estimates and instructions for interpretation subject to frequent and dizzying changes.

It is unfortunate, with the stakes so high, that all of these researchers cannot come together in a spirit of open exchange. I'm sure that would result in more scientifically sound, and defensible, risk estimations in court.

The timing of this latest brouhaha is apropos, as reports of bias, inaccuracy and outright fraud have  shaken the psychological sciences this year and led to more urgent calls for transparency and sharing of data by researchers. Earlier this year, a large-scale project was launched to systematically try to replicate studies published in three prominent psychological journals.

A special issue of Perspectives on Psychological Science dedicated to the problem of research bias in psychology is available online for free (HERE).

*Hat tip to blog reader David Thompson for alerting me that the trial had concluded. 

December 9, 2012

Documentary targets family courts and custody evaluators

Stuck in the middle of nowhere on a case, I happened to catch the new documentary No Way Out But One, depicting injustices against abused women and children in U.S. family courts. Of potential interest to blog readers, the film critiques the role of child custody evaluators as usurping the authority of fact finders by substituting their own judgments for the facts.


No Way Out highlights the internationally known case of Holly Collins, who fled with her son Zachary and daughter Jennifer in 1994 after her husband was granted sole custody by a court in Minnesota. According to the film, the judge ignored evidence of domestic violence and child abuse, including a skull fracture to the boy. After a circuitous flight through Canada and Guatemala, Collins eventually won asylum in the Netherlands. By the time the FBI caught up with the family, the children were adults. In the film, they convincingly describe chronic abuse at the hands of their father. Holly's dynamic daughter, Jennifer, the inspiration for the film, is executive director of Courageous Kids, which empowers children to go public about family court abuse (her blog is HERE).

The Collins children, grown up
The Collins's long-running custody battle featured allegations of Parental Alienation Syndrome, a controversial syndrome in which one parent (most often the mother) is accused of alienating the children from the other parent. Collins was also labeled with another highly contentious diagnosis, Munchausen by Proxy, after she sought medical treatment for her children, whom she says were being injured by their father’s abuse and neglect.

Due in part to Collins's supposed attempts to alienate the children, the father was granted full custody in 1993, and Collins was initially denied even phone or mail contact. Eventually, she was granted supervised visitation, but neither she nor her children were allowed to talk about the father’s abuse. In the film, Collins describes how she and the children secretly exchanged notes by placing them in the refrigerator; in the notes, the children begged for help and she finally promised to rescue them.

Collins became the first American ever granted asylum by the Netherlands. She ultimately married a Dutch man and had four more children. After the FBI located her, she returned to the United States in an effort to vindicate herself. Ultimately, the kidnapping charge was dismissed; she pled guilty to one count of contempt of court in exchange for a sentence of 40 hours of community service.

According to the film, Collins is just one of thousands of mothers forced to go on the run in order to protect their children from abusive fathers who have been granted custody of their children.

Jennifer (L) and Holly Collins (R) with filmmakers Nolan and Waller
Ironically, the film's debut on the Documentary Channel coincides with the publication of a similar story by another woman who is also named Collins. Frances Collins's book, Seashell Prisoners, chronicles her flight from Texas to the Honduras to protect her 3-year-old granddaughter. Her eight-year odyssey ultimately ended in arrest and incarceration.

The film is stoking up antipathy between the battered women's and father's rights camps, with the latter expending significant effort in to debunk the claims of Collins and her children that they were subjected to family violence.

Award-winning filmmaker Garland Waller told a Huffington Post columnist that she chose the Holly Collins case "because I believed her story would break through the barricade set up by the mainstream press." The film expands on last year’s award-winning short, Small Justice, produced on a shoestring by Waller, a communications professor at Boston University, and her husband Barry Nolan, a TV writer and reporter.

In the Huffington Post interview, Waller went on to say that what most surprised her in her involvement with this project was the dumbfounded reaction of members of the general public:
"They just can't believe that … family courts would give custody -- time and time again -- to abusers. But I suppose I really shouldn't be surprised. In both the tragedy of the Catholic Church sex abuse scandal and the Jerry Sandusky thing, ‘good’ people turned a blind eye to the abuse of children. It's the same thing in family courts. It is just heart-breaking that so often when terrified children summon the courage to speak up and tell what is happening to them, even though the abuser has warned them of the terrible consequences if they ever talk... even though we teach children to speak up and to tell the truth...when they speak up against this one awful thing, we just don't listen."

I don’t see any more upcoming airings on the DocumentaryChannel, but the DVD will be going on sale soon, from Passion River Films.  

For people who are trying to stay positive and collaborative while going through a stressful divorce, a Florida law firm has put together a set of helpful tips from top relationship experts: "Coping with Divorce." 

December 4, 2012

Free access: British Journal of Forensic Practice

This week only, the British Journal of Forensic Practice is offering open access to all of its content. The journal covers a wide range of criminal justice topics, making it of potential interest for forensic practitioners, correctional professionals, academics, and those in allied fields. From my brief perusal, the journal appears to offer a refreshingly humanistic perspective, focusing on rehabilitation and critical analysis of current approaches. A few examples of recent articles and issues that caught my eye, all accessible this week (I've included links):
And that, folks, is just the tip of the iceberg. You'll need to browse the content yourself (HERE) to find the articles of special resonance with you.

December 2, 2012

APA rejects "hebephilia," last standing of three novel sexual disorders

To hear government experts on the witness stand in civil detention trials in recent months, the novel diagnosis of "hebephilia" was a fait accompli, just awaiting its formal acceptance into the upcoming fifth edition of the influential Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM).

They were flat-out wrong.
In a stunning blow to psychology's burgeoning sex offender processing industry, the Board of Trustees of the American Psychiatric Association rejected the proposed diagnosis outright, not even relegating it to an appendix as meriting further study, its proponents' fall-back position.

The rejection follows the failure of two other sexual disorders proposed by the DSM-5's paraphilias subworkgroup. These were paraphilic coercive disorder (or a proclivity toward rape) and hypersexuality, an inherently hard-to-define construct that introduced the committee members' value judgments as to how much sex is within acceptable limits.

After abandoning those two disorders, the subworkgroup clung tenaciously to a whittled-down version of its proposed expansion of pedophilia to cover sexual attraction to early pubescent youngsters (generally in the age range of 11-14), ignoring widespread opposition from both within and outside of the APA.

The buzz is that senior psychiatrists in the APA were unhappy with the intransigence of psychologists in the subworkgroup who communicated the belief that if they just stuck to their guns, they could force the ill-considered proposal into the new manual, despite a lack of scientific support.

All three proposed sexual disorder expansions were widely critiqued by mental health professionals, especially those working in the forensic contexts in which they would be deployed. They led to a spate of critical peer-reviewed publications (including a historical overview of hebephilia by yours truly, published in Behavioral Sciences and the Law), and an open letter to APA leadership from more than 100 professionals, including prominent forensic psychologists and psychiatrists in the U.S. and internationally.

The unequivocal rejection sends a strong signal of the American Psychiatric Association's continuing reluctance to be drawn into the civil commitment quagmire, where pretextual diagnoses are being invoked as excuses to indefinitely confine sex offenders who have no genuine mental disorders. In marked contrast with the field of psychology, psychiatry leaders have expressed consistent concerns about the use of psychiatric labels to justify civil detention schemes.

Next time around, the APA might want to do a better job selecting committee members in the first place. The "paraphilias subworkgroup" was heavily biased in favor of hebephilia because of its domination by psychologists from the Canadian sex clinic that proposed the new disorder in the first place, and is the only entity doing research on it. But what a waste of time and energy to create a committee that comes up with wild and wacky proposals that are only going to end up getting shot down when the rubber meets the road.

Backpedaling on paradigm shift

As regular readers of this blog know, the DSM-5 developers' grand ambitions to bring forth a revolutionary "paradigm shift" produced alarm among mental health professionals and consumer advocacy groups both in the United States and internationally. The British Psychological Society, the UK's 50,000-member professional body, issued a strongly worded critique, and a coalition of psychological associations garnered more than 14,000 signatures on a petition opposing the wholesale lowering of diagnostic thresholds for disorder.

Yesterday's news release marked an about-face, with the APA now stressing that diagnostic changes in the DSM-5 were intended to be "very conservative."

"Our work has been aimed at more accurately defining mental disorders that have a real impact on people’s lives, not expanding the scope of psychiatry," said David J. Kupfer, MD, chair of the DSM-5 Task Force.

Consistent with this, several of the proposed changes that generated the most widespread alarm were rejected. The Board of Trustees rejected the highly controversial "attenuated psychosis syndrome" that could have created an epidemic of false positives, stigmatizing eccentric young people and lowering the threshold for prescribing potentially harmful antipsychotic drugs. It also backed away from an equally controversial, and complex, revamping of the personality disorders. These conditions, as well as a contentious Internet gaming disorder, will all be placed in "section 3" of the new manual as conditions meriting further study.

Allen Frances, the DSM-IV Task Force chair and a high-profile critic of the DSM-5 project, called the spin that the DSM-5 will have minimal impact on psychiatric diagnosis and treatment "misleading":
"This is an untenable claim that DSM 5 cannot possibly support because, for completely unfathomable reasons, it never took the simple and inexpensive step of actually studying the impact of DSM on rates in real world settings…. Except for autism, all the DSM 5 changes loosen diagnosis and threaten to turn our current diagnostic inflation into diagnostic hyperinflation. Painful experience with previous DSM's teaches that if anything in the diagnostic system can be misused and turned into a fad, it will be. Many millions of people with normal grief, gluttony, distractibility, worries, reactions to stress, the temper tantrums of childhood, the forgetting of old age, and 'behavioral addictions' will soon be mislabeled as psychiatrically sick and given inappropriate treatment."
Among the controversial diagnostic changes that will go forward in the DSM-5, due to be published in mid-2013:
  • Asperger’s syndrome is being eliminated as a separate disorder (it will be folded into an autism spectrum disorder)
  • Depression is being expanded to include some grief reactions
  • A brand-new "disruptive mood dysregulation disorder" has critics fearing psychiatric labeling of children who have temper tantrums

Two other sets of changes have particular relevance to forensic practitioners. Substance abuse disorders have been reframed as "behavioral addictions," which Frances warns could be a "slippery slope" leading to "careless overdiagnosis of internet and sex addiction and the development of lucrative treatment programs to exploit these new markets."

Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) will be included in a new chapter on trauma and stress-related disorders, with four distinct diagnostic clusters instead of the current three, and "more attention to the behavioral symptoms that accompany PTSD." Some worry that the reconfigured PTSD may lend itself to misuse of the hot-button diagnosis in forensic cases.

Yesterday’s APA news release outlining the changes can be found HERE. My hebephilia resource page is HERE.

November 28, 2012

Jury Expert: Timely focus on false confessions

"Why on earth would anyone, anywhere, ever confess to a serious crime they did not commit? Especially something like murder? Seriously? Mock jurors find this hard to believe." In the latest issue of the Jury Expert, two trial consultants present the research on why people falsely confess and the cascade of errors that follow a false confession.

The release of the documentary The Central Park Five makes Douglas Keene and Rita Handrich's overview, "Only the Guilty Would Confess to Crimes": Understanding the Mystery of False Confessions, especially timely. The consultants provide a concise summary of current research findings and references, making it an excellent resource for criminal attorneys, investigators, judges, law enforcement officials, students of law and public policy and, of course, forensic professionals. It is followed by commentaries from widely renowned false confession expert Saul Kassin and three others, including your blogger.

My essay, "Disputed confessions: The many hats of the expert witness," may be of special interest to this blog's readers, as it details the role of the expert witness in cases involving disputed confessions. I discuss the distinctions between "pure" academic research and clinical assessment, and the role of the forensic expert in evaluating both psychological vulnerabilities that might contribute to an unreliable confession and the separate issue of a suspect's comprehension of the mandatory Miranda rights waiver.

In an accompanying feature in the November/December issue, jury consultant Diane Wiley of the National Jury Project provides a supplemental jury questionnaire covering the issues attorneys need to address in a false confessions case.

And there's even more on the confessions topic in the new issue, hot off the press today: Rita Handrich reviews the 2010 volume, Police Interrogations and False Confessions: Current Research, Practice, and Policy Recommendations, edited by well-known scholars Daniel Lassiter and Christian Meissner.

The main feature (with accompanying essays) is HERE; my essay is HERE, and the entire current issue and back issues of the always-excellent Jury Expert can be accessed HERE. For you tweeters, the Jury Expert's Twitter feed is HERE.

November 24, 2012

Ayres case: Final act in long-running competency drama?

Notorious psychiatrist found fit for trial on molestation charges

The case has all of the elements of high drama: A once-respected child psychiatrist accused of molesting vulnerable boys sent to him by the courts. Allegations that prosecutors turned a blind eye. Pressure from victim’s rights lobbyists. And, of special interest to this blog’s readers, a bevy of mental health experts presenting contradictory evidence.

For forensic professionals, the case raises many questions that make it useful as a teaching tool:
  • Is competency an all-or-none construct?
  • Does symptom exaggeration equate to full-out malingering?
  • How might dementia affect a defendant’s trial abilities?
  • What weight should be given to the opinions of laypersons as opposed to trained psychologists and psychiatrists? 
William Ayres
The four-day competency hearing in San Mateo County, California (just south of San Francisco) was the latest in the long-running saga of William Ayres, one-time president of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry and host of a controversial 1960s public television sex education show for children, "Time of Your Life."

Ayres was arrested in 2007 on charges of molesting six boys, ages 9 to 13, between 1988 and 1996. He was suspected of molesting many more, but the statute of limitations barred prosecution. At his 2009 trial he claimed he was just conducting routine medical exams of his child patients. Although psychiatry focuses on the mind, he apparently felt the genital area was also necessary to probe. The jury deadlocked. After a subsequent jury trial on the issue of competency ended in another hung jury, the two sides stipulated that he was incompetent due to dementia. He spent about nine months at Napa State Hospital -- where defendants in Northern California are sent for competency restoration treatment -- before the hospital decided that he was faking dementia to avoid trial and sent him back.

The prosecution's star witness at the four-day hearing was a newly minted psychologist, licensed for less than one year, who bills himself as an expert on malingering. John McIlnay, who came to Napa after earning his PsyD degree in 2010 from the Christian evangelical school of Azusa Pacific, testified that the 80-year-old psychiatrist was cleverly malingering dementia in order to avoid retrial.

As an example, McIlnay recounted an episode in which Ayres talked with the head nurse about a perceived lack of safety on the unit. A day or so later, the nurse implemented some of his suggestions to address the problem. Ayres noticed, and sought her out to thank her. All of this indicated to McIlnay that Ayres could competently identify a problem, determine solutions, take effective steps to rectify the problem and, inconsistent with a dementia, track all of this in his memory.

Another example offered of spontaneous functioning inconsistent with dementia was his query of a nursing supervisor, when he returned to the hospital from a court hearing, as to whether he still had the same room; he reportedly walked straight to his old room without being directed.

Bolstering McIlnay’s testimony was that of a nurse on the intake unit who sounded the alarm that Ayres might be faking, in part because he was uncooperative with the treatment team. She testified that Ayres was able to correctly relate his medical history, supply the names of all of his medications, and even spell the word "Alzheimer’s" for her.

I didn't find that last example especially compelling. As I learned while doing a neuropsychology internship with the Alzheimer's Center of Northern California, overlearned information is often the last to go. A trained psychiatrist could easily retain the spelling of a word such as Alzheimer's even while suffering from that very condition himself.

Hospital staff divided

McIlnay's determination of malingering was countered by two members of Ayres's treatment team at the hospital, psychologist Thomas Knoblauch and psychiatrist Scott Sutherland. Additionally, Napa psychologist Erin Warnick, who conducted neuropsychological testing, testified that Ayres exaggerated his symptoms at times, but nonetheless had a dementing condition.

Warnick found a number of deficits that would interfere with Ayres's trial competency, including difficulty learning new information, inaccurate recall of some information, language deficits that interfered with retrieving and communicating relevant information in a coherent fashion, impairment in tracking thoughts and inhibiting irrelevant responses, mental perseveration, and emotional and cognitive disorganization when under stress, as might occur during a serious and extended trial.

In his brief decision finding Ayres competent to stand trial, Judge John Grandsaert discounted the testimony of all three clinicians as lacking objectivity.

The public split among hospital staff comes amid a new policy, intended to provide at least a veneer of greater objectivity, barring psychologists and psychiatrists on treatment units from writing forensic reports. While the judge faulted the treatment team as lacking objectivity, to my knowledge there was no discussion of potential bias among the staff members who labeled Ayres as malingering. In a peer-reviewed case study in the Journal of Forensic Psychology Practice, I wrote about my observation of a state hospital bias toward labeling criminal patients as malingerers. If nothing else, from a purely practical standpoint the diagnosis frees up scarce beds. In this case, hospital nurses and technicians might be biased against Ayres not just due to their institutional affiliation, but also because of the nature of the allegations.

The judge also discounted the opinion of UC San Francisco neuropsychologist Amanda Gregory, who testified for the defense, and that of Ayres's attorney, Jonathan McDougall, who in a relatively unusual move took to the witness stand to explain his client's difficulties in rationally assisting in his own defense.

In addition to McIlnay, the judge also afforded greater weight to two other experts called by the prosecution, both of whom opined that Ayres was competent. George Wilkinson, a forensic psychiatrist, concluded Ayres was malingering after the elderly colleague greeted him by name in their first meeting in more than a year. Wilkinson testified that Ayres did have a dementing condition, but was exaggerating his level of impairment. Similarly, forensic psychologist Paul Good -- who evaluated Ayres several times over a two-year period -- testified that Ayres had a dementia, but nonetheless was competent to stand trial "by the thinnest of margins."

Test data brushed aside

Complicating the clinical picture, Ayres passed several specialized tests for malingering administered by various professionals. These included tests of cognitive feigning (the Test of Memory Malingering and the Word Memory Test), tests of malingered incompetence, a test of malingered psychosis (the Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms Test), and measures of symptom distortion that were embedded in the longer neuropsychological test batteries.

The judge dismissed all of these data, concluding that Ayres's professional training and experience as a psychiatrist rendered him savvy enough to fake out the seasoned experts:
"The defendant's conduct and statements at Napa State Hospital viewed in the light of his extensive professional training and experience and his intellectual capabilities that were demonstrated from time to time in the evidence in this case showed the defendant to be competent and at the very least exaggerating his cognitive deficits." 
Obviously, a psychiatrist who understands the concept of malingering and knows about the existence of tests to detect it is better positioned to get away with faking than the average layperson. But we're talking about an elderly psychiatrist with no known training in the methodology of contemporary malingering tests. It might pose a challenge, for example, to differentiate neuropsychological tests that are measures of effort (which one would have to do well on to avoid being suspected of malingering) from those that measure cognitive decline (on which one would need to bomb in order to get a dementia diagnosis).

To be competent, the defendant must have a factual and rational understanding of his legal situation and have the rational capacity to assist in his defense. Here, the burden was on the defense to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Ayres was not competent. Had he been found incompetent and permanently unrestorable to competency, he would have avoided trial, but might have faced a legal conservatorship.

The case has spawned its own victim advocacy website
The backdrop to all of the legal wrangling over malingering is a vocal victims' advocacy chorus chomping at the bit to see Ayres get justice. With the specter of Jerry Sandusky lurking in the background, the case has earned national publicity, and even has its own advocacy website: "William Ayres: Child Molester and Malingerer" featuring blow-by-blow coverage. Prosecutors initially dragged their feet on filing charges despite around three dozen alleged victims stepping forward; for a while the courts were still sending boys to Ayres even while he was under investigation. Now that they are on board, prosecutors are anxious to redeem themselves by moving forward against the increasingly feeble octogenarian before it is too late.

Malingering: All-or-nothing?

With such a confluence of interests embracing the image of Ayres as malingerer, any nuance is lost. Symptom exaggeration, so commonplace in our work, is equated as synonymous with all-out malingering, or the complete fabrication of a mental disorder for purposes of secondary gain. As I wrote about in my 2008 case study, individuals who are genuinely impaired may also exaggerate symptoms at times, for a variety of reasons, and it is sometimes quite difficult to disentangle the truth.

There is no doubt that a sly and intelligent defendant can fake out the experts. The best example I know of is that of Vincent "The Chin" Gigante, a Mafia don who feigned insanity for years. But outside of fiction and the movies, such sophisticated deception is rare.

Did it happen here? It's hard to know for sure. But one thing is certain: If Ayres truly does have a progressive dementia such as Alzheimer's, he will only get more impaired as the case drags on. So it would be premature to rule out the possibility of a renewed claim of incompetency as the March 11 trial date draws near.

Meanwhile, Ayres has been released on $900,000 bail, raising another issue that is ripe for reform. More than 70 percent of the 71,000 inmates in California's county jails are there because they are too poor to post bail. From the perspective of social justice, it seems odd for a man suspected of molesting dozens of boys to be walking the streets for year after year while petty miscreants lounge in jail awaiting trial on misdemeanor charges of vandalism or petty theft.

Further resources: