May 25, 2011

NPR series on psychopathy in court

This Thursday and Friday, NPR is airing a 2-part series about the controversial use of psychopathy in court.

In Part I on All Things Considered, psychology and science reporter Alix Spiegel shows the profound negative consequences of psychopathy on the lives of those so designated. She profiles a California prisoner whose friends and family do not believe he is a psychopath, but who will likely never win parole due to that label.

Part II (on Friday) examines the history of the Psychopathy Checklist (PCL-R) and explores how it became so entrenched in the criminal justice system. Dan Murrie’s research questioning the reliability of the PCL in adversarial contexts is highlighted. Robert Hare also expresses concerns about the way his tool is being used in court, and the corrupting influences of the adversarial system.

The show will be complemented by an online debate, “Does the PCL-R test have value in the criminal justice system?” I am one of the featured experts on the panel, so I hope some of you will visit the website; I will provide a link just as soon as it goes live.

For those of you who would rather tune in once, the show is also airing as a single piece on Friday on the radio program This American Life, and you will be able to download the podcast there as well.

Part I of the 2-part series is HERE; the online debate is HERE.

Steffan's Alerts #5: Miranda warnings, child custody, and more

Click on a title to read the article abstract; click on a highlighted author's name to request the full article.


Marije Stoltenborgh and colleagues, in a new issue of Child Maltreatment, report the prevalence of childhood sexual abuse based on over 9 million subjects extracted from 217 publications from various countries.


Using hypothetical cases, Sanford Braver and colleagues examined judgments of various custody arrangements by jury-eligible citizens in Arizona. Reporting their findings in Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, the authors suggest that a significant gap exists between the judgments of the public and what occurs in the family law system.


In the same issue of Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, Richard Rogers and colleagues continue their research on defendants’ comprehension of Miranda warnings. Based on analyses of 416 pretrial defendants’ understanding of current Miranda terminology, the authors offer recommendations to simplify Miranda phrases so that persons with academic and cognitive limitations may more easily understand their rights at the time of interrogation.


Robin Wilson and colleagues examine the accuracy of four methods for assessing pedophilia and appraising risk of recidivism among a sample of 130 child sexual abusers. They report their findings in a new issue of Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research and Treatment.


In a new issue of Child and Youth Services Review, Rebecca Yazzie analyzes the types of treatment programs available in the United States through a sample of 3,163 juvenile facilities. Compared to public facilities, private facilities appeared better equipped, with more mental health staff and treatment programs. Facilities that offer family counseling reported a lower incidence of suicide.

Steffan's alerts are brought to you by Jarrod Steffan, Ph.D., a forensic and clinical psychologist based in Wichita, Kansas. For more information about Dr. Steffan, please visit his website.

May 23, 2011

California prisons 'cruel and unusual,' U.S. high court rules

In a historic decision, the Supreme Court of the United States has ruled that prison conditions in California are so bad that they violate the U.S. Constitution's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Opining that the prison system produces "needless suffering and death" through its failure to deliver minimal medical and mental health care to serioiusly ill prisoners, the court ordered California to cut its massive prison population by more than 30,000 prisoners (still 137.5 percent over capacity) within the next two years. Rather than releasing prisoners outright, the state can ship them to other states or keep them in county jails. As Adam Liptak of the New York Times reports:

The majority opinion included photographs of inmates crowded into open gymnasium-style rooms and what Justice Kennedy described as 'telephone-booth-sized cages without toilets' used to house suicidal inmates. Suicide rates in the state's prisons, Justice Kennedy wrote, have been 80 percent higher than the national average. A lower court in the case said it was 'an uncontested fact' that 'an inmate in one of California’s prisons needlessly dies every six or seven days due to constitutional deficiencies.'

The court's ruling in Brown v. Plata is HERE.

May 22, 2011

Wallowa Lake diagnostic training

Sculpture on Main Street of Joseph, Oregon
with Eagle Cap Wilderness Area in background
(K Franklin)


On the day that the world didn't end, I found it fitting to be literally at the end of the road, giving a training on controversies in psychiatric diagnosis. The setting was Oregon’s picturesque Wallowa Lake, where for 26 years the Eastern Oregon Psychological Association has sponsored an annual retreat.


The mental health professionals at the retreat were a bright and independent bunch whose practices take them across scenic mountainous terrain to far-flung rural communities, Indian reservations, jails and psychiatric facilities in eastern Oregon, Washington and Idaho.


Since Oregon has avoided the Sexually Violent Predator quagmire, the practitioners – as well as the psychologists from Eastern Oregon University in La Grande in attendance -- were both amused and appalled to learn about the pseudoscientific constructs of hebephilia and paraphilic coercive disorder for which the sex offender industry is lobbying. Other controversial diagnoses and proposed diagnoses covered in the daylong workshop included:
  • Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
  • Antisocial Personality Disorder and Psychopathy
  • Parental Alienation Syndrome
  • Attenuated Psychosis Syndrome
  • Mild Neurocognitive Disorder
  • Disruptive Mood Dysregulation Disorder
  • Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder
  • Traumatic Grief Disorder
  • Gambling Disorder
Wallowa River as seen from Chief Joseph
Trail (K Franklin)
If you ever get a chance to attend this annual retreat, which is not well advertised but always takes place the weekend before Memorial Day Weekend, I recommend it highly. Not only is the crowd an enjoyable and intellectual one, but the setting is amazing. It's not for no reason that the Nez Perce consider sacred this valley butting up against the mountains of the Eagle Cap Wilderness Area.

The legendary Chief Joseph is buried on a glacial moraine overlooking the lake. The town named in his honor, Joseph, was a dying old ranching and mining community when it was discovered by artists who have reinvigorated the main drag, opening shuttered storefronts and installing amazing sculptures on every corner. Summer vacationers can now rub shoulders with cowboys and Indians in gourmet restaurants featuring local micro-brews and wines.

It's not an easy place to get to (one must catch a puddle jumper to Walla Walla, Washington or Pendleton, Oregon and then drive for several hours), but its breathtaking beauty and unique character make it well worth a visit.

Special thanks to David Starr, Dwight Mowry, Marianne Weaver, Terry Templeman, Charles Lyons, and Stephen and Beth Condon for all of your work and your kindness in arranging and facilitating this event.

May 18, 2011

The curious story of 'a reasonable degree of professional certainty'

I recently had a strange experience: An opposing attorney made a motion to exclude my report in a legal case, because I had not written that I held my expressed opinions "to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty." The attorney who had retained me was forced to scramble to obtain a written declaration from me, stating that I did indeed hold my opinions to this level of certitude. I typically do not include this magic phrase in reports, finding it rather obtuse and, frankly, pompous-sounding. So, when my colleague Dr. Worthen expressed knowledge about the phrase, I prevailed upon him to write this guest post. 

Guest post by Mark D. Worthen, Psy.D.*

Expert witnesses who testify based on their medical, psychological, or other scientific training and expertise, are often asked to express their opinions "to a reasonable degree of medical (or psychological or scientific) certainty." But what does this phrase mean and why is it used in legal proceedings?

Before exploring what the phrase means, let's first examine why the phrase is used in courts of law. As it turns out, the "reasonable degree of medical certainty" phrase developed almost by accident and has no clear rationale for its almost universal use. After conducting exhaustive research, law professor Jeff L. Lewin traces the origins of the phrase to Chicago, Illinois sometime between 1915 and 1930 [1]. Professor Lewin notes:

While the phrase was generated by the efforts of Illinois attorneys to comply with legal doctrine, litigators in other states adopted this curious phrase through unreflective imitation of models provided in a best-selling manual on trial technique. The phrase was then incorporated into legal doctrine through the judiciary's uncritical acceptance of this attorney usage. The judicial response to the phrase thus exemplifies the generation of legal rules by chance instead of by deliberate judicial choice.

In addition to lacking a clear rationale for its usage, the "reasonable degree of medical certainty" phrase also lacks a consistent definition.

Many professionals who use the phrase in their testimony have their own understandings of the phrase's meaning. For example, some assume that the phrase means that there is a preponderance of the evidence in support of their opinion, or that their opinion is "more likely than not" to be correct. Other professionals require more evidence: They assume that the phrase means that they possess "clear and convincing" evidence for their opinion or even that their opinion is accurate "beyond a reasonable doubt." On the other hand, most testifying experts probably do not have a pre-determined definition for the phrase and utter it simply because they know it is expected.

Although the phrase is not routinely used in the practice of medicine, psychology, or other scientific disciplines (have you ever seen a journal article that concluded, "To a reasonable degree of psychological certainty" we found that X caused Y?), textbooks written to provide guidance to professionals who testify in legal proceedings have offered various definitions. For example, the authors of Effective Medical Testifying: A Handbook for Physicians assert that the phrase means "more likely than not", i.e., 51% probability or more.

Black's Law Dictionary defines the phrase similarly: “A standard requiring a showing that the injury was more likely than not caused by a particular stimulus, based on the general consensus of recognized medical thought.”

However, courts have not always agreed with this definition. For example, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Griffen v. University of Pittsburgh ruled that a doctor who indicated that there was a 51% chance that a certain action caused an injury did not provide a sufficient basis for testifying to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. In declaring that 51% certainty was not certainty for the purposes of the law, the Court did not indicate what percentage of certainty is required.

In other cases, it seems that the courts don't care how confident an expert may be about his or her opinion. What matters is that they use the "magic phrase" during their testimony. For example, in a Missouri case:


... a medical doctor testified that he was ninety percent certain as to the causality of a condition. See Bertram v. Wunning, 385 S.W.2d 803, 807 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965), appeal after remand, 417 S.W.2d 120 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967). However, despite giving this high probability, he later retreated when asked to testify as to causation of the condition with “reasonable medical certainty.” In the end, notwithstanding the strong and “practically certain” testimony of the doctor, the Missouri court found the testimony to be insufficient because it lacked the “reasonable certainty” stamp of approval. [2]
Frustration with the inexactness of the phrase has led some to call for a clear-cut, agreed-upon definition.

The American Law Institute (ALI) declared, in its Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm (§ 28, Comment e, 2010), that the phrase should be specifically defined to mean that an expert's opinion is "more likely than not" accurate. The ALI reasoned that the standard for "reasonable degree of medical certainty" should not exceed the standard of proof considered by juries in tort cases, i.e., a preponderance of the evidence.

Attorneys James M. Beck and Mark Herrmann argue that the ALI standard "dumbs down" expert witness testimony and that the reasons for the proposed changes are faulty in many respects. They argue that the use of "reasonable medical certainty" should be retained and that its meaning should come from the standards for decision-making commonly used in the expert's profession.

Attorney Nathan Schachtman also argues for continued use of the phrase:

Surely, however, the phrase is not semantically empty. “Certainty” has clear epistemic connotations and implications for the witness’s opinion, both in terms of his own state of mind, and in terms of the empirical support the witness has for his opinion in the form of reasonably relied upon data, and sound inferences to a reliable conclusion. Subjectively, the witness who utters the phrase acknowledges that he is not speculating and that he believes that his opinion satisfies professional standards for claims of knowledge. A witness who qualifies his opinion with these “magic words” communicates his willingness to put his professional reputation on the line, and to defend the opinion before his peers. Objectively, the phrase conveys the notion of reliable knowledge. To be sure, human beings may not enjoy “certainty” in their knowledge of empirical propositions, but the “reasonable” qualifier makes the entire phrase meaningful and important.
While the debate over the definition of the phrase and whether or not it should be used at all will no doubt continue, individual experts might rightly ask, "Well, what should I do if asked to give an opinion to a reasonable degree of professional certainty?"

Here are some suggestions:

1. Ask the attorney you're working with if he or she plans to use the phrase in his or her direct examination of you. If so, ensure that each of you understand what you mean by the phrase, so that you'll be ready in the event that opposing counsel or the court asks you to define what you mean by "reasonable professional certainty." It's unlikely that you will be asked to define the phrase but it's better to be prepared with an answer than to stumble and mumble.

2. Make sure that your definition comports with relevant case law in your jurisdiction. For example, in Pennsyvania, you would not want to say, "It means that it's more likely than not" (see above).

3. In terms of how to define the phrase, consider how your profession determines "reasonable certainty." For example, when do you consider an opinion certain enough to proceed with a given treatment (medicine or psychology) or to proceed with a certain construction plan (architecture or engineering)?

4. If you give a numerical representation of your confidence in your opinion, a savvy attorney might challenge you on your ability to determine your own level of confidence with accuracy, citing research on the overconfidence effect. Your best bet is to be familiar with this research and to err on the side of underestimating your confidence.

5. Better yet, avoid numerical representations of confidence and focus on the evidence for your opinion, rather than your confidence in your opinion. Think about it this way: Are jurors or judges more likely to be persuaded by explanation #1 or #2:
  • Explanation #1: " 'Reasonable degree of psychological certainty' means that I am 75% sure of my opinion." 
  • Explanation #2: " 'Reasonable degree of psychological certainty' means that I found clear and convincing evidence for my opinion."

6. Focusing on the evidence for your opinion is an important distinction because it redirects the trier of fact to the strenth of your argument, namely, the scientific methods and research evidence for your conclusions.

FOOTNOTES
 
1. The Genesis and Evolution of Legal Uncertainity About "Reasonable Medical Certainty," Maryland Law Review, 57, pp. 380-504, 1998.

2. From "An Enigmatic Degree of Medical Certainty" by Nelson Abbott and Landon Magnusson, Utah Bar Journal, July/August 2008 (Vol. 21 No. 4).

*Guest author Mark D. Worthen, Psy.D. is a clinical and forensic psychologist in Asheville, North Carolina. Visit him on the web at DrWorthen.net.

May 14, 2011

Unusual saga: From prison warden to anti-execution activist

Ex-warden of hardscrabble San Quentin to direct abolitionist Death Penalty Focus
Jeanne Woodford is joining Death Penalty Focus, a nonprofit group that works to abolish the death penalty. She brings to the job her experience as the warden of San Quentin State Prison in the San Francisco Bay Area, where she oversaw four executions. (Photo credit: David Butow / Redux)
As the clock ticked past midnight and the death chamber phone refused to ring, San Quentin State Prison Warden Jeanne Woodford would calmly signal the executioners to inject a lethal dose of chemicals into the condemned man's veins.

Reared in a Roman Catholic family, she grew up believing that only God had the right to take a life. But four times in her 30-year career in California corrections, the soft-spoken mother of five carried out executions of notorious killers, remorseful and unrepentant alike.

Woodford resigned as director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation four years ago, dismayed over state authorities clinging to policies such as the death penalty that she had concluded are wasteful, discriminatory and fail to make the public safer.

Now, as the state tries to restart the execution machinery after a five-year legal hiatus, Woodford has crossed to the other side of the contentious debate over capital punishment. On Thursday, the abolitionist nonprofit Death Penalty Focus announced Woodford's appointment as executive director, a new role that will see her standing on the other side of the walls of San Quentin should any of the 713 death row inmates meet his or her end at the hands of the state.

"I never was in favor of the death penalty, but my experience at San Quentin allowed me to see it from all points of view. I had a duty to carry out, and I tried to do it with professionalism," Woodford, 56, said in explaining how she had to put her personal abhorrence of execution aside to do her job. "The death penalty serves no one. It doesn't serve the victims. It doesn't serve prevention. It's truly all about retribution."

Woodford says she sees an opportunity to get rid of the death penalty in the current quest for budgetary restraint. If the public can be educated about the true costs of capital punishment - at least $200 million a year, she says - as well as its potential for irreversible error, support for the ultimate penalty would wither, Woodford predicts. It is that prospect that has lured her from a brief retirement to the post with Death Penalty Focus from which she will lobby against the policy she once imposed.
Reform proposals ignored
After 26 years at San Quentin, Woodford was tapped by Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger to serve as corrections director in 2004, a job she initially hoped would allow her to reform the system from inside. She wanted to close the revolving door of parole violators flooding the prisons for three-month terms, enough to compound overcrowding and soak up medical care but too short to get into rehabilitative programs.

"It was an incredibly expensive bus ride to nowhere," she said of the vicious circle of petty offenses sending parolees back inside to reconnect with hardened criminals.

Her proposals for locating inmates in prisons closest to where their families lived went unheeded. Direly needed sentencing reform never happened, although, she says, the Legislature and governor are now drafting programs to cut the 70% recidivism rate, finally motivated by the need to trim the corrections budget.

"There are a lot of hard-working people in the corrections system who take the blame for so much that is out of their control," Woodford says of the frustration that led to her resignation. "They don't make the sentencing laws, but they are expected to carry them out."
The Los Angeles Times profile, by reporter Carol Williams, continues HERE.