Junk-science paraphilias remain popular despite official rejection, study finds

Sometimes, you can’t win for losing.

Just over a decade ago, opponents of junk science in court won a hard-fought battle when they succeeded in keeping two unreliable sexual-deviance diagnoses from debuting in the fifth edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM).

Now, a new study finds that the rejection did nothing to stop the introduction of these diagnoses in court. Rather, they are being snuck into forensic reports and testimony through the back door, via two vague catchall labels inserted into the DSM manual in 2013. And although proponents had argued at the time that these residual labels would reduce confusion and improve diagnostic reliability, the study suggests that the opposite has occurred.

Long-time readers of this blog may recall the brouhaha over the two novel conditions of “hebephilia” and “nonconsent.” Both were considered but rejected for the sexual disorders (“paraphilias”) section of the 2013 DSM. Their rejection owed to their lack of proven reliability or scientific validity. Neither condition has a standard definition, which is a basic precursor to accurate scientific measurement. Hebephilia generally references a sexual attraction to youths in the pubertal stage of development, while nonconsent refers to attraction to sexual coercion.

A single niche  

The single niche where the two labels are in widespread use is a forensic one: Sexually violent predator (SVP) litigation. That’s because the indefinite civil confinement of serial sex offenders has been ruled unconstitutional except in cases where an offender poses a substantial future danger to the public due to a formal mental disorder. The lobby to create the new disorders of nonconsent and hebephilia was led by forensic psychologists working in the SVP trenches, along with psychologists at a Canadian clinic with outsized influence over the paraphilias section of the 2013 DSM manual. The American Psychiatric Association’s refusal to label rapists as mentally ill has encouraged some evaluators to “bend the language of the DSM” to make it work.

The current researchers found that “nonconsent” and “hebephilia” are the two most common bases for invoking an idiosyncratic catchall label of “Other Specified Paraphilic Disorder” (OSPD). Their findings are consistent with a recent review of U.S. legal cases that found that large proportions of civilly committed sex offenders – including about half in California and 43% in Washington - are diagnosed with "OSPD-nonconsent."

The study, published in the journal Sexual Abuse, is the first to systematically analyze the prevalence and patterns of use of OSPD and another vaguely defined label, “Unspecified Paraphilic Disorder” (UPD), in sexually violent predator litigation. It analyzed SVP evaluations in Florida over a four-year period. Because the researchers aimed to calculate the reliability of the disputed labels, only cases in which a convicted sex offender was evaluated by two different psychologists were included. In all, 190 separate cases involving 380 forensic reports were analyzed.

At least one paraphilia was diagnosed in four out of five cases reviewed. Pedophilia was the most invoked, followed by the catchall categories of OSPD and UPD.

OSPD’s reliability – or the agreement among two psychologists evaluating the same man – was abysmal. In cases where one evaluator assigned a diagnosis of OSPD, there was a less-than-chance likelihood that a second evaluator would agree. The kappa reliability statistic was a very poor .21, far below chance agreement. Kappas of below 0.4 are generally considered to be below the minimum reliability threshold in the forensic arena.

Evaluator disagreement was even more profound with Unspecified Paraphilic Disorder, with two psychologists agreeing about its presence only 30% of the time. That comes as no surprise. That label, as critics have long pointed out, is inherently unreliable, in that it is designed to be used in circumstances in which there is not enough information to make a specific diagnosis, or a clinician “chooses not to specify the reason” why it is being assigned, according to the manual’s instructions.

One of forensic psychology’s dirty little secrets is that the assignment of controversial labels often hinges as much on evaluator whims as on the facts of the case. For example, research has found that some evaluators routinely assign higher scores than others on measures of psychopathy, an especially prejudicial label. The current research showed this same problematic pattern with diagnoses of OSPD. Two of the 21 psychologists under study proffered that catchall diagnosis in most of their cases, whereas 38% of the clinicians assigned it in fewer than one out of four cases; one evaluator never used it at all. This suggests that case outcomes are being influenced not only by offender characteristics but by which psychologist happens to be assigned to the case.

Similar evaluator variability was evident when the researchers zoomed in on OSPD diagnoses in which either hebephilia or nonconsent were proffered as its basis. Three evaluators used the term “hebephilia” in half of their OSPD diagnoses, while nine evaluators never used hebephilia-related terminology at all. And evaluators agreed on the hebephilia label in only about one out of four instances. Regarding nonconsent, 13 evaluators invoked it in at least half of their evaluations, whereas five evaluators never used that specifier.

The study’s authors theorized that the widely ranging rates of use of the OSPD and UPD labels likely reflect hesitancy by some psychologists to proffer diagnoses “with vague diagnostic criteria and debatable level of empirical support.”

What all this suggests is that whether an offender is said to have a mental disorder pertaining to an attraction to pubescent minors and/or rape hinges in large part on the luck of the draw as to whether they are assigned to Dr. Jones versus Dr. Smith.

The large variance among evaluators is especially remarkable in that “adversarial allegiance” was not in play. This forensic bias becomes an issue when evaluators’ opinion are influenced by whether they were retained by the prosecution or the defense. Here, all of the evaluators were members of the same ostensibly neutral panel of contracted psychologists. If adversarial allegiance had come into play, the divergences in diagnoses likely would have been even more profound.

Highlighting the higgledy-piggledy nature of any ad-hoc diagnosis, the researchers found that the so-called “specifiers” – or specific rationales – attached to OSPD diagnoses were highly idiosyncratic. Examples included descriptions of behaviors that are illegal but not necessarily evidence of mental disorder, such as “OSPD-Non-Consensual Sexual Activity with Adolescent,” “OSPD-Attraction to Adolescent Females” and an even more bizarre “OSPD-Sexting.”

 Custom-tailored labels

“[O]ne may be particularly concerned that several of the labels appear custom to the facts of the specific case rather than resting on any empirically derived diagnosis,” the study’s authors noted.

I witnessed this first-hand last month, when a psychologist testified in federal court that a sex offender the government was aiming to civilly commit had a novel combination of sexual interests that cumulatively rose to the level of a unique mental disorder called “OSPD-deviant sexual interests in hebephilic, sadistic, exhibitionistic and voyeuristic behavior.”

Fortunately, the federal judge at this particular trial was skeptical. Pointing out that “OSPD-hebephilia” was rejected from the DSM and remains controversial in the psychological community, he wrote in his opinion that he was “troubled by the combination of multiple insufficient specifiers, which does not appear to have been contemplated by the DSM-5-TR.”

No matter how nonconsent or hebephilia were defined in the specific psychological reports, the interrater agreement – or concordance between evaluators – remained poor across the board, and far below recommended reliability for diagnoses in routine clinical practice, much less the forensic arena in which precision is especially critical.

"Bad science"

“Relying upon diagnoses with poor empirical support can perpetuate the use of bad science in the courtroom,” the authors concluded. “While it is certainly true that there are high-risk individuals who are likely to sexually recidivate upon their release from prison, providing makeshift diagnoses to satisfy civil commitment criteria significantly questions the ethical practice of psychological decision making.”

A survey of legal cases found a smattering of successful challenges to these controversial diagnoses. These Daubert and Frye evidentiary challenges focused on definitional problems, an absence of substantial research support, and a lack of general acceptance. In State of New York v. Jason C., for example, the court wrote:

“This Court cannot help but ask, if this disorder exists, why isn't there convincing evidence that it exists outside the realm of civil commitment? If this disorder is a matter of the human condition, then shouldn't this paraphilia be seen outside of SVP proceedings?”

The diagnosis was similarly excluded in a Missouri case, In Re: Stanley Williams, on the basis of a high error rate, a dearth of peer-reviewed publications, poor validity, and lack of general acceptance. The judge in that case wrote:

“Using diagnostic language which has been rejected from inclusion in the DSM does not indicate general acceptance by the relevant community, but rather an unwillingness to accept the given methods and language in question.”

The study, "Other Specified Paraphilic Disorder: Patterns of Use in Sexually Violent Predator Evaluations," is authored by Nicole Graham, Cynthia Calkins and Elizabeth Jeglic of the John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York.

Related reading:

Behavioral Sciences and the Law published an overview of the evidentiary shortcomings of the nonconsent diagnosis, “The admissibility of other specified paraphilic disorder (non-consent) in sexually violent predator,” in 2020. The peer-reviewed article by forensic psychiatrist Brian Holoyda gives a blueprint of how a Daubert evidentiary admissibility challenge to OSPD-nonconsent might be raised due to the purported construct's weak interrater reliability, limited research support and lack of established diagnostic criteria. The same analysis easily applies to hebephilia.

Interested readers can find more background on the history of the term “hebephilia” in a 2010 article by this blogger, "Hebephilia: Quintessence of Diagnostic Pretextuality. " also published in Behavioral Sciences and the Law.

Hebephilia flunks Frye test

Photo credit: NY Law Journal

In a strongly worded rejection of hebephilia, a New York judge has ruled that the controversial diagnosis cannot be used in legal proceedings because of “overwhelming opposition” to its validity among the psychiatric community.

Judge Daniel Conviser heard testimony from six experts (including this blogger) and reviewed more than 100 scholarly articles before issuing a long-awaited opinion this week in the case of “Ralph P.,” a 72-year-old man convicted in 2001 of a sex offense against a 14-year-old boy. The state of New York is seeking to civilly detain Ralph P. on the basis of alleged future dangerousness.

State psychologist Joel Lord had initially labeled Ralph P. with the unique diagnosis of sexual attraction to “sexually inexperienced young teenage males,” but later changed his diagnosis to hebephilia, a condition proposed but rejected for the current edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5).

Under the Frye evidentiary standard, designed to bar novel scientific methods that are not sufficiently validated, a construct must be “generally accepted” by the relevant scientific community before it can be relied upon in legal proceedings.

Judge Conviser found that hebephilia (generally defined as sexual attraction to children in the early stages of puberty, or around the ages of 11 or 12 to 14) is being promoted by a tiny fringe of researchers and in practice is used almost exclusively as a tool to civilly commit convicted sex offenders. Under U.S. Supreme Court rulings, such offenders must have a mental disorder in order to qualify for prolonged detention after they have served their prison terms.

“It is not an accident, as Dr. Franklin outlined, that hebephilia became a prominent diagnosis only with the advent of SVP laws,” the judge wrote in his 75-page opinion. “It is also not a coincidence that each of the three expert witnesses who testified for the State at the instant hearing either work or formerly worked for state [Sexually Violent Predator] programs.”

Conviser’s ruling analyzed both the practical problems in reliably identifying hebephilia and the political controversies swirling around it: Without any standardized criteria, “clinicians are free to assign hebephilia diagnoses in widely disparate ways, many of which are just plainly wrong.” Using age as a proxy for pubertal stage is no guarantee of reliability because pubertal onset is highly variable. Ultimately, he concluded, whether erotic interest in pubescent minors is deemed "pathological" is more about moral values than science.

APA secrecy faulted

The judge was harshly critical of the American Psychiatric Association for its refusal to publicly explain why it rejected hebephilia from the DSM-5 in 2013. The diagnosis was aggressively promoted by a Canadian psychologist, Ray Blanchard, and fellow researchers from Canada’s Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH), who dominated the DSM-5 subcommittee on paraphilias.

Blanchard rewrote the DSM section on paraphilias (sexual deviances) in a broad way such that virtually all sexual interests other than a narrowly defined “normophilic” pattern became pathological. However, the APA rejected Blanchard’s proposal to expand pedophilia to pathologize adult sexual attractions to pubescent-aged (rather than just prepubescent) minors.

“The proposal was apparently rejected because it was greeted with a firestorm of criticism by the sex offender psychiatric community, which was communicated to the APA board…. As best as this Court can surmise, the APA rejected the pedohebephilia proposal because it was opposed by most of the psychiatrists and psychologists who worked in the field.”

“[S]trikingly,” wrote Judge Conviser, “the process through which proposed new diagnoses are approved or rejected is shrouded in a degree of secrecy which would be the envy of many totalitarian regimes…. With respect to hebephilia, the APA board’s actions will have a direct impact on both public safety and the fundamental liberty interests of hundreds or thousands of people.”

The APA forces those involved in the DSM revision process to sign nondisclosure contracts. That policy came in the wake of a series of published exposes – including Christopher Lane’s Shyness: How Normal Behavior Became a Sickness, Jonathan Metzl's The Protest Psychosis, and Ethan Watters’s Crazy Like Us (to name just a few of my favorites) -- that embarrassed the world’s largest psychiatric organization by shining a light inside the often subjective and political process of diagnosis creation and expansion.

“Overwhelming” opposition

Blanchard and his CAMH colleagues’ 2009 proposal to expand pedophilia into a new “pedohebephilia” diagnosis in the DSM-5 spawned a massive outcry, which mushroomed into at least five dozen published critiques.

In preparation for my testimony at this and similar Frye hearings in New York, I expanded on my 2010 article in Behavioral Sciences and the Law tracing hebephilia’s rise from obscurity, to produce an updated chart containing all 116 articles addressing the construct. If one tallies only those articles that take a position (pro or con) on hebephilia and are not written by members of the CAMH team, fully 83% are critical as compared to only 17% that are favorable. This, Judge Conviser noted, is strong evidence against the government’s position that hebephilia is “generally accepted” by the relevant scientific communities.

“The thrust of the evidence at the hearing was … clear: there was overwhelming opposition to the pedohebephilia proposal in the sex offender psychiatric community,” he wrote. “There is overwhelming opposition to the hebephilia diagnosis today.”

Courts scrutinizing nouveau diagnoses

With the APA’s rejection of hebephilia as well as two other proposed sexual disorders (one for preferential rape and another for hypersexuality), government evaluators continue to shoehorn novel, case-specific diagnostic labels into the catchall DSM-5 category of “other specified paraphilic disorder” (OSPD) as a basis for civil commitment.

Under a 2012 New York appellate court ruling in the case of State v. Shannon S., upon a defense request, a Frye evidentiary hearing must be held on any such attempt to introduce an OSPD diagnosis into a Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) case. That has triggered a spate of Frye hearings in the Empire State, affording greater scrutiny and judicial gatekeeping of scientifically questionable diagnoses.

Ironically, although the Shannon S. court upheld hebephilia by a narrow 4-3 margin, Shannon S. would not have met diagnostic criteria under the narrower definitions presented by the government experts at Ralph P.’s Frye hearing four years later, because his victims were older than 14.

“Assuming hebephilia is a legitimate diagnosis, Shannon S., like many SVP respondents, was apparently diagnosed with the condition not based on evidence he was preferentially attracted to underdeveloped pubescent body types but because he offended against underage victims,” Judge Conviser observed in his detailed summary of prior New York cases.

The three dissenting judges in Shannon S. were adamant that hebephilia was “absurd,” and an example of “junk science,” deployed with the pretextual goal of “locking up dangerous criminals” who had committed statutory rapes.

The opening of the Frye floodgates has led to a flurry of sometimes-competing opinions.

In 2015, in State v. Mercado, Judge Dineen Riviezzo ruled against “OSPD--sexually attracted to teenage females” as a legitimate diagnosis. However, she declined to rule on the general acceptance of hebephilia because it was not specifically diagnosed in that case.

A year later, relying on similar evidence, a judge in upstate New York ruled in State v. Paul V. that hebephilia was generally accepted, in large part because it was backed by the APA’s paraphilias sub-workgroup. Judge Conviser found that reasoning unpersuasive, pointing out that the subworkgroup was dominated by the very same CAMH researchers who were hebephilia’s primary advocates; it was therefore “not a valid proxy" for the scientific community.

In July, another court rejected both hebephilia and “OSPD--underage males” as valid diagnoses, in the cases of Hugh H. and Martello A. The court noted that hebephilia is inconsistently defined, was rejected for the DSM-5, and is primarily advanced by one research group; further, attraction to pubescent minors is not intrinsically abnormal.

Cynthia Calkins, a professor at John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York, echoed those points in her testimony at Ralph P.'s hearing. She noted that in the United States, the main psychologists advocating for hebephilia are government-retained evaluators in SVP cases, who make up only perhaps one-fourth of one percent of psychologists and psychiatrists in the U.S. and so cannot be a proxy for “general acceptance” in the scientific community.

The government’s choice of experts illustrated Calkins’ point: Testifying for the government were Christopher Kunkle, director of New York’s civil management program for sex offenders, David Thornton of Wisconsin’s civil commitment center, and Robin Wilson, formerly of Florida’s civil commitment center and a protégé of Ray Blanchard’s.

The third expert called by Ralph P.’s attorneys was Charles Ewing, a distinguished professor at the University at Buffalo Law School who is both an attorney and a forensic psychologist and has authored several books on forensic psychology.

Defense attorneys Maura Klugman and Jessica Botticelli of Mental Hygiene Legal Service represented Ralph P. Assistant New York Attorney General Elaine Yacyshyn represented the state.

Ultimately, New York State’s highest court may have to weigh in to resolve once and for all the question of whether novel psychiatric diagnoses like hebephilia are admissible for civil commitment purposes. But that could be years down the road.

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The ruling in State v. Ralph P. is HERE. The subsequent order of Sept. 28, 2016 granting Ralph P.'s motion for summary judgment and dismissal of the civil commitment petition is HERE.

A New York Law Journal report on the case, "judge Rejects Diagnosis for Civil Confinement," is HERE.

A search of this blog site using the term hebephilia will produce my reports on this construct dating all the way back to my original post from 2007, "Invasion of the Hebephile Hunters."

Greetings from Bismarck, North Dakota

Here on the northern edge of the Great Plains, the local folk, of hardy Norwegian and Swedish stock, are strolling around as if it's a balmy day. Not me. Breathing steam into the 14-degree (-10 Celsius) air, I’m bundled up in a parka, ear muffs and gloves and still feel like an iceberg!

I’m up here at the behest of the state Supreme Court, giving a training to the judges on psychiatric diagnosis in court.

North Dakota is a sparsely populated state with the lowest crime rate in the nation, and the judicial community is tight-knit. Ninety percent of the state’s judges – from trial judges to Supreme Court justices – were crowded into the hotel ballroom.

It was hard to distill a day-long training into just two hours, but fortunately the well-informed and inquisitive judges brought up some of the omitted topics in the question-and-answer period. They seemed especially intrigued to learn of the reliability issues plaguing DSM-5 diagnoses, and the research on adversarial allegiance and psychopathy by Murrie and Boccaccini’s crew down in Texas and Virginia.

In 1997, North Dakota’s legislature jumped on the bandwagon and enacted a sexually violent predator law (here called a Sexually Dangerous Individual, or SDI, law), ushering in the circus of experts battling over diagnoses and risk assessment techniques that we see in the other 40 percent of U.S. states with such laws. So, naturally, someone asked about hebephilia, which testifying experts had falsely assured them would be in the DSM-5.

That reminds me: I just testified as a pure expert in a Frye evidentiary hearing in Washington on whether hebephilia was a generally accepted construct in the relevant scientific community. The judge ruled against hebephilia, but allowed an even-more-suspect "Paraphilia Not Otherwise Specified" diagnosis that the evaluator candidly admitted he had made up for that specific case.

North Dakota, by the way, holds the distinction of being the only U.S. state that has not adopted either the Daubert or Frye standard for evidence admissibility. It has its own unique rule that is very liberal. Still, as anywhere, judges bear the burden of being the evidentiary gatekeepers.

Talking with the judges after my session gave me a greater appreciation for the difficulties they face. Politicians pass laws, many ill-conceived, and then judges get stuck having to figure out how to enforce them, as best they can.

DSM-5: Forensic applications (Part II of II)

Courts cling to DSM as "bible"

As alluded to yesterday, in Part I, mental health professionals know not to take the DSM (or the ICD, for that matter) too seriously. It's just convenient fiction, or at best "useful constructs," mainly used to attain insurance reimbursement.

Only, there's this curious phenomenon: In the legal system, where the consequences of error can be grave, DSM diagnoses have taken on a mantra of grand truth. Increasingly, I find myself being asked during court testimony about some nit-picky little criterion or another (such as the six-month specifier for pedophilia) as if it is sacred gospel, rather than the arbitrary creation of some idiosyncratic back-room committee.

One bold colleague, when asked on the witness stand to confirm that the DSM is indeed "the bible of psychiatry," answers with a resounding "YES!" But, he adds, "Bible is Greek for 'book,' and the DSM's are a collection of books or chapters submitted by sundry subcommittees and approved or not based on politics. As with the Christian Bible, some known books (like the Book of Thomas) did not make the cut."

I don't recommend that tactic unless you are well grounded in theological studies. I myself cannot state under oath that the DSM is "the bible," when the attorney is really seeking to have me confirm its status as a learned treatise, that is, sufficiently authoritative that it should be relied upon in court. It may be the only game in town, but it's hardly known for its empirical fidelity. The text's assortment of vague generalities are not even referenced, so we don't know where they came from. If you are going to testify about a specific mental condition, such as delusional disorder, I recommend relying on empirical research from reliable sources that you can cite. 

Turning now to specific changes in the DSM-5 of most potential relevance to forensic work....

The good news is that some of the more outlandish proposals -- such as parental alienation syndrome and hebephilia -- got a resounding thumbs-down. So, here's my first-glance summary of what's new and different. 

Sexual paraphilias

An attempt by an ambitious minority to add a slew of new sexual disorders fell flat. So, you won’t find hebephilia, paraphilic coercive disorder or hypersexuality in the DSM-5. They didn’t even make the appendix for "conditions for further study" (which is populated by such non-starters as caffeine use disorder, internet gaming disorder, and the more worrisome attenuated psychosis syndrome).

These defeats are a big blow for the civil commitment industry, which lobbied for them to replace the shady "not otherwise specified" diagnoses being used to justify indefinite detention of offenders who don't have legitimate mental illnesses.

The section does, however, contain a few pesky little wording changes that may come into play in forensic cases. Each  disorder except pedophilia in the paraphilias chapter now has two remission qualifiers. If the person has not been impaired for five years, the disorder can be said to be "in full remission." This is a nod to the reality that sexual kinks often come and go over time. But there's a catch: The remission must be while the person was "in an uncontrolled environment." Otherwise, a new remission specifier of "in a controlled environment" can be applied. I anticipate that government evaluators in sexually violent predator trials may use this language to argue that a prisoner whose predicate offense was decades in the past is still disordered and at risk today, despite no objective evidence of such.

Another important change is in the text accompanying sexual sadism disorder, which now reads more like it was written for adversarial deployment. There are now two types of sadists -- "admitting individuals" and deniers. For deniers, the fact of having "inflicted pain or suffering on multiple victims on separate occasions" may be sufficient for a diagnosis. As a "general rule," the text instructs, recurrent can be interpreted to mean "three or more victims on separate occasions."

As discussed yesterday in Part I, the DSM-5 does not provide citations to empirical research to back up its recommendations. This is especially problematic in the case of sexual sadism, because even most chronic rapists are not necessarily aroused by a victim's suffering; rather, the victim's suffering fails to inhibit their arousal as it would for other men. The fact of inflicting pain or suffering also says nothing about what is going on in the mind of the inflicter, and three is just an arbitrary number pulled from a hat. These new guidelines will only complicate a problematic diagnosis with abysmally poor reliability and no predictive validity.

Antisocial personality disorder

Early buzz was that this pejorative label -- which can be applied to essentially any chronic offender -- would be revised to more closely align it with the even more pejorative and controversial construct of psychopathy. But the APA abandoned all proposed personality disorder changes (including a radical move to drop half of them altogether and to place the rest of them on a dimensional spectrum), so this diagnosis remains unchanged.

The real news here comes from the field trials. In regard to reliability, antisocial personality disorder came in at the bottom of the barrel, down there with the new mixed anxiety-depressive disorder with a kappa reliability rating of only 0.2. Historically, kappas below 0.4 have been considered poor. Although DSM-5 chief statistician Helena Kraemer is arguing that lower kappas should be deemed "acceptable," a 0.2 essentially means that even trained professionals cannot agree on whether a given individual has a disorder. This makes antisocial personality disorder far too unreliable for use in court.

Speaking of empirically dubious disorders, intermittent explosive disorder got a change worth noting. Whereas the aggressive outbursts at the core of this disorder used to require physical aggression, now "verbal aggression" suffices. If you've ever reviewed psychiatric hospital charts, you know that this is how hospital technicians chart episodes of disquiet among patients. For example, I recently saw a chart notation that "John Doe was verbally aggressive" stemming from an incident in which the involuntarily hospitalized Mr. Doe muttered profanities at hospital orderlies who had barged into his room while he was sleeping and confiscated the gauze pads he was using for an acute injury. In short, look for upticks of this disorder wherever the powerless are concentrated.

Posttraumatic stress disorder

Psychologist Richard Samuels checks his DSM
"bible" during testimony in Jodi Arias murder trial

PTSD got some significant tweaking in the DSM-5, mostly in directions that could increase its prevalence. The requirement of experiencing “fear, helplessness or horror” in reaction to the trauma was eliminated. There are now four "symptom clusters" rather than three. A new symptom of "reckless or self-destructive behavior" has been added, and the symptom of irritable behavior or angry outbursts has some added language, "typically expressed as verbal or physical aggression toward people or objects" and "with little or no provocation" (have fun explaining that one in court!).

In clinical practice, these changes won’t much matter. As Greenberg noted, "Mostly we’re content to find a label that matches people in some vague way and then get on with the business of helping them figure out what's going on in their lives that landed them in our offices." However, in court the devil is in the details. Difference between an "and" or an "or," or a three-month versus a six-month time specifier, can be critical. Unfortunately, there are no side-to-side charts with the changes from DSM-IV to DSM-5 highlighted or crossed out. The biggest benefactor of all this tweaking will be psychological test companies, whose psychometric tests for PTSD will have to be revamped. So get out your pocketbooks now.

Intellectual functioning and the death penalty

Last but not least, changes to the developmental disabilities section could make more criminals eligible for execution. Under the U.S. Supreme Court's Atkins standard, an IQ score of below 70 had been like a magic line in the sand, below which one becomes ineligible for capital punishment. However, the DSM-5's intellectual developmental disorder (renamed from mental retardation) drops IQ scores in favor of the more subjective construct of adaptive functioning, or the ability to live independently in the world.

"There are a lot of courts that are hostile to the basic legal doctrine the Atkins case established," death penalty lawyer David Dow told Reuters. "When you replace a test that is one part objective, one part subjective with a solely subjective test, it becomes easier for courts that are hostile to the constitutional principle of Atkins to evade that criterion."

"We believe that we are providing the courts with a more fine-grained means to consider adaptive functioning more comprehensively and more meaningfully," countered James Harris, of the DSM-5 work group.

Other specified or unspecified disorder

As I just mentioned, the devil is in the details. When a person does not meet minimum criteria for a diagnosis, clinicians can choose between the new categories of other specified disorder and unspecified disorder (the listed example being the unwieldy "other specified depressive disorder, depressive episode with insufficient symptoms"). These quick-and-dirty options are meant for use in the emergency department, where clinicians have little time and not much background information to go on. But the DSM-5 authors open the door for forensic misuse by stating their desire for "maximum flexibility for diagnosis." How's this for a loophole large enough to drive a Mack truck through:

"When the clinician is not able to further specify and describe the clinical presentation, the unspecified diagnosis can be given. This is left entirely up to clinical judgment."

Look to shady evaluators to misuse these "other" and "unspecified" labels to create nonexistent disorders for forensic use. That won't be anything new; it's essentially the same phenomenon we now see in sexually violent predator proceedings with the deployment of the DSM-IV-TR classifier "paraphilia not otherwise specified (NOS)," which these new categories replace. Such improper diagnosis may be legal, but that doesn't make it ethical.

Forensic caveat

One welcome change in the new manual is that the old cautionary statement about use of the DSM in forensic contexts gets more prominent play. Rather than being buried in the introduction, it's got its own little page in the DSM-5:

"... In most situations the clinical diagnosis of a DSM-5 mental disorder ... does not imply that an individual with such a condition meets legal criteria for the presence of a mental disorder or a specified legal standard...."

But when push comes to shove, judges and juries are going to do what they want to do, forensic cautions or no. As Texas lawyer Susan Orlansky -- whose client is slated for execution despite a lower-than-70 IQ -- told Reuters, "If the Texas court system is willing to ignore the DSM-IV, I don't know why they wouldn't be just as willing to ignore the DSM-5."

By all means take a moment to familiarize yourself with the changes in the new diagnostic manual that are relevant to your work. Just don't be conned into taking this whole diagnostic enterprise too seriously. After all, that's what the American Psychiatric Association is counting on to keep itself financially solvent.

I welcome comments, especially if you know of other changes of potential forensic relevance that are not listed here, or if you have a different take on the changes I highlighted.

And, if you are planning to attend the American Psychological Association convention in Honolulu, I invite you to my full-day CE training on psychiatric diagnosis in legal settings on July 31.

SVP verdict overturned for prosecutorial misconduct -- again

Prosecutor impugned defense witness in hebephilia case

In a highly unusual development, a California appeals court has overturned the civil commitment of a convicted sex offender for the second time in a row due to egregious prosecutorial misconduct.

The prosecutor in the most recent trial engaged in a "pervasive pattern" of misconduct and "flagrantly" violated the law by implying that jurors would become social pariahs if they did not vote to civilly commit sex offender Dariel Shazier, the appellate court wrote.

Prosecutor Jay Boyarsky, now the second in command of the district attorney's office in Santa Clara County (San Jose), also improperly impugned the reputation of the forensic psychologist who testified for the defense, according to the scathing opinion by the Sixth District Court of Appeal.

Prosecutor Jay Boyarsky

"This is not a case in which the prosecutor engaged in a few minor incidents of improper conduct. Rather, the prosecutor engaged in a pervasive pattern of inappropriate questions, comments and argument, throughout the entire trial, each one building on the next, to such a degree as to undermine the fairness of the proceedings. The misconduct culminated in the prosecutor flagrantly violating the law in closing argument, telling the jury to consider the reaction of their friends and family to their verdict, implying they would be subject to ridicule and condemnation if they found in favor of defendant."

This was the second civil commitment verdict against Dariel Shazier to be overturned on appeal due to prosecutorial misconduct. The license of the previous prosecutor, Benjamin Field, was suspended in 2010 based on his severe misconduct in several cases, including Shazier's 2006 trial. In the first of Shazier's three trials, a jury deadlocked as to whether the convicted sex offender qualified for civil detention as a sexually violent predator.

The case revolves around the controversial diagnosis of hebephilia. Shazier served nine years in prison for sexual misconduct with teenage boys. At the end of his sentence, in 2003, the district attorney began efforts to commit him indefinitely to a locked hospital based on his risk of reoffense. At Shazier's most recent trial, two state evaluators testified that he suffered from hebephilia, thereby making him eligible for civil commitment. However, they admitted that hebephilia was highly controversial and had only come into vogue with the advent of civil commitment laws.

Incendiary questioning of defense expert witness

The appellate court chastised the prosecutor for stepping far over the line in his questioning of a psychologist who was called by the defense to rebut the diagnosis of hebephilia. Psychologist Ted Donaldson testified that hebephilia is not a legitimate mental disorder, and that socially unacceptable or immoral conduct does not constitute a mental illness.

On cross-examination, Boyarsky questioned Donaldson about previous cases in which he had testified that sex offenders were not mentally disordered. Naturally, Donaldson had not brought the files from all of his old cases to court with him. This, the appellate court wrote, gave the prosecutor an excuse to recite inflammatory facts from select cases, which the defense correctly complained "were only brought up to incite the passions and prejudice of the jury."

The appellate court also chastised Boyarsky for impugning Donaldson's character. In his closing argument, the prosecutor described Donaldson as "completely biased and not helpful," called his opinion "laughable," and implied that he was biased because he had repeatedly testified for the defense:

"He has got a streak that would make Cal Ripken jealous. Cal Ripken the baseball player and the Iron Man that played in something like 4,000 straight games. Dr. Donaldson’s streak of 289 straight times testifying exclusively for the defense. Now he would like to tell you that is not his fault, because he offered to teach the State of California all his wisdom. His brilliance has yet to be fully appreciated by this society. It is appreciated by defense attorneys who pay him...."

Boyarsky also improperly attacked a psychiatric technician at Atascadero State Hospital (where Shazier was undergoing sex offender treatment while awaiting the outcome of his case) who testified for the defense. The appellate court critiqued "rhetorical attempts to degrade and disparage" that witness during cross-examination. The justices highlighted Boyarsky's question: "Mr. Ross, you don't know what you’re talking about, do you?"

"Here, the prosecutor’s questioning … was clearly argumentative, and was not intended to glean relevant information. 'An argumentative question is a speech to the jury masquerading as a question. The questioner is not seeking to elicit relevant testimony. Often it is apparent that the questioner does not even expect an answer. The question may, indeed, be unanswerable. . . . An argumentative question that essentially talks past the witness, and makes an argument to the jury, is improper because it does not seek to elicit relevant, competent testimony, or often any testimony at all.'(People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 384.)"

The appellate opinion strongly rebuked trial judge Alfonso Fernandez for overruling repeated objections by defense attorney Patrick Hoopes. "Defense counsel objected to all of the prosecutor's improper questions, statements and arguments. We observe that not one of counsel's well-taken objections was sustained by the court. The court erred in overruling these objections."

Who’s grooming who?

In a humorous twist, Boyarsky was also reprimanded for misusing the loaded term "grooming" during his closing argument.

During the trial, a government expert had testified that Shazier "groomed" his victims by slowly manipulating them into situations in which he could violate sexual boundaries with them.

The prosecutor tagged off this in his closing argument, warning the jury that Shazier had "groomed" them during his testimony. "The grooming behavior, the manipulation, it still continues," Boyarski stated.

The appellate court agreed with the defense that this statement was "intended to inflame the jury, making them each feel like victims in the case." The justices went even further, noting that Shazier was not necessarily the one doing the grooming:

"During trial, Dr. Murphy defined grooming as a 'slow, steady manipulation to get a person in a compromising position or violate boundaries without awareness.' The irony here is that the prosecutor's conduct toward the jury throughout the trial closely fit Dr. Murphy's definition of grooming."

The unanimous appellate ruling is HERE. San Jose Mercury News coverage is HERE; the San Francisco Chronicle's, HERE.

APA rejects "hebephilia," last standing of three novel sexual disorders

To hear government experts on the witness stand in civil detention trials in recent months, the novel diagnosis of "hebephilia" was a fait accompli, just awaiting its formal acceptance into the upcoming fifth edition of the influential Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM).

They were flat-out wrong.

In a stunning blow to psychology's burgeoning sex offender processing industry, the Board of Trustees of the American Psychiatric Association rejected the proposed diagnosis outright, not even relegating it to an appendix as meriting further study, its proponents' fall-back position.

The rejection follows the failure of two other sexual disorders proposed by the DSM-5's paraphilias subworkgroup. These were paraphilic coercive disorder (or a proclivity toward rape) and hypersexuality, an inherently hard-to-define construct that introduced the committee members' value judgments as to how much sex is within acceptable limits.

After abandoning those two disorders, the subworkgroup clung tenaciously to a whittled-down version of its proposed expansion of pedophilia to cover sexual attraction to early pubescent youngsters (generally in the age range of 11-14), ignoring widespread opposition from both within and outside of the APA.

The buzz is that senior psychiatrists in the APA were unhappy with the intransigence of psychologists in the subworkgroup who communicated the belief that if they just stuck to their guns, they could force the ill-considered proposal into the new manual, despite a lack of scientific support.

All three proposed sexual disorder expansions were widely critiqued by mental health professionals, especially those working in the forensic contexts in which they would be deployed. They led to a spate of critical peer-reviewed publications (including a historical overview of hebephilia by yours truly, published in Behavioral Sciences and the Law), and an open letter to APA leadership from more than 100 professionals, including prominent forensic psychologists and psychiatrists in the U.S. and internationally.

The unequivocal rejection sends a strong signal of the American Psychiatric Association's continuing reluctance to be drawn into the civil commitment quagmire, where pretextual diagnoses are being invoked as excuses to indefinitely confine sex offenders who have no genuine mental disorders. In marked contrast with the field of psychology, psychiatry leaders have expressed consistent concerns about the use of psychiatric labels to justify civil detention schemes.

Next time around, the APA might want to do a better job selecting committee members in the first place. The "paraphilias subworkgroup" was heavily biased in favor of hebephilia because of its domination by psychologists from the Canadian sex clinic that proposed the new disorder in the first place, and is the only entity doing research on it. But what a waste of time and energy to create a committee that comes up with wild and wacky proposals that are only going to end up getting shot down when the rubber meets the road.

Backpedaling on paradigm shift

As regular readers of this blog know, the DSM-5 developers' grand ambitions to bring forth a revolutionary "paradigm shift" produced alarm among mental health professionals and consumer advocacy groups both in the United States and internationally. The British Psychological Society, the UK's 50,000-member professional body, issued a strongly worded critique, and a coalition of psychological associations garnered more than 14,000 signatures on a petition opposing the wholesale lowering of diagnostic thresholds for disorder.

Yesterday's news release marked an about-face, with the APA now stressing that diagnostic changes in the DSM-5 were intended to be "very conservative."

"Our work has been aimed at more accurately defining mental disorders that have a real impact on people’s lives, not expanding the scope of psychiatry," said David J. Kupfer, MD, chair of the DSM-5 Task Force.

Consistent with this, several of the proposed changes that generated the most widespread alarm were rejected. The Board of Trustees rejected the highly controversial "attenuated psychosis syndrome" that could have created an epidemic of false positives, stigmatizing eccentric young people and lowering the threshold for prescribing potentially harmful antipsychotic drugs. It also backed away from an equally controversial, and complex, revamping of the personality disorders. These conditions, as well as a contentious Internet gaming disorder, will all be placed in "section 3" of the new manual as conditions meriting further study.

Allen Frances, the DSM-IV Task Force chair and a high-profile critic of the DSM-5 project, called the spin that the DSM-5 will have minimal impact on psychiatric diagnosis and treatment "misleading":

"This is an untenable claim that DSM 5 cannot possibly support because, for completely unfathomable reasons, it never took the simple and inexpensive step of actually studying the impact of DSM on rates in real world settings…. Except for autism, all the DSM 5 changes loosen diagnosis and threaten to turn our current diagnostic inflation into diagnostic hyperinflation. Painful experience with previous DSM's teaches that if anything in the diagnostic system can be misused and turned into a fad, it will be. Many millions of people with normal grief, gluttony, distractibility, worries, reactions to stress, the temper tantrums of childhood, the forgetting of old age, and 'behavioral addictions' will soon be mislabeled as psychiatrically sick and given inappropriate treatment."

Among the controversial diagnostic changes that will go forward in the DSM-5, due to be published in mid-2013:

• Asperger’s syndrome is being eliminated as a separate disorder (it will be folded into an autism spectrum disorder)
• Depression is being expanded to include some grief reactions
• A brand-new "disruptive mood dysregulation disorder" has critics fearing psychiatric labeling of children who have temper tantrums

Two other sets of changes have particular relevance to forensic practitioners. Substance abuse disorders have been reframed as "behavioral addictions," which Frances warns could be a "slippery slope" leading to "careless overdiagnosis of internet and sex addiction and the development of lucrative treatment programs to exploit these new markets."

Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) will be included in a new chapter on trauma and stress-related disorders, with four distinct diagnostic clusters instead of the current three, and "more attention to the behavioral symptoms that accompany PTSD." Some worry that the reconfigured PTSD may lend itself to misuse of the hot-button diagnosis in forensic cases.

Yesterday’s APA news release outlining the changes can be found HERE. My hebephilia resource page is HERE.

Forensic psychiatrists reject hebephilia - yet again!

Will American Psychiatric Association heed professional consensus?

Twenty years ago, Humbert Humbert went to prison for a series of sexual assaults on his 12-year-old stepdaughter, whom he famously nicknamed "Lolita." Now, as his lengthy prison term draws to a close, Wisconsin is petitioning to have the 60-year-old literature professor indefinitely detained as a Sexually Violent Predator.

The venue for last week's trial of Vladimir Nabokov's fictional protagonist was the annual convention of the American Association of Psychiatry and Law (AAPL) in Montreal. The central question, decided by audience vote, was whether the controversial diagnosis "hebephilia" qualified as a legitimate mental disorder justifying Mr. Humbert's indefinite civil detention.

The rousing theatrical performance featured an all-star cast of attorneys and psychologists, presided over by Toronto Judge Maureen D. Forestell. New Jersey Assistant Attorney General Mark Singer served as prosecutor. His expert witness was prominent psychiatrist Richard Krueger, a member of the paraphilias subworkgroup that has proposed adding "hebephilia" to the next edition of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5). A hebephilic qualifier would extend pedophilia to men with sexual preferences for children who have entered puberty, such as the fictional Lolita.

Defending Mr. Humbert was preeminent Wisconsin attorney Robert LeBell. His expert was Washington psychologist Richard Wollert, who has published peer-reviewed articles on SVP-related topics and testifies for the defense in civil commitment proceedings. Appearing as the court's expert was prominent Canadian psychiatrist John Bradford, an advisor on paraphilia (or sexual deviance) to the DSM-IV, past president of the AAPL and clinical director of the Sexual Behaviors Clinic in Ottawa.

After a spirited and sometimes heated trial, the 131-member audience was given electronic clickers and voted overwhelmingly -- 82 percent -- against including hebephilia as a diagnosis in the DSM-5, due out in mid-2013. A majority also voted against even including the controversial diagnosis in a DSM-5 appendix as a condition meriting further study.

Third time's the charm?

This marks at least the third time in two years that respected professional bodies have voted against the idea of hebephilia as a new mental disorder. At a 2010 vote in Oslo, Norway, members of the International Association for the Treatment of Sexual Offenders (IATSO) were near-unanimously opposed to the newly proposed sexual paraphilia. U.S. forensic psychiatrists followed suit a month later at the 2010 AAPL conference, overwhelmingly voting against hebephilia as well as two other proposed paraphilias, "paraphilic coercive disorder" (aka rape) and hypersexuality, both since scrapped.

Earlier this year, more than 100 professionals, including prominent forensic psychologists and psychiatrists in the U.S. and internationally, sent an open letter to the DSM-5 revisers, urging them to nix hebephilia. Since then, at least two peer-reviewed articles have been published deconstructing its legitimacy, one in the respected Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases ("Hebephilia and the Construction of a Fictitious Diagnosis" by forensic psychologists Paul Good and the late Jules Burstein) and the other a broad review ("Hebephilia as mental disorder?") by scholars Bruce Rind and Richard Yuill in the Archives of Sexual Behavior.

Rind and Yuill said they undertook their extensive review of the historical and cross-cultural evidence after hebephilia proponent Raymond Blanchard (a member of the DSM-5 paraphilias subworkgroup) and his colleagues at Toronto's Centre for Addiction and Mental Health brushed aside numerous published criticisms of the proposed disorder (see Table 1). Building on their earlier research, Rind and Yuill argue that hebephilia -- generally defined as sexual attraction to young pubescents in the age range of 11 to 14 -- is a biologically normal trait found to varying degrees in both human males and our closest mammalian relatives, such as higher apes. They blast hebephilia as a bold example of naked moral values masquerading as science:

"Blanchard et al. … did not invoke comparative evidence…. They did not invoke any evidence…. They declared it a disorder by fiat, bypassing scientific analysis in favor of a pre-given conclusion supportable only because it is, for the current time and place, culturally resonant. Had their pronouncement been the opposite (i.e., hebephilia is functional), their article would never have been accepted in a peer-reviewed journal without massive evidential backing. Strongly resonant opinion can facilely pass through without the kind of scrutiny demanded of non-resonant views."

Why hebephilia still clings to life, despite so much opposition and so little scientific support, is beyond me. It's like an unwanted house guest who just refuses to take the hint and pack his suitcase.

The evidence at trial 

In attacking the government's diagnosis of his client, defense attorney LeBell focused on the dearth of empirical studies on the condition, other than by researchers at a single Toronto clinic, and the likelihood of "false positive" diagnoses in legal cases.

The wording of the proposed new diagnosis has been changed again and again over the past couple of years. In its current iteration, pedophiles are defined as those who have "an equal or greater sexual arousal from prepubescent or early pubescent children than from physically mature persons, as manifested by fantasies, urges, or behaviors." (The requirements that the fantasies or urges be "recurrent" or "intense" have been removed, broadening the potential pool of sufferers.) Hebephiles are now defined as those with sexual attractions to "pubescent children" in Stages 2 to 3 of Tanner's pubertal stages (e.g., early development of pubic hair and breasts).

Defense expert Wollert testified that the problem of "false positives" -- people incorrectly identified as having a condition -- was extraordinarily high even in the controlled setting of the research laboratory. This problem would be much more acute in the forensic trenches where the hebephilia diagnosis is being deployed, he testified.

One insurmountable problem would be reliably identifying a sexual abuse victim's Tanner stage of pubertal development. Complicating this issue, testified the court's expert, John Bradford, Tanner Stages are highly variable. Because they reflect hormonal developments rather than specific ages, one could not assume a specific Tanner stage based on the age of a victim. About two years ago, alarming research indicated that girls are entering puberty far earlier than in previous generations; this month, a large study by the American Academy of Pediatrics identified a similar trend in boys.

Wisconsin psychiatrist Lynn Maskel, who organized and moderated the mock trial, labeled hebephilia a "weed diagnosis in the botanical garden of DSM."

"The question is not if sex with pubescent year old girls illegal, or if it is immoral," she told the audience of forensic psychiatrists. "The question to the psychiatric field is: Is it a disorder? And if it is, does this translate, for the expert witness, into a requisite mental disorder found in the specific SVP statute?"

Meanwhile, back in the real courtroom trenches …

In my seminal review, published in 2010 in Behavioral Sciences and the Law, I traced hebephilia's sudden emergence and rapid spread in legal discourse to the advent of Sexually Violent Predator laws, which require that the individual being considered for civil detention have a mental disorder that makes him qualitatively different from the garden-variety offender.

Since that article's publication, the introduction of hebephilia in U.S. courts has continued unabated, despite the lack of an official imprimatur by the American Psychiatric Association. In a string of SVP cases brought under the Adam Walsh Act, federal judges in North Carolina have ruled that the faux diagnosis is not a legitimate basis for civil detention.

However, other courts have been less circumspect. For example, just yesterday, in a narrow, 4-3 opinion, New York's high court upheld the civil commitment of a repeat sex offender named "Shannon S." based on the purported conditions of "paraphilia NOS" and "hebephilia." Mr. S. had engaged in a series of forcible rapes of adolescent girls, ages 13 through 16.

As the dissenters conceded, Shannon S. was a "very bad actor" and "the community may well be safer if he is kept behind bars."

"But, they added, "to put him there on the fiction that he has some sort of mental condition other than a tendency to commit the crimes for which he was convicted (and has served his time) is and should be constitutionally unacceptable."

Judge Robert Smith, writing for the minority, labeled as "absurd" the premise that attraction to adolescent girls is abnormal, as the government's two experts testified: "What is abnormal about appellant, and others who commit statutory rape by having sex with girls below the age of consent, is not that they find the girls attractive, but that they are willing to exploit them for their sexual pleasure -- in other words, they commit statutory rape."

Smith labeled hebephilia and the similarly disputed diagnosis of "paraphilia not otherwise specified" (rape) as "junk science devised for the purpose of locking up dangerous criminals." While such a practice might seem appealing from a public safety viewpoint, it creates "dangers of abuse," he eloquently warned:

"Many sex offenders are, or could reasonably be found to be, dangerous, and in common parlance they all have mental abnormalities: Mentally normal people do not commit sex crimes. Thus, unless 'mental abnormality' is defined with scientific rigor, such statutes could become a license to lock up indefinitely, without invoking the cumbersome procedures of the criminal law, every sex offender a judge or jury thinks likely to offend again.

"Some will intuitively respond: Not a bad idea. But it is a very bad idea, because not even a concern for public safety should be allowed to trump certain fundamental rules. Among them are that criminals can be confined only for crimes they have committed, after their guilt is proved beyond a reasonable doubt in a procedure in which they receive the many protections that our Constitution gives to those accused of crime, and that even when convicted they can be incarcerated for no more than the term of the maximum sentence provided by law. If the present sentences for sex offenders are too short, the Legislature should make them longer, but it should not, and constitutionally cannot, simply substitute civil for criminal proceedings as a means of keeping dangerous criminals off the streets."

As Judge Smith seems to recognize, it's a slippery slope. Bogus psychiatric diagnoses for sex offenders now, political dissidents (or others) tomorrow. That's the way they rolled in the former Soviet Union, after all.

Pretextual court rulings aside, the paraphilias subworkgroup has had more than two years to produce evidence for the reliability and validity of hebephilia, and it has not done so.

It is clear to most observers that hebephilia is not accepted by the relevant professional community. What remains unclear is whether the Board of Trustees of the American Psychiatric Association will get the message in time to prevent yet another in a veritable maelstrom of public-relations disasters and historical mistakes.

* * * * *

Additional resources: My resource page on hebephilia is HERE.

Of related interest: DSM-5  field trials discredit the American Psychiatric Association, by Allen Frances, Huffington Post, 10/31/2012

Happy Halloween!

Hebephilia update: DSM-5 workgroup stubbornly clinging to pet diagnosis

Salvador Dali*: The Average Bureaucrat

A few weeks ago, I reported on an open letter to the American Psychiatric Association, calling for it to reject three controversial expansions of sexual paraphilia diagnoses that are being promoted by government evaluators in civil commitment cases.

A lot has happened since then. The only one of the three controversial diagnoses still in the running for official status has been altered for the umpteenth time. An esteemed journal is issuing a scathing critique. And the open letter is generating buzz in the blogosphere.

The open letter has garnered more than 100 signatures, many from prominent forensic psychologists and psychiatrists in the U.S. and internationally. If you intend to sign on but haven’t yet, act now because I understand it will be submitted very soon. (Click HERE to review the text; click HERE to email your name and professional title to co-author Richard Wollert.)

Hebephilia gets yet another makeover 

This week, the Sexual Disorders Workgroup for the upcoming fifth edition of the APA's diagnostic manual toned down its proposal to turn sexual attraction to young teens into a mental disorder. As psychiatrist Allen Frances explains at his DSM5 in Distress blog, hebephilia is still there -- you just have to read the small print to see it:

Dali: Enchanted Beach with Three Fluid Graces

Confronted by universal opposition from the rest of the field, the DSM 5 group has been forced progressively to whittle down their pet, but they so far have refused to just drop it altogether. 'Hebephilia' first lost its free-standing independence and was cloaked as Pedohebephilia. When this didn't fly, the term was dropped altogether in the title but the concept was slipped into the definition of Pedophilia -- which was expanded out of recognition by having a victim age cut-off of 14 years. No one accepted this outlandish suggestion and now finally the work group comes back with ‘early pubescent children' and tries to keep 'hebephilia' as a term in the subtype. The instability of the criteria sets associated with this concept is additional evidence that the fervor for its adoption stems from emotional loyalty rather than reasoned review of its weak conceptual and research base. How can the group vouch for the reliability of the diagnosis when the concept and criteria are changing every month? This is no way to develop a diagnostic system.

The staunch insistence on this transparent attempt to turn statutory rape into a mental disorder owes in large part to the makeup of the sexual disorders workgroup. As Frances notes, "the most wayward of all the DSM 5 work groups" is "lopsidedly dominated" by psychologists from a sex clinic up in Toronto, whose ambition is "to find a place in DSM 5 for their pet diagnosis."
Although the group's other outlandish proposals, Paraphilic Coercive Disorder and Hypersexuality, have been shelved for the time being, Frances worries that putting them in the appendix "for further study" is still risky:

Recognizing that the jig is up on the grand design, members of the DSM 5 sexual disorders work group have been heard saying they may have to settle for an Appendix placement for their three hothouse creations. This would create forensic dangers. We have learned from the abuse of "Paraphilia Not Otherwise Specified" in Sexually Violent Predator cases that any (even remote) legitimization by DSM 5 is certain to be misconstrued and misused in the courtroom. 

Come on guys. This is absolutely absurd just on the face of it…. So back to the drawing board, DSM 5 sexual disorders work group. The grand dream is lost -- now at least make sure you don't mess up on the fine print.

On the professional listservs today, some conspiracy theorists were speculating that the new wording signifies a plot to enhance the standing of physiological testing in sex offender assessment. The latest proposed criteria for "pedophilia, hebephilic type" require "equal or greater sexual arousal from prepubescent or early pubescent children than from physically mature persons." How to determine that fuzzy standard? Enter the penile plethysmographer, a new niche career track, penis cuff at the ready to measure who is aroused by what.

"There is withering criticism already that the DSM is being expanded to sell more drugs," wrote one colleague. "Now it appears that psychiatry and psychology are conspiring to use the DSM to spur PPG tests -- tests which risk leaving patients with traumatic and indelible memory traces. Do most psychiatrists really want to open this door?!"

Orwellian thought police? 

The mere idea of allowing the American Psychiatric Association to dictate "normal" sexuality frightens English Professor Christopher Lane. Lane, whose book Shyness: How Normal Behavior Became a Sickness exposed the unscientific inner workings of the DSM-III committee, expressed shock over the first listed criterion for the shelved disorder of hypersexuality: "Excessive time is consumed by sexual fantasies and urges, and by planning for and engaging in sexual behavior." On his Side Effects blog, Lane mused:

Dali: Femme a Tete de Roses

"Excessive time"? What exactly does that mean, and according to whose standards? That's not a small or trivial matter to settle when the APA is talking in vague generalities about the nation’s libido -- how much sex it wants and how much sex the APA thinks it should think about wanting. The APA is talking about how much time Americans can devote to sexual fantasy before it suggests that we’re mentally ill if our preoccupations are stronger than those set by the relevant task force.

Does that initiative seem to overreach a bit, even to the point of sounding almost Orwellian? It does so to me. If we're to have criteria, are quotas next, including for fantasy? It’s as if the East Coast offices of the APA had morphed into those of the Thought Police in Orwell's 1984, warning citizens that they’d overstepped their "sexual thought quota" for the week and must be rationed -- or punished accordingly.

Lane analyzed hebephilia through his characteristic historical lens:

It's an archaism, a throwback literally to 19th-century psychiatry, but refers to practices that were as central to the Classical age -- and thus to Western democracy -- as were Socrates, Plato, and especially Plato’s Symposium, one of the foundational books in the West on eros and love.

The APA is already trying to determine how long normal grief should last before it’s thought pathological. Its brisk, jaw-dropping answer: two weeks. Do we really want the same organization dictating how often we can think about sex? These kinds of proposals can only end badly.

Leading journal tackles the controversy

The good news this week, which should have all of us jumping up and down with joy, is that the APA has caved in under massive public pressure and dropped its plan for a new psychosis risk disorder. This disorder would have put thousands if not millions of youngsters at risk of being dosed up with dangerous antipsychotic drugs based on a suspicion that they might go crazy in the future. Mixed Anxiety Depression has also bit the dust.

Dali: Daddy Longlegs of the Evening Hope

But, as featured in a special issue of the esteemed Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases due out in June on the raging diagnostic controversies, there are still many battles ahead as the bloated DSM-5 enters the final stretch. The special issue will tackle diagnostic inflation, pharmacological conflicts of interest, controversies with the newly revamped personality disorders, and problems with diagnostic reliability in the recent field trials. Hebephilia, often neglected amidst controversies with wider impact such as psychosis risk syndrome and the pathologization of normal grief, merited an article in this special issue.

 In "Hebephilia and the Construction of a Fictitious Diagnosis," forensic psychologists Paul Good and the late Jules Burstein make a strong case for abandoning this faux disorder, which will only make the APA more of a laughingstock in the future.

Good and Burstein catalog an assortment of empirical problems. These range from the difficulty of reliably measuring "recurrent and intense" sexual arousal to problems determining the pubertal status of a young teenage victim. They also challenge the very idea that sexual attraction to pubescent minors is a mental illness, rather than merely illegal.

Although the Sexual Disorders Workgroup hides behind a fictive notion of a pure and ethereal "science," Good and Burstein clearly believe that hebephilia, if added to the DSM-5, will be mainly invoked in a partisan manner in forensic proceedings, in order to justify harsher punishment and involuntary civil detention. Because of its power to do harm, they say, its scientific grounding should be especially strong. If it does manage to worm its way into the DSM, they say, it should still be challenged in court:

We believe the admissibility of the proposed revision to DSM-5 that would include Hebephilia as a type of Pedophilia could be challenged in a court of law based on current legal standards. For example, since there is no professional consensus or general acceptance in the scientific community to support the notion of Hebephilia as a mental disorder, it would have difficulty passing the Frye test for admissibility. Similarly, without a widely established body of peer-reviewed, validation research and repeated studies showing inter-rater reliability in the laboratory and among clinicians in the field, Hebephilia would also have difficulty meeting the criteria specified in the Daubert standard.

Indeed, this is just what has been happening to hebephilia in federal court, where at least three civil detention petitions in a row have been thrown out due to the level of controversy in the field over this purported condition.

With all of this tumult, it seems that the DSM-5 excesses are producing a backlash against the American Psychiatric Association and, indeed, fueling disenchantment with the whole enterprise of psychiatric diagnosis.

As Frances writes, the turnaround on psychosis risk syndrome came about due to a combination of:

• extensive criticism from experts in the field
• public outrage
• uniformly negative press coverage
• abysmal results in DSM-5 field testing

For the first time in its history, DSM 5 has shown some flexibility and capacity to correct itself. Hopefully, this is just the beginning of what will turn out to be a number of other necessary DSM 5 retreats. Today's revisions should be just the first step in a systematic program of reform.… This is certainly no time for complacency. Much of the rest of DSM 5 is still a mess. The reliabilities achieved for many of the other disorders are apparently unbelievably low and the writing of the criteria sets is still unacceptably imprecise.

Who needs reliability? 

Frances calls for slowing down the process to allow for additional field testing and, more importantly, an independent scientific review of all the remaining controversial DSM-5 changes. But the DSM-5 folks are taking a different tack. Faced with field trial results showing very poor reliability -- not much better than chance -- for many of their proposed diagnoses, they want to change the definition of what counts as minimally adequate.

Dali: Autumn Cannibalism

It’s pretty ironic: The DSM-III went down in history for elevating the importance of reliability at the expense of validity. Remember, diagnostic reliability just means that similarly trained raters see a certain symptom presentation and call it by the same label. It says nothing about external validity, or whether the label is meaningful in explaining a real-world phenomenon. But reliability is basic. If a diagnostic label cannot be reliably applied, you can't even start talking about its validity. And now, the same psychiatric organization that reified the kappa reliability statistic as the be-all, end-all of science is trying to tell us that traditional kappa levels are unrealistically high for psychiatric research.

Historically, psychiatric reliability studies have adopted the Fleiss standard, in which kappas below 0.4 have been considered poor. In the January issue of the American Journal of Psychiatry, Helena Kraemer and colleagues complained that this standard is unrealistically high, and lobbied for kappas as low as 0.2 -- traditionally considered poor -- to be deemed "acceptable."

Former DSM-III guru Robert Spitzer and colleagues object to this proposal in a letter in the latest issue of the Journal. "Calling for psychiatry to accept kappa values that are characterized as unreliable in other fields of medicine is taking a step backward," they state. "One hopes that the DSM-5 reliability results are at least as good as the DSM-III results, if not better."

Alas, just wishing won't make it so. Despite its grandly stated ambitions, the DSM-5 will likely go down in history as a major gaffe by American psychiatry in its continuing struggle for world dominance.  

Remember to check out the open letter 

and send in your name, if you are in agreement with it.

Further reading:

• American Sex and American Psychiatry: The APA is trying to determine how much sex we can fantasize about by Chris Lane at Side Effects
• DSM 5 Rejects 'Hebephilia' Except for the Fine Print: Now the devil is in the details by Allen Frances at DSM5 in Distress
• Wonderful News: DSM 5 Finally Begins Its Belated and Necessary Retreat: Perhaps this will be the beginning of real reform by Allen Frances at DSM5 in Distress

*Salvador Dali: "One day it will have to be officially admitted that what we have christened reality is an even greater illusion than the world of dreams."