Showing posts with label insanity defense. Show all posts
Showing posts with label insanity defense. Show all posts

February 19, 2009

Veteran with PTSD won’t do time for robberies

Last month I wrote about the potentially landmark case in which an Army veteran was found insane in the armed robbery of a pharmacy. Sargent Binkley said he robbed that pharmacy and one other of painkillers to cope with his symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder.

Yesterday, Sargent pleaded no contest in a separate San Francisco Peninsula robbery committed during the same time period, in exchange for a promise of probation. He had faced at least 12 years in prison.

Binkley cannot be formally sentenced until state hospital doctors find him sane and no longer dangerous. The ability of the white West Point graduate and former Eagle Scout to garner sympathy among jurors and prosecutors bodes well for his stay at the hospital. If I had to bet, I would predict state hospital psychiatrists will agree to a quick release.

Armed robbers are rarely found insane when their crimes appear rational, goal-directed, and premeditated. Additionally, California law does not allow for an insanity verdict based on addiction alone.

The defense had argued that Binkley was traumatized by two events -- guarding a mass grave in Bosnia and shooting a teenager during a Honduran drug raid. Prosecutors countered that Binkley exaggerated his military service and that his claim of involvement in drug interdiction in Honduras was pure fantasy. Further, they said, his addiction to pain pills stemmed not from military-related activities but from a hip injury incurred while he was running away from a production assistant for the Fox reality TV show "Temptation Island" after a bar fight.

The trial featured dueling psychiatric experts who agreed that Binkley suffers from PTSD, but disagreed on whether his symptoms were of sufficient magnitude as to render him insane, or incapable of knowing right from wrong at the time of the robberies.

The case comes amid growing interest in the plight of veterans returning from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Military leaders acknowledge that multiple deployments in particular put a severe strain soldiers and their families, and can increase the likelihood of domestic violence, alcohol abuse, and symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder.

To handle a wave of arrests of soldiers, special courts for veterans are opening in several states, including Arizona.

Related stories:

Insanity verdict for soldier with PTSD: Case heralded as landmark for traumatized veterans (blog post, Jan. 14, 2009)

Ex-Army captain won't do time for two holdups (San Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 19, 2009)

Focus on violence by returning GIs (New York Times, Jan. 2, 2009)

New court is sought to aid vets charged with crimes (Arizona Republic, Jan. 6, 2009)

Reaching out to returning vets (Wisconsin Law Journal, Feb. 6, 2009 – subscription required)

January 14, 2009

Insanity verdict for soldier with PTSD

Case heralded as landmark for traumatized veterans

Photos: Sargent Binkley before and after
In a potentially landmark case, a jury in the San Francisco Bay Area has acquitted a former Army captain who used a 9mm handgun to rob a pharmacy because he was addicted to painkillers.

The Santa Clara County jury found West Point graduate Sargent Binkley not guilty by reason of insanity after hearing testimony that he suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of his military experiences in Bosnia and Honduras. Binkley is still awaiting trial for a similar robbery in nearby San Mateo County.

Armed robbers are rarely found insane when their crimes appear rational, goal-directed, and premeditated. Additionally, California law does not allow for an insanity verdict based on addiction alone.

The defense argued that Binkley was traumatized by two events -- guarding a mass grave in Bosnia and shooting a teenager during a Honduran drug raid. His father testified that he became addicted to morphine-based painkillers after dislocating his hip in Honduras while running away from an alcohol-fueled fight over a woman.

The trial featured dueling psychiatric experts who agreed that Binkley suffers from PTSD, but disagreed on whether his symptoms were of sufficient magnitude as to render him insane, or incapable of knowing right from wrong at the time of the robberies.

Dr. Jeff Gould, originally appointed by the court in adjacent San Mateo County, testified for the prosecution that Binkley's PTSD did affect his judgment but did not render him insane.

Dr. Kenneth Seeman testified for the defense that Binkley manifested symptoms of psychosis, depression, suicidality, and anxiety in addition to PTSD and was incapable of knowing right from wrong.

Prosecutor Deborah Medved challenged Seeman on why he did not render any of these diagnoses in his original report, written a year prior to testimony. In his written report, according to news reports, Seeman opined that Binkley's insanity was due to his drug addiction. In California, addiction is barred as a basis for the legal defense of insanity. Seeman responded to the prosecutor’s challenge by saying his diagnoses had evolved over the course of his two subsequent evaluation sessions with Binkley.

In another unusual twist suggesting that the jury may have been motivated at least in part by sympathy for the defendant, the pharmacist whom Binkley robbed of Percocet testified for the defense.

The case has been the subject of web sites and petition drives pleading for leniency due to Binkley's status as a veteran. A group of military veterans had regularly attended Binkley’s court hearings. "It's a great day for our veterans who have come back suffering from PTSD to now know they can receive justice," said one, Vietnam veteran and West Point graduate Alan Lubke.

Binkley had faced a minimum term of 12 years in prison. Now, he will undergo a mental health evaluation aimed at determining whether he should be psychiatrically hospitalized or ordered into outpatient treatment.

"I am expecting the doctors will determine he has regained his sanity and is no longer a danger," said defense attorney Chuck Smith. "I hope he will be released relatively soon, like within the next six months."

San Jose Mercury News coverage is here. San Francisco Chronicle coverage is here.

Related resources:

January 9, 2009

Eye-plucking prisoner competent and sane

Andre Thomas plucked out his right eye in 2004. Now, he has plucked out his left.

The Texas death row inmate with a history of mental problems killed his wife and their two children and ripped out their hearts. He then walked into a police station and confessed.

None of that sounds all that sane. Indeed, Thomas has been diagnosed with schizophrenia and suffers from psychotic delusions and a preoccupation with death, religion, and suicide, sources say.

Nonetheless, he was found competent to stand trial, convicted, and sentenced to die for the death of his 13-month-old daughter.

The self-mutilation is unlikely to have any effect on his appeals, but at least they got him transferred to a psychiatric hospital for treatment.

The story is here.

September 25, 2008

Jam-packed new issue of psychiatry-law journal

The latest issue of the Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law is now available online, with interesting articles on competency, insanity, dangerousness, practice guidelines, diagnosis in SVP proceedings (a topic I am addressing in an upcoming training and an article in press), and much more:

The LEGAL DIGEST section includes the following summaries and analyses:
And there's even more, believe it or not – check out the full table of contents here.

August 7, 2008

Bizarre verdict: Both sane and insane

Kier Sanders was a severely psychotic and delusional 21-year-old when he shotgunned his grandparents to death in Tupelo, Mississippi back in 1985. Amazingly, he wandered the streets of America for two decades before finally being apprehended in 2005 and put on trial for double murder.

The defense, insanity, was no surprise.

The verdict, both guilty and not guilty, was.

Apparently worried that the 43-year-old Sanders might be released if they found him not guilty by reason of insanity, jurors acquitted him in the death of one grandparent, but found him guilty of murder in the other.

After deliberating for 45 minutes, the jury sent a note to the judge asking when Sanders might be released if they found him NGI. The judge, following the law, ordered them not to consider that issue. The strange verdict came four hours later.

The judge sentenced Sanders to life in prison, noting that if he was ever paroled he would then be committed to the state hospital as NGI. The verdict and sentence will be appealed, Sanders' attorney said.

Psychologist John McCoy of Memphis, who treated Sanders in 1983 and who testified for the defense that Sanders was not malingering, reported on the case for the National Psychologist. His article, along with contact information for him, is here.

June 5, 2008

Seattle mistrial highlights complexity of insanity law

On the one side, the defense: Naveed Haq was in a manic, psychotic state and was prompted to commit his rampage at the Jewish Federation of Greater Seattle on July 28, 2006 by hearing God tell him he was on a mission.

On the other side, the prosecution: Haq was a frustrated, chronically unemployed, and awkward man whose killing of one woman and wounding of five others was an attempt to commit "suicide by cop."

Faced with these dueling positions, jurors threw up their hands Wednesday after many days of grueling deliberations and declared that they could not decide whether Haq was insane. Haq will be retried.

During the nationally televised trial, James Missett, MD, Ph.D. testified for the defense that Haq thought he was on a mission from God and thought he could bring peace to the Middle East. Haq believed God approved of his mission because God was talking to him during the shooting and he felt like something was controlling his trigger finger, Missett testified. Missett is a prominent forensic psychiatrist from Menlo Park, California, who is affiliated with Stanford University's Center for Psychiatry and the Law.

However, Under the Washington case of State v. Potter (68 Wn. App. 134), just believing that he was acting on a mission from God would not be enough to establish legal insanity; he would still have to show that he was unaware that his act was legally and morally wrong.

Missett testified that Haq was unable to perceive the nature of what he was doing or tell right from was wrong. Under Washington law, Haq was insane if he was "unable to perceive the nature and quality of the act" or "unable to tell right from wrong" due to a mental disease or defect. The burden is on the defense to prove insanity by a preponderance of the evidence.

Countering Missett’s testimony was J. Robert Wheeler, Ph.D., a forensic psychologist in Washington who specializes in sex offender treatment and evaluation. He testified for the prosecution that Haq was depressed, angry, and suicidal - but not psychotic or manic - in the days leading up to the shooting.

He testified that Haq told him, "I was very lonely. My family was always on my case. I had monetary problems. I was enraged all the time. I had no friends. This whole Jewish Federation thing was kind of an escape, you know - it was a suicide attempt.' " On cross-examination, however, Wheeler acknowledged that Haq did tell him, "It was like something had taken hold of me, some other force, on my hand, on my body, on my brain."

As evidence of Haq's capacity to plan and premedite, Wheeler pointed out that Haq purchased three guns and test-fired them before the shooting.

The dueling experts did not differ significantly on Haq's diagnosis: Missett diagnosed him with bipolar disorder, while Wheeler diagnosed schizoaffective disorder, a psychotic disorder similar to schizophrenia but with mood swings.

The jury spent more than seven days struggling over the starkly competing versions of Haq's mental state at the time of the offense before finally announcing that they were hopelessly deadlocked.

"We deliberated with tears, and to the best of our ability," said one juror. "I have great compassion for the victims and their families, as well as everyone involved in the case. ... We were all very, very sad at the end."

The Seattle Times and the Seattle Post-Intelligencer have extensive coverage of the case. In April I also blogged (here) about some of its interesting evidentiary issues.

May 8, 2008

Forensic psychology angles in the Josef Fritzl case

The whole world seems glued this week to the bizarre case of Josef Fritzl. As you know, Fritzl is the Austrian man who kept his daughter and three of their children together locked in an elaborate basement dungeon for 24 years. As the dust settles, I'm trying to set aside my moral and emotional reactions to parse out the intriguing forensic psychology angles. Among them:

Insanity defense

At the top of the list is the defense's announcement that it will pursue an insanity defense.

"I believe that the trigger was a mental disorder, because I can't imagine that someone has sex with his own daughter without having a mental disorder," said his lawyer, prominent Viennese attorney Rudolf Mayer.

If the attorney is thinking about the archaic concept of moral insanity, he has a point. From a lay perspective, Fritzl has got to be deranged. How else could he engage in such an elaborate, long-running scheme against his own flesh and blood? Indeed, "mentally deranged" was how he was described by a barman at a brothel he frequented, based on his sadistic and deviant sexual behavior with the prostitutes there. (Prostitution is legal in Austria.)

Pundits don't seem to know much about Austria's legal standard of insanity, and I couldn't find it online. But in most countries, including in Western Europe, the insanity defense is rarely invoked and is even more rarely successful.

As one criminal defense lawyer recently put it, "You can be extremely crazy without being legally insane. You can hear voices, you can operate under intermittent delusions, you can see rabbits in the road that aren't there and still be legally sane."

I could be wrong, but it's hard for me to see how a retired engineer and real estate developer who could maintain such an elaborate subterfuge for a quarter of a century would meet the legal standard of insanity in terms of not knowing the difference between right and wrong.

However, even were Fritzl to pursue the defense, it would not mean that he would "get off," a common misperception regarding the insanity plea. Rather, he would likely be locked in a psychiatric hospital for the remainder of his natural life.

You can listen to a half-hour conversation among experts on NPR's Talk of the Nation. Featured are law professors Christopher Slobogin and Alan Dershowitz and Slate magazine legal correspondent Dahlia Lithwick. (Click on the NPR logo to the right.)

It will be interesting as case facts emerge to learn what complex algorithm may have produced Fritzl's twisted psyche. According to a sister-in-law, he grew up without a father, and his mother beat him on a near-daily basis. Certainly, that is one type of home environment that can produce a sexual sadist.

Competency to stand trial

Much public confusion exists about the distinction between legal insanity and incompetence to stand trial, and this confusion may be occurring in the Fritzl case as well.

Fritzl's attorney is quoted as saying that his client is "mentally incompetent" and that he will challenge any other decision reached by the psychiatrist who has been appointed by the court. Austrian law allows him to obtain an expert opinion from a psychiatrist of his choice.

While the legal construct of insanity pertains to an accused person's past state of mind, including whether he knew the difference between right and wrong at the time of his crime, competency pertains to the accused's present ability to understand the legal proceedings and assist one's attorney at trial.

As such, incompetency is not a permanent barrier to prosecution. If a person is found incompetent to stand trial, he is treated until he becomes competent, at which time he stands trial. (In the NPR program I link to, above, Dershowitz claims competency is often a permanent barrier to prosecution, but I believe he is wrong about that except in unusual cases in which a defendant cannot be restored to competency due to such things as severe retardation or dementia.)

Sex offending

Austria, like the rest of Western Europe, has not jumped on the imprisonment bandwagon in recent years. Its incarceration rate is 108 per 100,000, more than seven times lower than the United States'. Criminal code reforms in 1974 emphasized the importance of diversion as an alternative to incarceration. And Austrians are so opposed to capital punishment that they stripped California Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger's name from a soccer stadium in his hometown because he refused to pardon a condemned man.

But as we here in the United States certainly know, extreme cases fuel extreme laws, and the heinousness of Fritzl's deeds may fuel a drive for harsher punishment in Austria, especially of sex offenders.

Indeed, Austria's justice minister is already vowing to spearhead a sweeping review of all sentencing laws and to propose legislation doubling prison sentences for "especially dangerous" predators.

Fueling outrage around the world is the fact that Fritzl had a prior sex offense conviction. Way back in 1967, when he was in his early 30s, he served time for rape. He also had a second conviction for attempted rape and an arrest for indecent exposure, according to reports.

Prosecutors are still deciding how to charge Fritzl so that he faces the maximum possible punishment. The maximum sentence for rape is 15 years, and unlike in the United States time is not added consecutively for multiple charges. He could get a few additional years if convicted of "murder through failure to act" for the death of an infant whom he admits incinerating. But since he is 73 years old, the difference in his sentence is probably moot except on a symbolic level.

Trauma psychology

Perhaps most interesting, and most unsettling, is the psychological effects of their ordeal on Fritzl's victims. These include Elizabeth, the daughter imprisoned for a quarter of a century, the children, and even Fritzl's wife Rosemarie, who claims to have had no inkling of her husband's deeds.

Elisabeth was initially kept tethered on a cable that allowed only limited movement. For about nine years, she and her older two children, 19-year-old Kerstin and 18-year-old Stefan, were kept in a tiny room together, meaning the children would have witnessed their grandfather’s sexual abuse of their mother.

Nineteen-year-old Kerstin remains quite physically ill, so we do not know much about her mental state. Stefan, however, shows signs of severely impoverished physical and psychological development, including trouble talking and moving around in the open after spending his entire life in a small, windowless basement. Younger son Felix, 5, probably has the best chance of recovery. The children reportedly communicate through a combination of speech and animal sounds, including growling and cooing, and become exhausted with the effort of trying to make themselves intelligible to outsiders.

As child psychologist Bruce Perry explains in his new book, The Boy Who Was Raised as a Dog, trauma and neglect at any age can cause gaps in neurological development that are difficult to reverse. Dr. Perry’s treatment is "neurosequential," meaning he sequentially targets brain regions left undeveloped by trauma. When children's brains are affected in infancy, for example, therapy may start with healing touch or rhythm before moving on to higher brain functions.

Elizabeth's psychological state is difficult to even fathom. Her father reportedly began raping her when she was 11 and continued to do so for a number of years. She bore seven of his children, one of whom died and three of whom were taken away from her to live upstairs. Imprisoned in the tiny cellar from the age of 18, she reportedly looks far older than 42.

"Why didn’t she try to escape?" some people have asked. We, of course, don't know that she did not try. But if she didn't, based on the limited available facts it seems reasonable to guess that it was due to a combination of fear, learned helplessness, and Fritzl’s diabolical control and terrorization. The initial door to the prison cell was a half-ton of reinforced concrete on steel rails. Fritzl apparently convinced Elisabeth and the children that the concrete door was wired to explode, and that poisonous gas canisters would explode if they tried to escape.

One can only hope that with high-quality treatment and support the family will have some chance of recovery. And that can only begin to happen after the legal case is resolved.

The Scotsman of May 9 has details of Fritzl's in-depth interview on his motives. Wikipedia has additional information and links to background sources.

April 14, 2008

Statements during insanity evaluation: Admissible?

Can the state introduce at trial incriminating statements made by a defendant during a court-ordered insanity evaluation?

That is one of several intriguing evidentiary issues in the case of Naveed Haq, whose trial gets underway today in a Seattle courtroom.

Haq has pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) to multiple charges stemming from a shooting rampage last year at the Jewish Federation of Greater Seattle that left one woman dead and five other people wounded.

Defense attorneys argue that any self-incriminating statements made by Haq to psychologists and psychiatrists should be excluded from evidence, because the evaluations were court-ordered and Haq could not invoke his Fifth Amendment right to silence.

Senior Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Don Raz retorted that "to slice and dice" what information his expert witness can rely on goes against "proper methodology" and is "an affront to good forensic psychology."

This is a thorny issue and one worthy of contemplation by forensic psychologists and psychiatrists. The reigning text in our field, Gary Melton and colleagues' Psychological Evaluations for the Courts, suggests that experts should be "circumspect" in relying upon statements of defendants, especially defendants' statements to police, and should initially refuse to even consider third-party information that is known to be inadmissible so as not to contaminate our opinions. Parsing out specific statements made during a clinical evaluation is probably trickier, but certainly not impossible.

Judge Paris Kallas deferred ruling on the matter pending further contemplation. It will be interesting to see how she decides to balance Haq's rights against self-incrimination with the state’s right to challenge the insanity defense.

Haq's lengthy history of bipolar disorder is not disputed; indeed, it was a basis of the prosecution's decision to drop the death penalty. What is at issue is the severity of his illness, and whether his mental state at the time of the crime met Washington's legal standard for insanity, the M'Naghten test, which requires that a defendant be unable to tell the difference between right and wrong. (For more detail on the standard in Washington, see the 2003 appellate opinion in Washington v. Applin.)

Defense lawyers say Haq was delusional at the time of the murders. The prosecution contends that his careful planning belies psychosis. Insanity verdicts are notoriously difficult to obtain, in part because many people driven by persecutory delusions appear superficially rational and are capable of carrying out complex plans in furtherance of their delusionally based goals.

The judge denied a motion by defense attorneys to place the burden on the prosecution to prove that Haq was sane at the time of the rampage. Although the judge observed that Washington's higher courts had "not squarely resolved" this issue, prosecutors argued that a century of state law established that the burden was on the defense to prove insanity. (States handle this issue differently, with about one-third of states putting the burden on the prosecution to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.)

In another evidentiary issue, the judge ruled last week that Haq's videotaped statement to police could not be introduced at his trial, because police ignored not just one but at least six requests for an attorney.

The Seattle Times has ongoing coverage; Wikipedia has additional background on the case.

March 27, 2008

Two major competency cases in court

Self-representation and execution at issue
  • Should a higher level of competency be required for being one's own lawyer than for standing trial with a real lawyer?
  • How competent must someone be in order for the state to kill him?
Those two issues were in court yesterday in separate but somewhat related cases, one before the U.S. Supreme Court and the other in a widely awaited Texas appellate court ruling.

Competency to represent oneself

Although it was eclipsed by the OJ trial happening at the same time in Los Angeles, some readers may recall the farcical spectacle of Colin Ferguson's trial. Ferguson was the delusional man who opened fire on the Long Island Railroad, killing six people and wounding 19 more. After firing his prominent attorneys, he represented himself and presented a bizarre, delusionally based defense. He was found guilty, naturally, and received six consecutive life terms.

The Ferguson spectacle was enabled by the high court's 1993 opinion in Godinez v. Moran. Tom Moran was a severely depressed, suicidal defendant who waived the right to an attorney in a double murder case, pled guilty without presenting any evidence, and was promptly sentenced to die. The Supreme Court held that the same low standard of competency exists for all criminal proceedings.

Proponents of allowing mentally ill defendants to represent themselves despite questionable understanding and judgment cite the Sixth Amendment's right to self-representation. Legal scholar Michael Perlin, who just published an excellent book on competency, calls this argument a "pretextual" rationalization.

The competing positions were at the forefront of oral arguments before the U.S. Supreme Court yesterday in the case of Indiana v. Edwards. The case involves Ahmad Edwards, a schizophrenic man whom a trial judge ruled was competent to stand trial for a robbery-shooting but incompetent to represent himself.

The state of Indiana argued before the high court yesterday that allowing states to set their own, higher standards for self-representation ensures both fairness for accused individuals and the dignity of the courts.

Edwards' attorney countered that "the expressed premise of the Sixth Amendment and of our adversarial system generally is that the defense belongs to the accused and not to the state."

The high court justices were divided along predictable lines. Justice Stephen Breyer and Anthony Kennedy seemed concerned about people ending up in prison because they were too disturbed to represent their best interests at trial. But Justice Antonin Scalia said that's just too bad for them – if a defendant makes a poor choice, it is "his own fault."

A ruling is expected within the next few months.

Competency to be executed

The legal standard is much lower for competency to be executed. If you've got a basic understanding that you committed a crime and the state is going to kill you for it, you're good to go (to the Pearly Gates, that is).

That's the "Ford standard" set in the 1986 case of Ford vs. Wainwright, in which the Supreme Court ruled that executing a person who is severely mentally ill constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.

Last year, the highly polarized Supreme Court declined to clarify the somewhat vague Ford standard, issuing a 5-4 opinion on narrow procedural grounds in the closely watched Panetti v. Quarterman case (see my previous blog posts here and here; the opinion is here).

Yesterday, a Texas court responded by affirming convicted killer Scott Panetti's competence to die. Indeed, said the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, "if any mentally ill person is competent to be executed for his crimes, this record establishes it is Scott Panetti."

Panetti, who killed his estranged wife's parents, was found competent to stand trial after two jury trials on that issue. Unlike Ahmad Ewards, he was allowed to represent himself at his 1995 murder trial despite being floridly psychotic and delusional - and he's been regretting it ever since. During his trial, he rambled insanely and tried to subpoena Jesus Christ, John F. Kennedy, and other dead people.

"The record of Panetti's competency hearings and trial is not pretty," the appellate court conceded. "For better or worse, however, the issues of Panetti's competence to stand trial and his insanity defense have been tried, appealed, reviewed in state and federal habeas proceedings, and conclusively put to rest. Panetti is not permitted to relitigate these arguments in his proceedings under Ford."

The court’s 62-page opinion is interesting reading. It reviews the facts of the case, the exhaustive history of appeals, and the expert witness testimony of numerous well-regarded forensic experts called by both sides. The case even involved expert testimony by a forensic psychiatrist and neurologist, Dr. Priscilla Ray, on the science behind competency opinions, that is, "the extent to which psychiatric science can assist the Court in assessing competence to be executed, particularly with regard to the concept of rational understanding."

In discussing Panetti's "rational understanding" of his situation, the court also contemplated evidence suggesting that Panetti was exaggerating his schizophrenic disorder to avoid the needle. Yesterday's opinion cited the results of widely used tests of malingering, including the Structured Inventory of Reported Symptoms (SIRS) and Green's Word Memory Test (WMT).

At the end of the day, after reviewing all of the evidence, the Court held:

"Panetti is seriously mentally ill…. While the extent to which Panetti has been manipulating or exaggerating his symptoms is unclear, it is not seriously disputable that Panetti suffers from paranoid delusions of some type… However, it is equally apparent … that [his] delusions do not prevent him from having both a factual and rational understanding that he committed [the] murders, was tried and convicted, and is sentenced to die for them…. Panetti was mentally ill when he committed his crime and continues to be mentally ill today. However, he has both a factual and rational understanding of his crime, his impending death, and the causal retributive connection between the two."
The ruling can be found HERE. National Public Radio has coverage and commentary here. A 28-minute video, "Executing the Insane: The Case of Scott Panetti," is available here. An essay by Yale scholar Steven Erickson entitled "Minding Moral Responsibility," which discusses the Panetti case, is available here. The Indianapolis Star has more coverage of Indiana v. Edwards.

Hat tip: Steven Erickson

March 15, 2008

Insanity: Murder, Madness, and the Law

From the internationally known forensic psychologist/attorney who co-authored the excellent case-study book "Minds on Trial" comes a scintillating new case-study book, described by one reviewer as "a mesmerizing compilation of the most notorious cases in which mental illness has been claimed to trump personal responsibility."

Here's the front flap of Charles Patrick Ewing's Insanity: Murder, Madness, and the Law:

The insanity defense is one of the oldest fixtures of the Anglo-American legal tradition. Though it is available to people charged with virtually any crime, and is often employed without controversy, homicide defendants who raise the insanity defense are often viewed by the public and even the legal system as trying to get away with murder. Often it seems that the legal result of an insanity defense is unpredictable, and is determined not by the defendant’s mental state, but by their lawyer’s and psychologist’s influence.

From the thousands of murder cases in which defendants have claimed insanity, Dr. Ewing has chosen ten of the most influential and widely varied. Some were successful in their insanity plea, while others were rejected. Some of the defendants remain household names years after the fact, like Jack Ruby, while others were never nationally publicized. Regardless of the circumstances, each case considered here was extremely controversial, hotly contested, and relied heavily on lengthy testimony by expert psychologists and psychiatrists. Several of them played a major role in shaping the criminal justice system as we know it today.

In this book, Ewing skillfully conveys the psychological and legal drama of each case, while providing important and fresh professional insights. For the legal or psychological professional, as well as the interested reader, Insanity will take you into the minds of some of the most incomprehensible murderers of our age.

The cases:

  • Jacob Rubenstein (aka Jack Ruby) of JFK fame
  • David “Son of Sam”Berkowitz
  • Andrea Yates, the Texas mom who drowned her five kids in the bathtub
  • Scott Panetti, the Texan whose competency-to-be-executed case I've blogged about (here and here)
  • John Wayne Gacy, serial killer of 30 or more boys and young men
  • Andrew Goldstein, who shoved a stranger in front of a New York City subway
  • Robert Torsney, a New York City police officer who shot and killed an unarmed teenager
  • Eric Michael Clark, a teenager who shot and killed a police officer during a traffic stop
  • Arthur Shawcross, who raped and strangled at least 11 women in upstate New York
  • Eric Smith, a 13-year-old who fatally beat a 4-year-old boy
In the mood for a little light bedtime reading?

February 20, 2008

"I've always been crazy . . .

. . . but it's kept me from going insane"

Those Waylon Jennings lyrics echoed in my head upon seeing today's article in the New York Times differentiating craziness from legal insanity.

The article, "Actions Considered Insane Often Don't Meet the Standards of New York's Legal System," highlights the case of David Tarloff, a chronic schizophrenic awaiting trial in the slashing death of a Manhattan therapist. But it is relevant across the board to the insanity defense, which is widely misunderstood by the general public and even many in the mental health professions.

The defense, which varies by jurisdiction but generally requires that the defendant did not know the difference between right and wrong, is rarely employed and is even more rarely successful.

As Ronald Kuby, a criminal defense lawyer, put it in the article, "You can be extremely crazy without being legally insane. You can hear voices, you can operate under intermittent delusions, you can see rabbits in the road that aren't there and still be legally sane."

Another public misconception is that successful use of the insanity defense allows people to "get off" for the crime. In reality, most insanity acquittees are sent to locked state hospitals that look very much like prisons. They often spend more time locked up than if they had been convicted of their crime.

The New York Times article is temporarily available here. A previous blog post of mine on high-profile insanity cases is here. Wikipedia has more information on the insanity defense.

February 8, 2008

Can insane killer inherit mother's estate?

Under most circumstances, killing your mother is a sure-fire way to lose out on the inheritance. But what if you were legally insane at the time of the killing?

That's the issue in a case that may set legal precedent in Washington.

Joshua Hoge, a 37-year-old man with schizophrenia, has been locked up on the forensic unit at Western State Hospital (where I happened to do my forensic postdoctoral fellowship) since being found not guilty by reason of insanity in the stabbing death of his mother and half-brother in 1999. Hoge was experiencing a so-called Capgras delusion at the time, believing identical-looking impostors had replaced his family members.

We're not talking chump change.

After the death of Hoge's mother, her family won $800,000 because two days before the killings a public health clinic had refused to give Hoge his antipsychotic medication. The family wants the money to go to the deceased woman's third son, who is also mentally ill and in need of lifelong care.

In some U.S. states, the question of whether someone found not guilty by reason of insanity can inherit from the estate of his or her victim has been decided by case law. Not so in Washington.

The legal issue here is whether the killings were "willful" and "unlawful," which would preclude Hoge from getting the money under Washington's "Slayer Statute." Hoge's attorney is arguing that the killings were not "unlawful" because Hoge was found not guilty. In a preliminary ruling, an appellate court held that while Hoge's mental illness absolved him of criminal responsibility, the killing was still unlawful. Whether the killing was "willful" remains to be decided.

The case has been remanded to the trial court in King County for a determination of "the degree to which Hoge's delusion prevented him from forming the intent to kill." A court date has not been set.

The opinion in Estate Of Pamela L. Kissinger v. Joshua Hoge is here. The Seattle Times has news coverage.

Hat tip: Andrew Scarpetta

October 17, 2007

Hot off the press: Mental health and criminal justice

The new issue of Criminal Justice, the American Bar Association magazine (Vol. 22 No. 3), features a roundup of cutting-edge topics at the intersection of psychology-law. The articles are written by notables in their fields and, best of all, they are available online and for free:

Mental Health and Criminal Justice: An Overview

By Andrew E. Taslitz

The Supreme Court's Recent Criminal Mental Health Cases Rulings of Questionable Competence

By Christopher Slobogin

For decades the subject of mental illness and criminal law languished in the legal "backwaters" at the U.S. Supreme Court. That changed in 2003 when the Court accepted the case of Sell v. United States (a defendant's right to refuse medication), followed quickly by two more seminal decisions in Clark v. Arizona (2006) (the scope of psychiatric defenses) and Panetti v. Quarterman (2007) (the definition of competency to be executed). But has this sudden interest in mental illness issues resulted in good law? The author argues to the contrary and details where and how the Court has erred.

Prosecutor as "Nurse Ratched"?: Misusing Criminal Justice as Alternative Medicine

By Gerald E. Nora

Traditionally, prosecutors approach claims of mental impairment by criminal defendants with skepticism, contesting competency defenses and sentencing mitigation. More recently, though, they find themselves as "diversionary gatekeepers" - seeking alternatives to trials and prison for those who more aptly belong in the medical arena. The author, a Cook County ( Illinois) state's attorney, finds neither role satisfactory and argues for reforms that will limit a prosecutor's responsibility for addressing a defendant's mental health needs through the justice system.

The Promise of Mental Health Courts: Brooklyn Criminal Justice System Experiments with Treatment as an Alternative to Prison

By Matthew J. D'Emic

Judge D'Emic tracks the establishment of one of the country's first courts to use diversionary treatment in dealing with mentally ill criminal defendants. He maps the defendant's journey from intake through assessment and treatment to "graduation" from the program.

Executing the Mentally Ill: When Is Someone Sane Enough to Die?


By Michael Mello

An opponent of the death penalty, Prof. Mello presents this personal account of advocating for mentally ill death row inmates. While detailing his clients' descent into madness and the tortured disconnect between the fantasy world of the insane and a justice system bent on accountability, the author looks at the impact of three high-profile cases.

Mental Health Status and Vulnerability to Police Interrogation Tactics

By William C. Follette, Deborah Davis, and Richard A. Leo

The authors offers a psychological explanation of how police interrogation methods affect the "average" person's ability to understand and exert his or her Miranda rights and what makes the mentally ill so much more susceptible to police coercion and likely to falsely confess.

August 29, 2007

Astronaut to claim insanity

Last year saw two high-profile insanity cases - Lee Boyd Malvo and Andrea Yates. Next up, it looks like we will be seeing an insanity trial for Lisa Nowak.

Remember the case? Nowak is the astronaut who assaulted a romantic rival back in February. She armed herself with pepper spray, a steel mallet, a knife, and a BB gun, then drove 1,000 miles - wearing diapers so she would not have to stop for bathroom breaks - to confront the girlfriend of a former space shuttle pilot she had dated.

In court papers released yesterday, Nowak's attorney gave notice that he intends to use the insanity defense. He plans to call two Texas psychiatrists, including Dr. Richard Pesikoff, who testified in Andrea Yates' successful insanity defense in the drowning of her five children.

The experts are anticipated to testify that Nowak was suffering from major depression, obsessive-compulsive disorder, severe insomnia, and "brief psychotic disorder with marked stressors" at the time of the offense. One news report said Nowak was also diagnosed with Asperger's Disorder, a condition with autistic-like symptoms that causes problems with social skills and can lead to eccentric behavior.

"Even the most naive observer should recognize that Lisa Nowak's behavior on February 5 [2007] was uncharacteristic and unpredicted for such an accomplished person with no criminal record or history of violence," her attorney said in a separate public statement.

A Navy captain and pilot who was fired as an astronaut after her arrest, Nowak is charged with attempted kidnapping, battery and burglary with assault. She is out of custody pending trial, wearing an electronic monitoring bracelet.

Under Florida law, the burden is on the defense to prove insanity by clear and convincing evidence. To prove insanity, the defense must show that the defendant had a mental disorder that either (1) made her unaware of what she was doing or its consequences or, (2) caused her not to realize that the behavior was wrong.

Unfortunately, high-profile insanity cases like this one skew public perceptions of the insanity defense.

In reality, the insanity defense is rarely used. Once it is invoked, proving that someone did not know the difference between right and wrong is extremely difficult. One eight-state study found that the defense was used in less than 1% of cases, and was successful only about one-fourth of the time. In 90% of the successful cases, the offender had been psychiatrically diagnosed prior to the crime. To public knowledge, Nowak was not previously diagnosed with a severe mental disorder.

Another public misconception is that successful use of the insanity defense allows people to "get off" for the crime. In reality, most insanity acquittees are sent to locked state hospitals that look very much like prisons. They often spend more time locked up than if they had been convicted of their crime.

More information on the insanity defense is available at Wikipedia. A forensic psychologist colleague of mine, Paul Mattiuzzi, has an interesting take on Nowak's case on his blog.